Tourism, Security and Safety From Theory to Practice

Case Study 2. Bali’s Recovery after the October 2002
Sari Club Bombing
The eastern Indonesian island of Bali is traditionally promoted as a destination
with little reference to the fact that it remains politically an integral part of
Indonesia. In the period of the late 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, the Indonesian nation, which gained independence in 1949 under the slogan
“Unity in Diversity,” has experienced an upsurge of political instability accompa-
nied by outbreaks of ethnic, religious, and nationalist separatist movements. The
most significant campaign resulted in the creation of an independent East Timor in
2002 following a bloody 25-year guerrilla war. However, from Aceh in the northwest
extremity of Sumatra to Irian Jaya in Western New Guinea (Indonesia’s eastern
extremity), separatist movements are now an integral part of Indonesia’s complex
political landscape in a country with a population of 210 million people and
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12,000 islands, the sprawling archipelago dominating the region between the
Malay Peninsula and Australia.
Until October 2002, Bali, especially from a tourism perspective, was a superfi-
cially idyllic anomaly in Indonesia. Bali’s population and culture are predomi-
nantly Hindu, whereas 90% of Indonesia’s people are Muslim. Bali’s distinctive
culture, as the last surviving remnant of India’s former cultural hegemony over the
Indonesian archipelago, is unique in Indonesia. Over the past 20 years Bali has
become a popular “paradise” resort island for tourists from all over the world.
Beautiful scenery, a pervasive spiritualism among the traditional Balinese, excel-
lent surfing beaches, friendly people, and relatively relaxed attitudes to cultural
pluralism are the elements that have resulted in Bali’s popularity as one of the most
visited single tourist and resort destinations in SE Asia. Bali is the most popular
destination for foreign tourists in Indonesia.
Bali’s tourism infrastructure has attracted a vast amount of foreign investment
and contributed to its comprehensive and diverse tourism infrastructure, with
resorts ranging from the ultimate in luxury to the basic. The influx of tourists has
brought a mixture of economic benefits and social and economic problems. Bali’s
economy is heavily dependent on tourism but many Balinese are exploited by the
tourism-based economy. Many of the resorts and hotels are owned by multinational
companies and Australian or Western entrepreneurs. The dark side of Bali’s
tourism success has resulted in the growth of a subculture of corruption, drug deal-
ing, and a high rate of petty crime. The combination of unregulated capitalism and
the daily influx of ten jumbo loads of foreign tourists, some of whom are totally
ignorant and insensitive to traditional Bali’s social mores, has undermined Bali’s
traditional society (interview: King, 2003).
A minority of Western tourists, especially from nearby Australia, treated Bali as
an exotic tropical “pub” and a relatively inexpensive resort island paradise to let
off steam after a football season or to celebrate personal or communal events. The
alcohol- and drug-induced hedonism of this section of the Western market has
caused offense to the traditional local Hindu Balinese. For the growing numbers of
Indonesians who have embraced Islamist fundamentalism, these tourists symbol-
ize Western decadence inimical to their beliefs. Since the mid-1990s, some Islamic
groups in Java have attacked nightclubs and liquor outlets as part of a wider
demand to impose (Islamist) Sharia law in Indonesia. Until 2002, Bali had been
spared this form of violence primarily because most Balinese are non-Islamist and
such acts would harm the lucrative tourism industry.
Inbound tourism to Indonesia statistically peaked in 2001 with a total of
5,163,620 arrivals. The main source markets in 2001 were Singapore, 1.477 mil-
lion tourists; Japan, 611,000; Malaysia, 485,000; Australia, 397,000; Taiwan,
391,000; South Korea, 212,000; United Kingdom, 189,000; United States,
177,000; and Germany, 159,000. Malaysian and Singaporean numbers were heav-
ily inflated by their proximity to Indonesia and the fact that many of these visits
were essentially cross-border short trips. NE Asia and Japan, Europe, Australasia,
and North America were the primary sources of high-yield tourism for Indonesia
and Bali specifically. Bali’s capital, Denpassar, was the port of entry for 27.71% of
foreign visitors to Indonesia and the principal port of entry for inbound tourists
(Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2004).
The October 12, 2002, Bali bombing had a profound impact on Balinese
tourism but it would impact tourism broadly throughout Indonesia and SE Asia.
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On that evening the crowded Sari Club and nearby Paddy’s Bar were destroyed by
powerful truck bombs. The convicted perpetrators, members of Jemaal Islamiya, a
radical Islamic group allegedly linked to Al Qaeda with a substantial presence in
Indonesia, readily admitted responsibility for the attack. The bombing was the
deadliest attack directed against tourists in the world for many years. Of the 200
deaths, 88 were Australian, 24 British, and 10 Indonesian, and the victims included
citizens from 21 other countries (Wilks, 2003).
The impact of the Bali bombing on tourism to the island was instantaneous.
Tourism demand fell and forward booking dried up. The bombing exposed a num-
ber of serious infrastructure problems, the most obvious of which was the lack of
medical and hospital facilities to cope with a disaster on this unprecedented scale.
The lack of mortuary facilities was a factor that contributed to the major difficul-
ties in identifying many of the deceased. The bombing also exposed the serious
security shortcomings of the entire tourism infrastructure in Bali. The Indonesian
government does not make provisions for adequate medical facilities to cope
with the general needs of locals or tourists. The Balinese were unprepared and 
ill-equipped for an act of terrorism so alien to their way of life.
Many of Bali’s major tourism source countries immediately imposed upgraded
travel advisories. Australia, the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan advised
their citizens to defer travel. Garuda Airlines and Qantas facilitated the evacuation from
Bali of many travelers, especially Australians. The Australian government offered med-
ical assistance to the Indonesian government and sent medical and rescue teams, pro-
viding Australian medical facilities and personnel to all victims of the attack.
As discussed in the introduction, the executive members of the PATA were in
Bali on the night of the Sari Club bombing to celebrate the wedding of PATA Vice
President Peter Semone. The PATA executives were to play a significant role in
galvanizing regional travel industry support for Bali’s beleaguered tourism indus-
try. They immediately assisted local tourist authorities in establishing a crisis
communications unit. PATA recruited a team of crisis management experts to
assist the Balinese and Indonesians in planning a recovery strategy for the tourism
industry.
The Indonesian government contracted Australian tourism crisis management
specialist John King, CEO of Tourism and Leisure and the Chairman of Tourism
Tasmania, to assist them in developing a marketing recovery strategy. King’s sig-
nificant involvement in Tourism Tasmania’s highly successful campaign to restore
tourism to Tasmania after the 1996 Port Arthur massacre of tourists eminently
qualified him to assist in Bali catastrophe. Mr. King observed that the Indonesian
government demonstrated minimal commitment to implementing the advice
provided by him, his colleagues, or any other foreign experts.
The private sector of the tourism industry within Bali and regionally was char-
acterized by a strong sense of unity of purpose. Conscious of the need to reassure
tourists, hoteliers, tour operators, and local attractions upgraded security. Tour
operators and airlines combined to introduce a range of incentive-based marketing
campaigns and familiarization tours for media and travel industry leaders from
source markets. PATA maintained its long-term plan to hold its annual conference
in Bali in April 2003. Australian tourism industry organizations, including the
Australian Institute of Travel and Tourism and the Council of Australian Tour
Operators, chose to hold major conferences in Bali as gestures of support for the
Balinese tourism industry. The Balinese regional tourism authority produced a
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highly professional promotional film that illustrated the distinction between nega-
tive perception and the actual experience of travelers in 2003. The film featured
tourists from the main source markets telling viewers how much they were enjoy-
ing their visit and showing there was no cause for concern. The underlying theme
was to communicate a message that tourism to Bali was safe.
Major obstacles to a fully integrated tourism recovery in Bali included the main-
tenance of negative travel advisories, negative media publicity mostly emanating
from international media, and the Indonesian government’s decision to conduct the
trial of the Bali bombers in Bali. According to Australian, British, American, and
Japanese travel industry professionals invited by the Indonesian government to
assist in the recovery, the greatest barrier to implementing a recovery was the inep-
titude and incompetence of the Indonesian government and the Indonesian
Ministry of Tourism. The Indonesian government ignored professional advice and
implemented policies counterproductive to an effective tourism recovery cam-
paign. The Indonesian government compounded its problems from the very begin-
ning of the Bali crisis by its failure to show due concern for the welfare of the
victims and launching into attacks verging on the paranoia against governments
that had issued negative travel advisories after the bombing. Indonesian govern-
ment attacks against the Australian government were especially vituperative.
Considering that Australians accounted for almost half the victims of the Sari Club
attack, the Indonesian response to the advisories demonstrated insensitivity at best,
and at worst a petulant abandonment of diplomacy. The attitude toward Australia,
in particular, was colored by wider strains in bilateral relations including Timor’s
struggle for independence from Indonesia in 1999 and Australia’s prominent mili-
tary and diplomatic involvement as a guarantor of this process.
The Indonesian government was a vocal supporter of reconstituting the ASEAN
tourism marketing organization. During the November 2003 summit of ASEAN
leaders in Phnom Phenh, Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri joined
many of her fellow ASEAN leaders in criticizing Western government negative
travel advisories. The Bali attack had led to the imposition of security-based neg-
ative travel advisories applying to several SE Asian countries. Indonesia was
strongly supported in this forum by all SE Asian leaders, especially Malaysian
Prime Minister Dr. Mohathir Mohammed.
The Indonesian government officially committed US$9 million toward Bali’s
tourism recovery but there was little evidence of spending on any identifiable pro-
gram. Tourism, Security and Finance Ministry officials undertook “fact finding
marketing missions” to source markets; two were conducted in Australia. The
Indonesian delegates involved in the second visit in November 2003 were unaware
of the first one, which had taken place in May 2003. One policy initiative
widely condemned by local and overseas tourism industry stakeholders was the
Indonesian government’s decision to impose a series of visa fees. Whatever the
merits of the policy, the timing of its release several weeks after the Bali bombing
was condemned by private sector stakeholders who viewed it as a major disincen-
tive to tourism recovery.
The decision to try the alleged bombers in Bali was controversial. There were
legitimate legal reasons to conduct the trial at or near the scene of the crime.
However, from a tourism recovery perspective, the trial served as a painful and
protracted reinforcement of the Bali bombing. Understandably, the trial focused far
more global media coverage on Bali than the issue of restoring tourism.
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Private industry marketing campaigns led to a gradual recovery of tourism to
Bali from April 2003. PATA’s conference during that month focused on positive
tourism attention on Bali. Bali also figured in the broad scheme of PATA’s Project
Phoenix. Additionally, a range of cut-price holiday deals was successful in entic-
ing many tourists to return to Bali. The Balinese tourism authorities successfully
cooperated with the private sector of the tourism industry. The anniversary of the
Bali bombing was conducted in a manner intended to end to the formal mourning
period (if not for the survivors and the families of victims) to this terrible event at
least to non-Balinese victims. The Balinese tourism industry took almost a year to
recover. Australian and Japanese markets have been slower to recover than SE
Asia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.