Tourism, Security and Safety From Theory to Practice

The Recovery of the Washington, DC Hospitality Industry
Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, most hospitality leaders anticipated
that 2002 would be a very challenging year for the hospitality industry in
Washington, DC. It would be an election year in a narrowly controlled Congress.
It would be the year before opening a major new convention center. Few signifi-
cant new attractions were expected. Even Washington’s insulated economy was
feeling the pain of economic downturn prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Several declining demand factors seemed inevitable and a moderate increase in
supply foreshadowed a disappointing year. Despite these conditions, Washington,
DC has seen year after year occupancy increases in 16 out of the first 28 weeks of
2002 vs an average of only 3 weeks of increased occupancy nationally. More
importantly, Table 3 shows that occupancies and REVPARS were close to stabiliz-
ing at prior year levels by spring 2002. Washington, DC rebounded better and
faster than most other US markets. Many factors contributed to marketplace
performance—overall marketing and sales effort of the destination, marketing
budgets, changes in specific demand generators, changes in supply, adverse indus-
try or company circumstances, and much more. The simple fact remains that every
hospitality market had to decide how to respond to the impact of the September 11
terrorist attacks. As Table 3 further illustrates, all three lodging performance indi-
cators, occupancy, average daily rate, and REVPAR, reached almost to their 
pre-September 11 levels by the end of 2003.
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Table 3
Hotel Revenue Performance in DC and the DC Metro Area, 2000–2003
DC Occupancy Rate, 2000–2003
2000
2001
% Change
2002
% Change
2003
% Change
January
51.0%
57.0%
11.9%
51.8%
−
9.2%
54.3%
4.9%
February
65.6%
68.6%
4.6%
67.5%
−
1.6%
64.6%
−
4.3%
March
81.1%
82.8%
2.0%
76.9%
−
7.1%
74.1%
−
3.6%
April
84.8%
81.2%
−
4.3%
86.7%
6.9%
73.9%
−
14.8%
May
82.9%
78.7%
−
5.1%
78.4%
−
0.4%
76.1%
−
2.9%
June
81.7%
80.0%
−
2.2%
77.4%
−
3.2%
79.5%
2.6%
July
76.6%
74.1%
−
3.3%
71.2%
−
3.9%
77.1%
8.3%
August
71.5%
66.6%
−
6.8%
64.3%
−
3.4%
63.9%
−
0.7%
September
79.4%
45.8%
−
42.3%
69.6%
52.1%
73.2%
5.1%
October
81.1%
59.3%
−
26.9%
75.4%
27.2%
79.2%
5.1%
November
67.3%
56.5%
−
15.9%
58.8%
3.9%
63.2%
7.5%
December
50.1%
46.1%
−
8.1%
46.1%
0.0%
48.4%
5.0%
DC Average Daily Rate, 2000–2003
2000
2001
% Change
2002
% Change
2003
% Change
January
134.21
177.32
32.1%
130.85
−
26.2%
132.39
1.2%
February
143.01
156.17
9.2%
143.05
−
8.4%
145.59
1.8%
March
153.64
167.81
9.2%
153.86
−
8.3%
162.70
5.7%
April
162.42
168.91
4.0%
170.10
0.7%
155.56
−
8.5%
May
161.12
164.88
2.3%
164.57
−
0.2%
162.84
−
1.0%
June
150.03
155.10
3.4%
149.12
−
3.9%
151.77
1.8%
July
131.63
132.14
0.4%
128.35
−
2.9%
131.13
2.2%
August
128.99
124.48
−
3.5%
121.00
−
2.8%
118.84
−
1.8%
September
159.72
149.25
−
6.6%
164.85
10.4%
158.00
−
4.2%
October
168.03
149.95
−
10.8%
165.12
10.1%
159.06
−
3.7%
November
153.78
140.34
−
8.7%
141.45
0.8%
143.49
1.4%
December
137.87
125.49
−
9.0%
128.70
2.6%
131.62
2.3%
DC REVPAR, 2000–2003
2000
2001
% Change
2002
% Change
2003
% Change
January
68.40
101.09
47.8%
67.76
−
33.0%
71.93
6.2%
February
93.76
107.06
14.2%
96.51
−
9.9%
94.02
−
2.6%
March
124.62
138.89
11.5%
118.28
−
14.8%
120.58
1.9%
April
137.70
137.09
−
0.4%
147.54
7.6%
115.01
−
22.0%
May
133.65
129.82
−
2.9%
129.04
−
0.6%
123.95
−
3.9%
June
122.63
124.01
1.1%
115.45
−
6.9%
120.59
4.5%
July
100.90
97.92
−
2.9%
91.40
−
6.7%
101.12
10.6%
August
92.17
82.92
−
10.0%
77.85
−
6.1%
75.91
−
2.5%
September
126.77
68.31
−
46.1%
114.77
68.0%
115.66
0.8%
October
136.20
88.91
−
34.7%
124.53
41.0%
126.04
1.2%
November
103.42
79.35
−
23.3%
83.12
4.8%
90.68
9.1%
December
69.11
57.81
−
16.4%
59.27
2.5%
63.64
7.4%
Source:
Compiled from monthly STAR Summary Reports, 
Smith Travel Research,
2000–2004.
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Conclusion
Terrorism has always been a threat to the normal operations of tourism business
worldwide. Such low-probability but high-impact attacks by terrorist groups can
disrupt hospitality operations and cause heavy financial losses in a particular desti-
nation area. Subsequent media coverage of the terrorist attack tends to scare poten-
tial visitors from visiting the destination since they perceive the destination as
unsafe or in continued turmoil. Managing a crisis caused by terrorist attacks
requires thoughtful coordination of all stakeholders with interests in the hospitality
industry and also requires well-developed crisis-management and recovery plans.
The September 11 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the ensuing bioterror-
ism events had an immediate and devastating impact on the hotel industry in the
Washington, DC metropolitan area. Room sales decreased drastically due to the
closure of Reagan National Airport and major tourist attractions, the series of
anthrax scares and cleanup publicity, and tourists’ perception of Washington, DC
and its primary tourist assets as prime targets for terrorists. A malevolence crisis
of such magnitude tested the local hotel industry’s ability to manage the crisis and
recover from the unexpected attack.
In light of the unprecedented nature of this event, the hotel industry in the
Washington, DC metropolitan area worked closely with local tourism and conven-
tion authorities, related industries, and government officials to reopen tourist facil-
ities and attractions and to stimulate travel activities. The four clearly defined
objectives were quickly leveraged to stabilize the deteriorating business environ-
ment and to bring the business community back to normalcy. The coordinated
industry response provided a single and reliable information source about the
industry status to the valued repeat and potential customers, to the government, to
the media, and to the local community. Therefore, any misinformation caused by
internal communication mishaps or poorly coordinated communications among
different partner groups could be minimized. The push for the reopening of
Reagan National Airport and the promotion of government related travel business
helped local hotels survive through the most difficult time in their business oper-
ations. The marketing campaign sent a reassuring and revitalizing message to the
local, regional, national, and international travel markets that Washington, DC was
open for business and more than ever a place that Americans and those who love
America simply must visit. Perhaps Reagan National Airport and major attractions
would have reopened promptly without the concerted, coordinated, and collective
commitment and campaigning of Washington, DC’s hospitality industry leaders.
Perhaps government business in Washington, DC would have materialized regard-
less of the efforts of these leaders. Perhaps tourists would have been inspired to
return to DC in massive numbers even if a large and expensive supplemental mar-
keting effort had not been funded and executed or had been poorly conceived or
executed. After all, few places in the world are as spectacular as Washington, DC
when the cherry blossoms burst forth in early April. However, it is hard to imag-
ine a better barometer of the success of the Washington, DC hospitality industry
crisis response and recovery efforts than examining a period of time when business
normally is running on all cylinders and observing it as fully recovered during this
time frame. In fact, as Table 3 shows, those hotels closest to the charred rubble of
the Pentagon, closest to the exposure to anthrax spores, and closest to the sweet
scent of the cherry blossoms enjoyed a banner month in April 2002.
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What can hospitality industry and tourism destination managers learn from the
Washington, DC hospitality industry response and recovery efforts following the
September 11 terrorist attacks? While many of the circumstances and factors
described in this chapter are unique to the Washington, DC region, some generic
lessons and even a rudimentary model for addressing future hospitality and
tourism industry related malevolence crises emerge. The model for managing
malevolence crises suggested by the DC hospitality industry September 11 terror-
ism experience is provided in Figure 1. Because malevolence attacks are sudden,
uncertain, and characterized by time compression and the human, financial, and
public image impact is calamitous, businesses should immediately access their cri-
sis plans. These plans should be built on a solid knowledge of crisis management
skills and refined through workplace practice.
When a malevolence crisis actually occurs, two response steps are vital.
Management must first assess conditions internally with guests, staff, and property.
This process of assessment also involves reassuring guests and staff, determining
additional dangers, mobilizing emergency preparedness, protecting the safety of
people and property, and establishing information outposts. When internal condi-
tions have been established, these should be quickly coordinated externally with the
local community through preestablished, efficient channels. In the case of the
Washington, DC hospitality industry, the conduit to emergency personnel and
between hotels was the office of the President of the Hotel Association of
Washington, DC, Reba Pittman Walker; and the conduit to local and federal gov-
ernment, regional tourism organizations, and the media was the office of the CEO
of the Washington Convention and Tourism Corporation, Bill Hanbury. Different
arrangements may work better in different communities. However, a coordinated,
orderly response in the early stages of a crisis will minimize disruption of emer-
gency officials’ primary focus of rendering assistance. Centralized response will
also reduce misinformation. Naturally, internal crisis response must be coordinated
with management company, owner, and brand representatives as well.
When the emergency conditions have subsided, management must transition
quickly to the process of recovery. There are four steps that appear to be critical to
ensuring a quick recovery. Elements of the first three steps may be intermingled and
may occur concurrently. First, all regional tourism stakeholders must coordinate their
activities. Forums for sharing information and ideas regionally must be rapidly estab-
lished if they are not already in place. Regional assessments of the impact of the cri-
sis on the area tourism infrastructure and assessments of how to communicate with
the media, the local community, and customers should be conducted. At the same
time, individual hotel managers should have a voice in this process and information
and decisions should be broadly and quickly shared with hotel managers. Fortunately,
e-mail communication facilitates such a process today. Second, the local community
must be engaged. This effort should include assisting with aid to victims and relief
workers, accessing local, state, and federal government agencies for business and
worker assistance, steering local media toward positive stories about the industry and
its contributions to alleviating the crisis, and encouraging local/regional visitation.
Third, clients must be reassured. Hotel general managers should contact as many
group and regular clients as possible in their respective hotels. At the destination
level, political leaders and industry leaders should contact and reassure convention
groups and major demand-generating organizations. Internet sites should be coor-
dinated and updated with timely information. Press events should be staged and
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Terrorist act/catastrophe
CRISIS
Suddenness Uncertainty
Time compression 
Restore internal order
Calm guests and ensure their safety
Ensure safety, reassure staff, 
and mobilize life safety equipment 
Assess damage and dangers
Establish information posts
CRISIS TRAINING
CRISIS PLANNING
CRISIS PRACTICE
PREPARE, 
PREPARE, 
PREPARE,
Internally/
externally
External emergency
response
Police, fire department,
emergency agencies
Hotel community Media
Brand, management
company, owner rep
Coordinate
internal
assessment
with…
When emergency
has passed and
order is restored 
Coordinate activities of all tourism
stakeholders
Hotels, restaurants, convention
center, attractions, airports, ground
transportation, local businesses and
organizations and government agencies
impacted by tourism or travel
Ensure the product can be used and
is as easy to use as possible
External reassurance to local
community 
Identify needs
Aid to victims
Employee assistance
Attend to local media
Involve all stakeholders and
government regionally 
External reassurance to clients; restore
faith that hotels and community are
open for business
Identify needs
Calls to clients
Media/press conferences and events
Internet sites
Understand and accommodate new
business related to the crisis
Market product
Tap or raise emergency funds
Develop a recovery marketing plan
Stay positive—no defeatist messages
Encourage local/regional visitation 
Who’s traveling and who isn’t 
traveling?
Re-engage target markets in all the
great stuff to see and do that was there 
before and still is
Create some new reasons to visit the 
destination
As customer anxiety subsides return
to core marketing plan or reevaluate
recovery marketing spending/message
Honor the brave and respect the lost
Not until
customers are 
ready to
return. Too
soon and the
money is
wasted