Tourism, Security and Safety From Theory to Practice

Long-Run Implications
Evidence is mounting that the narcoeconomy will continue to grow and pose
increasing threats to tourism and offshore finance. In the first case, Caribbean his-
tory has largely been the creation of global capitalism. In the same way the narco
trade has been accelerated by the worldwide forces of globalization unleashed by
the fall of Communism and nourished by the region’s economic uncertainty, with-
ering exports, and limited enforcement capability. The crime syndicates that con-
trol drug activity represent an almost intractable mega-multinational threat to local
authorities because of their criminal sophistication, adaptability, financial power,
and increasing political influence.
Second, the effectiveness of US-led counternarcotics activities in the region,
which have not materially reduced drug availability over the past decade, has been
hampered by fluctuating funding levels, conflicting objectives, and lack of opera-
tional coordination (US GAO, 1997). Specifically, it has been significantly blunted
by the recent closure of Howard Air Force Base, the center of US anti-drug oper-
ations, as part of the Panama Canal Treaty, and will suffer further weakening with
the proposed closure of the Roosevelt Roads Naval Base in Puerto Rico. Moreover,
very recently the United States has diverted significant Coast Guard resources
from drug interdiction efforts and patrolling Caribbean waters to shore up the
Mexican border and bolster homeland security (UNODC, 2003, p. 22). As a result,
today the United States has likely less than a third of the personnel and equipment
it employed before 1990 (Abel, 1999). There has been a similar scaling back of
European anti-narcotics efforts in the region (Sanders, 2003). The Caribbean has
witnessed a concomitant rise in trafficking.
A third complication is coordination friction. Local autonomy is threat-
ened by the perceived aggressive hegemony of the United States unilaterally
implementing anti-drug countermeasures “in her backyard.” These include send-
ing in Marines to destroy marijuana plants at remote island outposts, as well as
the recent Ship Rider Agreement that allows US incursions into Caribbean ter-
ritory and waters “in hot pursuit” of traffickers (de Albuquerque, 1997). The
sacrifices of local sovereignty caused by these US pressures to stanch narcotics
trade have been difficult to swallow for Caribbean leaders who perceive the
underlying problem to be primarily North American addiction. Moreover, the
climate of cooperation has obviously been weakened since the 1990s by declin-
ing US aid to the region and by the deportation of known drug felons from over-
crowded US prisons. For all these reasons, it is plausible to assume the
narcoeconomy will continue to grow in a business-as-usual climate, without any
sharp drop in North American drug consumption and/or dramatic success in
enforcement and interdiction.
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In the second case, the narcoeconomy with its violence, addiction, and corrup-
tion will undoubtedly pose the greatest threat to the sustainability of tourism. The
paramount prerequisites of visitors spending their hard-earned income on holiday
are safety and freedom from fear of victimization. Given the importance of visitor
security as a condition for industry success, it is no wonder that crime, along with
its drug-trafficking undercurrents, is considered the “most systemic internal threat
to Caribbean tourism” (McElroy, 2004, p. 53).
This conclusion is evident from a variety of sources. First, even the perception
of danger or irritation can tarnish a destination’s reputation. In a survey of major
US tour operators, King (2003) found the two most important factors deflecting
visitors away from the Caribbean were fear of crime and harassment. Second, there
is some reality to these fears since research has consistently shown that (1) visitors
are more likely than residents to be victims of crime (larceny, theft, robbery), and
(2) visitors are disproportionately targeted in “hot-spot” locations they are most
likely to frequent (Harper, 2001). Third, there are numerous anecdotes document-
ing the links between major and widely publicized crimes and negative visitor fall-
out. One of the most notorious was the so-called Fountain Valley Massacre in 1972
in St. Croix, USVI. Eight tourists were gunned down by local thugs during a rob-
bery. It took the island over 10 years to fully recover (de Albuquerque and
McElroy, 1999a).
Fourth, academic research both on cross-national patterns and case studies cov-
ering long-term trends underline the negative impact of crime on visitor flows.
In a multi-island study, Levantis and Gani (2000) found a 1% increase in crime
rates was associated with a half percent decline in visitation in the Caribbean. In a
longitudinal study of Jamaica, Alleyne and Boxill (2003) found a weak negative
link between crime and US arrivals but a stronger relationship with Europeans,
who tend to stay longer and spend more. The authors further argued that some of
the negative fallout on tourism from the rising crime wave was likely offset by
heavy promotional advertising as well as substantial hotel/airline discount pack-
ages, which are not sustainable practices in the long run.
Fifth, in a host of other less obvious ways, the narcoeconomy is impacting
tourism throughout the region. It is no mystery that visitor harassment is more
widespread in the Caribbean than in any other region across the globe, and that
drug peddling is a major aspect of the problem (McElroy, 2003). Such behavior is
fueled partly by local drug pushers seeking sales as well as by addicts needing
income to satisfy their own habit. In destinations like Jamaica and St. Croix, USVI,
harassment and theft against cruise passengers have become so dangerous that
cruise lines have dropped such stops from their itinerary, costing the islands mil-
lions in lost revenue. Even attempts to control such problems may be somewhat
unnerving for unsuspecting visitors. The presence of uniformed police patrolling
beaches, docks, and resort properties and guard dogs sniffing for narcotics at air
and seaports may seem incongruous with a typical vacationers’ paradise image,
and may negatively affect their word-of-mouth recommendations and preference
for a return visit.
Sixth, the high cost of security, surveillance, and insurance in the private sector
adds to the already relatively steep price of a Caribbean vacation, especially in the
context of expanding global travel markets and intensifying competition from Asia
and Pacific destinations. In the public sector, substantial resources devoted to res-
ident and visitor protection are diverted from more productive developmental uses:
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refurbishing the infrastructure, devising new attractions, human resource training,
and tourism promotion. Harriott (2002, p. 5) estimates the overall cost of violent
crime in Jamaica to be 6% of GDP per capita on an annual basis.
Seventh, a number of writers have argued that rising crime is particularly prob-
lematic for tourism since the industry is ultimately based on personal interaction
and a welcoming experience (Dunn and Dunn, 2002). According to Harriott (2000,
p. xv), a crimogenic environment breeds “insecurity among all segments of the
population [including investors and developers] . . . declining public confidence in
the criminal justice system, and growing cynicism among its functionaries,” that
is, a poor climate for business profitability and risk-taking. Sanders (2003, p. 384)
cites anecdotal evidence that in the wake of a recent rash of kidnappings in
Trinidad and Guyana “investment and tourism have been badly affected, and even
social life curtailed.” Sustained criminality also produces a loss of human capital
through the emigration of middle-class professionals (accountants, bankers, real-
tors, planners, hotel managers, etc.) and entrepreneurs who provide the skill base
for the tourism economy. They have the most to lose in a deteriorating climate and
the wherewithal to succeed elsewhere.
Eighth, the hotel sector’s principal response to shield visitors from potential
harm has been the rapid expansion of all-inclusive resorts with their full comple-
ment of on-site gift shops, restaurants, night clubs, water sports, etc., for the con-
venience of a fixed daily fee. While these popular gated properties protect tourists
and generate high foreign exchange and year-round employment, they have also
“triggered a new wave of resentment” (Pattullo, 1996, p. 74) among taxi drivers,
small shopkeepers, and other vendors who feel shut out. Adding to the charge of
enclavism and low local income circulation, critics argue that all-inclusive resorts
reinforce the worst perceptions of socioeconomic inequality attributed to Third
World tourism, justify harassment among excluded street vendors and hagglers,
and weaken community support for an industry that “heavily depends on the con-
sent of the host population” (Dunn and Dunn, 2002, p. 31). Such a strategy under-
mines sustainability because it fails to address the “daunting task of creating a
more egalitarian tourism in which all social strata share a viable stake and the moti-
vation to sustain it” (McElroy, 2004, p. 53).
Ninth, all-inclusive resorts can also symbolize for unemployed youth that they
lack access to legitimate channels of mobility and are left “condemned . . . to an
economically marginal existence” (Headley, 1996, p. 39). For many of these dis-
enfranchised outsiders, according to Block and Klausner (1987, p. 99), “prostitu-
tion and drug dealing have . . . become ‘the only viable equal opportunity
enterprises’ for the lowest socioeconomic classes.” Another ripple of debilitation,
according to Griffith (2003)—fueled in part by in-kind cocaine payments for traf-
ficking—is the associated sharp rise in the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Although it is
concentrated in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, it is second only to sub-
Saharan Africa in prevalence. In the short run this trend will place increasing pres-
sure on island health budgets, and in the long run it will further deplete the insular
labor pool.
Finally, the volume of drug-related cash crisscrossing the region has become so
large that money laundering threatens to undermine legitimate offshore activity.
Over the past decade, most islands with an offshore sector have either been impli-
cated or placed under serious scrutiny. The three major problems have been
excessive bank secrecy, poor supervision, and inhibiting international criminal
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investigations (Booth and Drummond, 1996). In response the OECD’s Financial
Action Task Force blacklisted a number of jurisdictions with the threat of sanctions
until they agreed to adopt new anti–money laundering legislation created to tighten
supervision and improve information exchange. All but one (Antigua) has com-
plied. In the process, however, the international credibility of offshore banking was
damaged (Bryan, 2000). According to Sanders (2003, p. 381), offshore banking in
one jurisdiction has virtually collapsed and “there has been a significant reduction
in the number of [offshore] businesses, revenue, and employment.”