The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

The ‘Invisible Constitution’ seen Realistically 

421

14.3.3.  The Hong Kong SAR under ‘One Country, Two Systems’

When considering regional autonomy under the unitary system, Hong Kong 

is a more significant case, both in terms of the limitation on autonomy in the 

SAR and the resulting tension with the central authorities for complex rea-

sons. Still under the principle of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ (OCTS) that is 

not written in the 1982 Constitution, Macau has experienced a more peaceful 

transition than Hong Kong and has experienced little friction with the central 

authorities.

81

 In fact, before reunification, Macau and Hong Kong had already 

taken different perspectives in terms of their attitudes towards integration with 

China.

82

For Hong Kong, the post-1997 constitutional framework inherited some 

similar structural elements to its past. The Basic Law of Hong Kong SAR sets 

out Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy in some details through a spe-

cific set of constitutional arrangements in nine of its chapters and three of its 

annexes.

83

 The Hong Kong SAR enjoys autonomous powers in administration, 

legislation and an independent judiciary with its own final adjudication.

84

 In 

Hong Kong’s pre-1997 colonial political system, the Governor – who repre-

sented the British monarch – took full control of Hong Kong’s internal affairs, 

and the United Kingdom authorities de jure controlled its external links. The 

constitutional design in both the Joint Declaration between China and the 

United Kingdom (1984) and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR (1990) have 

considered and echoed this historic institutional feature. The Basic Law of 

the Hong Kong SAR adopts the general political system and is ‘executive-led’. 

The Chief Executive represents the core of the constitutional structure in 

the Hong Kong SAR and is accountable to the Hong Kong SAR in addition 

to the central government.

85

 Although foreign affairs and regional defence in 

the Hong Kong SAR rest with the obligations of the central government in 

Articles 13 and 14 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, it is also clearly 

provided that the military force of the People’s Liberation Army garrisoned 

in Hong Kong shall not interfere in local affairs.

86

 Providing a workable con-

stitutional structure for Hong Kong’s politics after 1997, the Basic Law of the 

81 

Stuat Lau, ‘China Hails Macau’s Adherence to Basic Law in Subtle Warning against Democracy  

Movements’  South China Morning Post (9 December 2014) 

www.scmp.com/news/hong- 

kong/article/1659229/macau-held-role-model-obeying-basic-law?page

=all

.

82 

Ming K. Chan, ‘Different Roads to Home: The Retrocession of Hong Kong and Macau to 

Chinese Sovereignty’ (2003) 12 Journal of Contemporary China 493, 493.

83 

Kate Olley, ‘Introduction to Judicial Review in Hong Kong’ (2003) 8 Judicial Review 109.

84 

Article 2, Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR (1990).

85 

Article 43, 

ibid.

86 

Article 14(3), 

ibid.

.

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422 

Han Zhai

Hong Kong SAR also functions as the constitutional source of judicial review 

in Hong Kong’s courts: ‘No law enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong 

Special Administrative Region shall contravene this law’.

87

Treating the Hong Kong SAR as a separate constitutional system ‘in terri-

tory’ obscures the full picture of its autonomy, which is designed to be read 

together with the unitary system.

88

 The limitation is, first and fundamentally, 

somewhere between a generally high degree of autonomy and the direct gov-

ernance of the central government. Article 12 of the Basic Law of the Hong 

Kong SAR reads that Hong Kong is under the direct governance of the central