The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993.

27 

Constitution de la transition de la République Démocratique du Congo 2003 (‘Constitution of 

the Transition’).

28 

Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period 2004 (Iraqi National 

Council).

29 

Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan, note 19.

30 

Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Interim Edition) of BE 2549 2006.

31 

Act No. XXXI of 1989 (Act No. XX of 1949 (as amended)) (1989 Constitution of Hungary).

32 

Act No. XX of 1949 (1949 Constitution of Hungary).

33 

See e.g., Rudolf L. Tökés, ‘Institution Building in Hungary: Analytical Issues and Constitutional 

Models, 1989–1990 ’ in András BozÓki (ed.) The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hun-

garian Democracy: Analysis and Documents (Budapest: Central European University Press, 

2002) 123, 124, 126, 128, 130, 132, 133 

http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08625.0001.001

; Andrew Ara-

to, ‘The Roundtables, Democratic Institutions and the Problem of Justice’ in András BozÓki 

(ed.) The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy: Analysis and Docu-

ments (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002) 230–1. 

http://hdl.handle.net/2027/

heb.08625.0001.001

; Catherine Dupré, Importing the Law in Post-Communist Transitions: The 

Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right to Human Dignity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 

2003) 31–2, 34, 162; Zoltán MiklÓsi, ‘Constitution-Making, Competition and Cooperation’ in 

Gábor Attila Tóth (ed.) Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental 

---

 

Interim Constitutions and the Invisible Constitution 

175

Dupré argues that

it was understood that it would be only an interim constitution registering 

the concessions made by the ruling party during the Round Tables negotia-

tions and that it would be replaced by a new constitution to be adopted by 

the parliament due to be elected in spring 1990.

34

The matter was revived in the early 1990s, and a special parliamentary com-

mission was created with a view to drafting a new constitution. Each of these 

constitutional review projects failed, however, and the momentum for consti-

tutional replacement fell away; for many, the Hungarian constitution was in 

no way viewed as temporary in the 1990s. However the initial formal inclusion, 

in addition to the discussion of the 1989 constitution as an interim text is, I 

believe, sufficient to include it as a kind of border case.

35

6.2.3.  How Interim Constitutions Work: A Few Key Features

Interim constitutions are united by the formal characteristic of stipulating 

that they will be replaced by another constitution. In some cases, there is 

little detail as to how this will occur; the Preamble of the 1992 Polish Small 

Constitution states that it was passed ‘[f]or the purpose of improving the 

activity of the supreme authorities of the State, pending the passing of a new 

Constitution of the Republic of Poland . . .’.

36

 In Nepal, a more structured time 

Law (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2012) 59; Márta Dezso˝, A. Vincze and 

 

B. Vissy, ‘Part I: Sources of Constitutional Law’ in Márta Dezso˝ (ed.) Constitutional Law in 

Hungary (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2010), 59 [82].

34 

Dupré, Supra note 33, 32 (emphasis added).

35 

Note that in contrast, I do not consider the German Basic Law of 1990 (Basic Law for the Feder-