The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

Decision 1 of 2013: AB on the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Act on Election Proce-

dure (Hungarian Constitutional Court) [3.2–3.3].

89 

Ibid.

, 4.

90 

A. E.  Dick Howard, ‘Prospects for Constitutional Democracy in Poland’, in Marek Jan 

 

Chodakiewicz, John Radzilowski and Dariusz Tolczyk (eds.) Poland’s Transformation: A Work in  

Progress (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 137. See also Jerry Oniszczuk (ed.) ‘Intro-

duction’, Constitutional Tribunal, A Selection of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s Jurispru-

dence From 1986 to 1999 (Warsaw: Trybunal Konstytucyjny, 1999), 5.

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186 

Caitlin Goss

interpreting the principle,

91

 which was used to ‘read due process standards into 

the Constitution, including a prohibition against retroactive laws, the protec-

tion of “vested” rights, and access to the courts’.

92

 The Tribunal exercised pow-

erful legislative review in the period between 1 January 1990 and 30 June 1995 

with forty of fifty-two statutes considered being held to be unconstitutional.

93

  

The Tribunal’s influence during this time is all the more notable because the 

Tribunal’s decisions were not binding until the 1997 Constitution.

94

Oniszczuk argues that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence in relation to a 

range of issues, including the Rechtsstaat principle, has continued on into 

post-1997 jurisprudence, as well as having had a direct impact on the 1997 

Constitution itself.

95

 Garlicki and Garlicka also highlight the way in which the 

Constitutional Tribunal contributed to long-term constitutional law during 

the interim period, noting that

judges, particularly in the constitutional court, referred to the new consti-

tutional principles, mainly the Rechtsstaat principle, and in some cases, 

rewrote them using both new constitutional principles and provisions of the 

European Convention on Human Rights. In this way, the judicial branch 

civilized and modernized the old constitution and prepared a relatively 

smooth transition to the post-1997 constitutional order.

96

Although more recent developments have considerably challenged the inde-

pendence and authority of the Constitutional Tribunal, decisions of the 

interim era Tribunal based on non-textual features have continued to have an 

enduring effect on Polish constitutional law. 

97

 In one of the decisions relating 

to the amendment of the Constitutional Tribunal Act, the Tribunal referred to 

its decisions in the interim era on the same topic.

98

91 

Irena Grudzinska-Gross, ‘Interview with Professor Andrzej Zoll, Chief Justice of the Polish 

Constitutional Tribunal’ (1997) 6 Eastern European Constitutional Review 77, 77.

92 

Howard, Supra note 90, 138.

93 

Ibid.

94 

Amended Constitution 1952, Article 33a(2) (judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal on the 

nonconformity of laws to the Constitution are subject to examination by the Sejm); Grudzin-

ska-Gross, Supra note 91, 77–8.

95 

Oniszczuk, Supra note 90, 11.

96 

Garlicki and Garlicka, Supra note 50, 404.

97 

Paulina Starski, ‘Constitutionalism in Times of Extraordinary Developments: Resolving the  

Polish Constitutional Crisis’, Constitution Net (13 April 2016) 

www.constitutionnet.org/news/

constitutionalism-times-extraordinary-developments-resolving-polish-constitutional-crisis

.

98 

The content of the principle of the autonomy of the Sejm’s rules of procedure has been ana-

lysed in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence before in its ruling of 26 January 1993 (ref. no. U 10/92, 

OTK in 1993, part I, item 2) – which was issued prior to the entry into force of the Constitution 

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