fields within a single page of an application. In the previous example, suppose
that the
page_id
and
mode
parameters are subject to a maximum length of 12
characters. Because these fields are so short, the application’s developers did
not bother to implement any XSS filters. The
seed
parameter, on the other
hand, is unrestricted in length, and so rigorous filters were implemented to
prevent the injection of the characters
“ <
or
>
. In this scenario, despite the
developers’ efforts, it is still possible to insert an arbitrarily long script into the
seed
parameter without employing any of the blocked characters, because the
JavaScript context can be created by data injected into the surrounding fields.
A third technique for beating length limits, which can be highly effective in
some situations, is to “convert” a reflected XSS flaw into a DOM-based vul-
nerability. For example, in the original reflected XSS vulnerability, if the appli-
cation places a length restriction on the
message
parameter that is copied into
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