418
Han Zhai
bodies. In this light, the next question concerns which ‘specific issues’ fall
under autonomous powers, which directly concern the scope and limitation
of autonomy that the autonomous organs in one autonomous area enjoys.
The scope of autonomy in ethnic areas pertains to ‘internal affairs’, which
mainly covers the protection of the unique culture and traditions of a specific
minority group. This general principle is implicit in both the 1982 Constitution
and the LRNA, where the principle is only textually referred to in the pream-
ble. However, it could still be interpreted from the existing provisions of the
1982 Constitution, which contains six basic issues that fall in the autonomous
scope:
• With the approval of the standing committee of the people’s congress from
a higher level, to legislate autonomous regulations and specific regula-
tions; the regulations of the autonomous prefectures and the autono-
mous counties should also be reported to the Standing Committee of the
NPC to be recorded (Article 116);
• With the approval of the State Council, to organise local public security
forces (Article 120);
• In accordance with autonomy regulations, to employ the spoken and the
written language or languages in common use in the locality (Article 121);
• Under the guidance of state plans, to develop the economy in the respec-
tive areas (Article 118);
• To independently administrate their own finances in the autonomous
areas (Article 117);
• To independently govern educational, scientific, cultural, public health
and physical culture affairs (Article 119).
64
The internal scope of autonomous areas under RNA rests in the five issues
listed above. They also highlight the key terms for autonomous areas with vari-
ous types of state control.
65
More importantly, the limitation varies with respect
to different regional issues, and the formal independent exercise of autono-
mous power exists merely in their own finance and cultural development.
According to the LRNA, the latter power includes ethnic culture, regional
education and the use of ethnic languages, regional scientific development
and the heritage of ethnic traditional medicine.
66
However, autonomous
64
Articles 116–21, the 1982 Constitution (rev. 2004).
65
In fact, Chapter
3
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Au-
tonomy (1984, rev. 2001) unfolds and enriches these fundamental issues articulated in the
Constitution with details.
66
Articles 36–45 the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy
(1984, rev. 2001).
The ‘Invisible Constitution’ seen Realistically
419
legislative power, which represents the core characteristic of a RNA institu-
tion, is burdened by supervision from the central authorities.
67
Although the 1982 Constitution permits autonomous areas to modify higher
laws and policies by legislating their own specific regulations, legislative bod-
ies at the provincial and municipal levels are required to submit their local leg-
islation to the Standing Committee of the NPC for approval.
68
By comparison,
the general regulations and the implementation of non-autonomous local leg-
islation do not require the approval of the NPC. It seems that under the cur-
rent constitutional arrangement, the more autonomy an area enjoys, the more
central control will be designed to regulate the exercise of that autonomy in
order to ensure it will not endanger the central authorities.
Aside from the central supervision of autonomous legislatures, approval
from the central authority is also required in cases of alternative implementa-
tion or delayed practice of national policies, the organisation of local public
security forces, changes to regional boundaries and the establishment of the
foreign trade ports.
69
These ‘approval’ procedures highlight the continuing
central control over national autonomous regions and the limits of national
regional autonomy.
The reform has brought new issues to public governance on ethnic affairs
beyond the rigid constitutional structure, and these new issues require more
engagement of the central government in balancing regional development.
During the first two decades of the reform, national economic developments
prioritised the eastern part of China, as the fiscal decentralisation analysis
in the former section shows. As a consequence, the western part of China
has lagged behind. The minority-majority income inequality in rural China
rapidly widened between 1988 and 1995.
70
Policies from the central author-
ity to counteract the national minority-majority income gap in rural China
are needed.
71
Since 2000, the Western Development Project has been under
development with the aim of addressing the regional disparity through more
balance in regional economic development.
72
Together with this project, the
67
Article 116 the 1982 Constitution (rev. 2004).
68
Article 100 the 1982 Constitution (rev. 2004).
69
Article 116 the 1982 Constitution (rev. 2004); Articles 19, 20, 24, 31 the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy (1984, rev. 2001).
70
With data from nineteen provinces. Björn Gustafsson and Li Shi, ‘The Ethnic Minority-
Majority Income Gap in Rural China during Transition’ (2003) 51 Economic Development and
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