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Notes
Preface: Frontiers
1.
Jeremy Black,
Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 85.
2.
James C. Scott,
The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist
History of Upland Southeast Asia
(New Haven: Yale University Press,
2009), p. ix.
3.
The province was later renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
4.
Sugata Bose,
A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of
Global Empire
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 56.
5.
Golo Mann,
The History of Germany Since 1789
, translated by
Marian Jackson (London: Chatto & Windus, 1968), pp. 525 and 880,
1987 Peregrine edition.
6.
Ernest Gellner,
Muslim Society
(New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), pp. 38, 41, 180, 187.
PART I: VISIONARIES
Chapter I: From Bosnia to Baghdad
1.
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,”
The National Interest
,
Washington, Summer 1989. Book version:
The End of History and the
Last Man
(New York: The Free Press, 1992).
2.
Jonathan C. Randal, “In Africa, Unrest in One-Party States,”
International Herald Tribune
, Paris, March 27, 1990.
3.
Timothy Garton Ash, “Bosnia in Our Future,”
New York Review of
Books
, December 21, 1995.
4.
Carl E. Schorske,
Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture
(New
York: Knopf, 1980); Claudio Magris,
Danube
(New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 1986, 1989), p. 268.
5.
Timothy Garton Ash,
The File: A Personal History
(New York:
Random House, 1997), p. 51.
6.
Michael Ignatieff,
Isaiah Berlin: A Life
(New York: Holt, 1998), p.
24.
7.
Timothy Garton Ash, “Does Central Europe Exist?,”
New York
Review of Books
, October 9, 1986.
8.
W. H. Parker,
Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 201; K. A. Sinnhuber, “Central
Europe–Mitteleuropa–Europe Centrale: An Analysis of a Geographical
Term,”
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers
, vol. 20,
1954; Arthur Butler Dugan, “Mackinder and His Critics
Reconsidered,”
The Journal of Politics
, May 1962, p. 250.
9.
Saul B. Cohen,
Geography and Politics in a World Divided
(New
York: Random House, 1963), pp. 79–83.
10.
Halford J. Mackinder,
Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in
the Politics of Reconstruction
(Washington: National Defense
University, 1919, 1942), p. 90.
11.
Cohen,
Geography and Politics in a World Divided
, p. 222.
12.
Colin S. Gray,
Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare
(London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), pp. 37, 95, 176–77.
13.
Michael Ignatieff, “Homage to Bosnia,”
New York Review of
Books
, April 21, 1994.
14.
James Joyce,
Ulysses
(New York: Modern Library, 1922, 1934), p.
697, 1990 Vintage edition.
15. Timothy Garton Ash, “Kosovo and Beyond,”
New York Review of
Books
, June 24, 1999. He was referring to a line in Auden’s poem
“September 1, 1939,” published in 1940.
16.
Timothy Garton Ash, “Cry, the Dismembered Country,”
New York
Review of Books
, January 14, 1999.
17.
I have my own history regarding the story of these delayed
interventions. My book
Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History
(New York: St. Martin’s) was reportedly a factor in President Bill
Clinton’s decision not to militarily intervene in 1993, thus putting off
the dispatch of NATO forces into the Balkans for two years.
Balkan
Ghosts
, a record of my experiences in the Balkans in the 1980s,
appeared first as works in progress in
The Atlantic Monthly
before the
Berlin Wall fell. Then, in June 1991, Chapter 3 of
Balkan Ghosts
(about Macedonia) appeared in
The Atlantic
. According to a former
State Department official, quoted in
The Washington Post
(February
21, 2002), that article was instrumental in getting “the first and only
preventive deployment of U.N. peacekeepers in the former
Yugoslavia.” Though a 1990 CIA report warned of Yugoslavia
disintegrating, the State Department “was in a state of denial … until
Kaplan’s article came along.” As it happens, the deployment of 1,500
peacekeepers in Macedonia prevented violence that later broke out in
Bosnia and Kosovo.
Balkan Ghosts
was published in book form in
March 1993. That same month I published an article about Yugoslavia
in
Reader’s Digest
, in which I wrote: “Unless we can break the cycle
of hatred and revenge—by standing forcefully for self-determination
and minority rights—the gains from the end of the Cold War will be
lost. All aid, all diplomatic efforts, all force if force is used, must be
linked to the simple idea that all the people of Yugoslavia deserve
freedom from violence.” Soon after, I appeared on television to
publicly urge intervention in the Balkans. I also urged intervention on
the front page of
The Washington Post
’s Outlook section on April 17,
1994, more than a year before we finally intervened.
Balkan Ghosts
paints a grim picture of ethnic relations in southeastern Europe, but it
is only the grimmest human landscapes where intervention has usually
been required in the first place: one need never idealize a human
landscape in order to take action on its behalf. And as we would learn
later in Iraq, when you do intervene, you should do so without
illusions. Though my books and articles were read by the president and
others, at no point did anyone in the Clinton administration contact me
in any way concerning my work, and how it might be applied to
specific events and policy choices that arose after the book was
completed.
18.
Leon Wieseltier, “Force Without Force: Saving NATO, Losing
Kosovo,”
New Republic
, Washington, April 26 and May 3, 1999.
19.
Leon Wieseltier, “Winning Ugly: The War Ends, Sort Of. The
Peace Begins, Sort Of,”
New Republic
, Washington, June 28, 1999.
20.
Ibid.
21.
Leon Wieseltier, “Useless,”
New Republic
, Washington, April 17,
2006.
22.
Bob Woodward,
State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III
(New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 84–85.
23.
Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer,
The Israel Lobby and U.S.
Foreign Policy
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).
24.
Israel at the time of 9/11 was undergoing frequent terrorist attacks
and so naturally was at the receiving end of American sympathy.
Demands for it to freeze settlement activity in the occupied territories
would resume later on, though. During the buildup to the Iraq War, I
wrote that if Bush was successful in Iraq and achieved a second term,
he should end “the domination by Israeli overlords of three million
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza,” a situation which I called
“particularly untenable.” “A Post-Saddam Scenario,”
Atlantic Monthly
,
Boston, November 2002.
25.
Robert D. Kaplan,
Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a
Pagan Ethos
(New York: Random House, 2002), p. 84.
26.
Hobbes and Berlin are great precisely because of their nuance.
Hobbes’s philosophy may represent a grim view of humanity, but he
was also a liberal modernizer, because at the time of his writings
modernization meant the breakdown of the medieval order through the
establishment of a central authority, which his Leviathan represented.
Likewise Berlin, while the embodiment of liberal humanism, was also
a realist who recognized, for example, that the search for sufficient
food and shelter came before the search for freedom.
27.
Actually, advance columns of American forces in the First Gulf
War had come within 150 kilometers of Baghdad. But the bulk of the
troops were based in Kuwait and the Saudi desert. Robert D. Kaplan,
“Man Versus Afghanistan,”
The Atlantic
, April 2010.
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