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partment, where old policies never change or die. The United States will
therefore continue its commitment to a secure and stable China. But this
will become a major irritant in U.S.–Japanese relations by 2040. Obviously,
Japanese behavior in China will be incompatible with the American idea of
a stable China. By 2040 the relationship between Washington and Beijing
will grow closer, irritating the Japanese no end.
turkey
Turkey, meanwhile, will move decisively northward into the Caucasus as
Russia crumbles. Part of this move will consist of military intervention, and
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part will occur in the way of political alliances. Equally important, much of
Turkey’s influence will be economic—the rest of the region will need to
align itself with the new economic power. Turkish influence inevitably will
spread northward, beyond the Caucasus into Russia and Ukraine, asserting
itself in the politically uncertain Don and Volga river valleys, and eastward
toward the agricultural heartland of Russia. Muslim Turkey will influence
Muslim Kazakhstan, spreading Turkish power into Central Asia. The Black
Sea will be a Turkish lake, and Crimea and Odessa will trade heavily with
Turkey. There will be massive Turkish investment throughout this region.
Russia will have created a system of alliances to the south of Turkey be
fore its collapse, much as it did during the Cold War. As Russia weakens and
withdraws, it will leave behind a belt of instability from the Levant to Af
ghan istan. Turkey will have no appetite for engaging Iran and will be quite
content to leave it isolated and alone. But the instability in Syria and Iraq
will directly affect Turkish interests, particularly as the Kurds become free to
start thinking about setting up their own state again. Syria and Iraq will be
weak without Russian support, torn apart by traditional internal conflicts.
Between the danger of instability spreading north and the threat of other
powers filling the vacuum, the Turks will move south. Certainly the Turks
won’t want the Americans moving into Iraq: they will have had enough of
that in the 2000s.
The Balkans will be in chaos during this time as well. As the Russians
weaken, their allies in the Balkans will also weaken, creating regional imbal
ances. The Hungarians and Romanians will try to fill some of these voids, as
will the Greeks (Turkey’s historic enemies). As the new regional power,
Turkey will be drawn into the Balkans as a result of this widespread instabil
ity. Turkey will already have had close relations with Muslim countries in the
Balkans—Bosnia and Albania—and they will seek to expand their sphere of
influence not so much out of aggressive appetite, but out of the fear of the
intentions of other countries.
Geographically speaking, there is only one essential goal for any power
in this region: control of the eastern Mediterranean and Black seas. It is im
portant to remember that Turkey has been historically both a land and naval
power. The closer any European powers come to the Bosporus, the strait
connecting the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea, the more dangerous it is for
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Turkey. Turkish control of the Bosporus means pushing European powers
out of the Balkans, or at least blocking them decisively. Therefore, involve
ment in the Balkans is essential in order for Turkey to become a major re
gional power.
And, by the mid-2040s, the Turks will indeed be a major regional power.
They will create systems of relationships deep into Russia that feed agricul
tural products and energy into Turkey. They will dominate Iraq and Syria,
and therefore their sphere of influence will reach the Saudi Peninsula with
its dwindling oil and natural gas reserves, which are fueling the American
economy. The Turks will push their sphere of influence northwest, deep
into the Balkans, where their power will clash with the interests of key
American allies like Hungary and Romania, who will also be pressing their
influence eastward into the Ukraine and encountering Turkish influence all
along the northern shore of the Black Sea. There will be conflicts, from
guerrilla resistance to local conventional war, all around the Turkish pivot.
Turkey will enhance an already substantial armed force suitable for its
needs, including a sizeable ground force and formidable naval and air forces.
Projecting its power into the Black Sea, protecting the Bosporus, and mov
ing into the Adriatic to help shape events in the Balkans all will require a
naval force. It also, in effect, will require a dominant position in the eastern
Mediterranean as far as Sicily. It is not only the Bosporus that will have to be
protected. The Straits of Otranto, the gateway to the Adriatic, will also need
to be controlled.
Turkey will wind up pushing against U.S. allies in southeastern Europe
and will make Italy feel extremely insecure with its growing power. The
breaking point will come when Egypt, inherently unstable, faces an internal
crisis and Turkey uses its position as the leading Muslim power to insert
troops to stabilize it. Suddenly Turkish peacekeepers will be in Egypt, con
trolling the Suez Canal, and in a position to do what Turkey has tradition
ally done: push westward in North Africa. If Turkey seizes this opportunity,
it will become the decisive power in Western Eurasia. Israel will remain a
powerful nation, of course, but Turkey’s ability to expand its power as a
Muslim nation will both block Israel and force Israel into an accommoda
tion with Turkey, already seen as a friendly power.
Control of the Suez Canal will open up other possibilities for Turkey. It
will have already pushed southward into the Arabian Peninsula and will be
fighting Arab insurgents. Its overland supply lines will become strained, and
with control of the Suez Canal, Turkey will be in a position to supply its
forces through the Red Sea. This in turn will consolidate Turkish control
over the Arabian Peninsula and place Turkey in a much more threatening
position relative to Iran, enabling it to blockade Iran’s ports as well as strike
from the west. Neither of these will be things that Turkey wants to do. But
just the threat of such actions will quiet Iran, which will serve Turkish
interests.
It follows from this that Turkey will go beyond the Red Sea and enter the
Indian Ocean basin. Its focus will be on the Persian Gulf, where it will con-
solidate its control over the Arabian Peninsula and the region’s still valuable
oil supplies. By doing so, it will also become an important factor in Japan’s
security calculations. Japan has historically depended on oil supplies from
the Persian Gulf. With the Turks dominating that region, the Japanese will
have an interest in reaching an understanding with Turkey. Both countries
will be significant economic powers as well as emerging military powers.
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