The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

al Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) (rev 2012) 1949) the 

revised version of the 1949 West German Basic Law The Constitution of the German Democrat-

ic Republic (Die Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1949). This is for several 

reasons: first, that Article was simply a continuing provision of the 1949 Law. Second, it is ar-

guable that the language of Article 146 of the German Basic Law was permissive of a successor 

text, rather than stipulating that one would be adopted. Third, language from the 1949 text 

referring to a ‘transitional period’ was removed in the 1990 text. See Arthur Benz, ‘A Forum 

of Constitutional Deliberation? A Critical Analysis of the Joint Constitutional Commission’ 

in Klaus H. Goetz and Peter J. Cullen (eds.) Constitutional Policy in Unified Germany (Lon-

don: Routledge, 2013), 104; Donald P. Kommers and Russell A. Miller, The Constitutional 

Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 3rd edn (Durham: Duke University Press,  

2012) 686.

36 

Constitutional Act of 17th October 1992, on the Mutual Relations Between the Legislative and 

Executive Institutions of the Republic of Poland and on Local Self-Government Dziennik Ustaw 

Nr 84 Poz 426, Supra note 25, Preamble.

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176 

Caitlin Goss

frame was adopted, with a Constitutional Assembly charged with the task of 

producing the draft of a final constitution by 28 May 2010, a deadline that was 

not met by the Assembly.

Interim texts may be adopted for a variety of reasons, including the desire 

to reduce or avoid the decision costs and error costs that could come with 

drafting a constitution in a potentially volatile context, in a compressed time 

period, as discussed by Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg in relation to defer-

ral in constitutional design.

37

Typically, interim constitutions are adopted by unelected negotiating 

groups or round tables, and then followed by a longer phase of drafting – 

often more inclusive of the people – for the permanent constitution. Another 

feature of interim constitutions is that they are often – as with the constitu-

tion of the United Kingdom – not encapsulated in a singular canonical text. 

It is often the case that a series of constitutional or quasi-constitutional texts 

comprise the written constitution. This is seen in the Polish transition

38

 and 

in Iraq, through the United Nations Security Council Resolutions that had 

constitutional effect enabling or supporting the Transitional Administrative 

Law (‘TAL’) of 2004.

39

 The 2003 Transitional Constitution of the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo and the 2005 Interim Constitution of the Republic 

of Sudan existed alongside peace agreements that enjoyed constitutional sta-

tus.

40

 The multiplicity of texts that exist in these interim periods reflects several 

factors, including the political upheaval that is often present at the drafting of 

interim texts and a lack of clarity around amendment or replacement proce-

dures relating to the previous constitution.

37 

Rosalind  Dixon and Tom  Ginsburg, ‘Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional  

Design,’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 636.

38 

Constitutional Provisions Continued in Force Pursuant to Article 77 of the Constitutional Act of