Interim Constitutions and the Invisible Constitution
187
In Nepal, the 2007 interim constitution outlasted its intended duration by
some six years, before finally being replaced in 2015.
99
Repeated extensions
for the drafting of the permanent constitution were granted by the Supreme
Court, some invoking the doctrine of ‘necessity’. Continuing political discord,
the inability of the legislature to complete the constitutional drafting required
of it by the interim constitution and the willingness of the Supreme Court
in many cases to sanction repeated extensions, contributed to the prolonged
duration of the interim constitution. The decisions of the Supreme Court
have the potential to have a lasting impact upon Nepali constitutional law,
including the endorsement of the doctrine of necessity. The doctrine of neces-
sity posits that ‘that which is otherwise not lawful is made lawful by necessity’
100
and was used on several occasions to justify extensions to the temporal juris-
diction of the IC.
101
On other occasions, the Court disallowed similar exten-
sions.
102
Following a 2011 ruling that no further extension would be granted
for the Constituent Assembly to complete its task the CA was dismissed and
replaced by a second CA, a step which was not provided for in the constitu-
tion.
103
The complicated series of events in Nepal demonstrate the way in
which an interim constitution that lacks clear solutions in the event of stasis
or deadlock opens itself to collapse or to creative interpretation by a court.
Further, the case of Nepal shows that where there is political and legal uncer-
tainty during an interim period, courts may play an outsized role or generate
a constitution that is broader than – or even contradictory to – its written fea-
tures. The period may be described as involving a kind of dialogic relationship
between the Supreme Court and constitution drafters, involving a ‘sequel of
implicitly or explicitly shaped communications back and forth between two
or more actors characterized by the absence of a dominant actor . . . with the
of 1997, which is currently binding, [6.9], in Ref. No. K 34/15, 3 XII 2015, available at
http://
trybunal.gov.pl/en/hearings/judgments/art/8748-ustawa-o-trybunale-konstytucyjnym/
.
99
Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2015.
100
See discussion in Rajib Dahal, ‘Nepal: (Un)Necessary – Doctrine of Necessity’ Telegraph
Nepal (21 September 2011)
www.telegraphnepal.com/views/2011-09-21/nepal:-unnecessary-doc-
trine-of-necessity.html
.
101
Advocate Vijaya Raj Sakya v. President of Nepal, Mr Ram Baran Yadav, Office of the President,
Sital Niwash, Kathamandu & Ors and in Advocate Kamlesh Dwivedi v. President of Nepal, Mr
Ram Baran Yadav, Office of the President, Sital Niwash, Kathmandu & Ors (Supreme Court of
Nepal) [2011] Supreme Court of Nepal Writ No. 066-WS-0050.
102
Advocate Bal Krishna Neupane v. The Office of the President, Maharajgunj, Kathmandu &
Ors and Bharatmani Jangam v. The Office of the President, Maharajgunj, Kathmandu & Ors
(Supreme Court of Nepal) [2011] Supreme Court of Nepal Special Writ No. 066-WS-0056.
103
Bharatmani Jungam Case (Writ No. 068-WS-0014) (25 November 2011).
188
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