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resident in companies today result from the cumulative choices engineers have made of what to tackle
versus what to leave alone. Clark posits that technological improvements requiring that companies
build upon or extend an existing cumulative body of knowledge favor an industry’s established firms.
Conversely, when changes require a completely different body of knowledge, established firms will be
at a disadvantage compared to firms that had already accumulated a different hierarchically structured
body of knowledge, most likely in another industry.
5.
See, for example, Michael L. Tushman and Philip Anderson, “Technological Discontinuities and
Organizational Environments,”
Administrative Science Quarterly (31), 1986, 439–465; and Philip
Anderson and Michael Tushman, “Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs,”
Administrative Science Quarterly (35), 1990, 604–633.
6.
The concept of
value network builds on Giovanni Dosi’s concept of
technological paradigms. See
Giovanni Dosi, “Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories,”
Research Policy (11),
1982, 147–162. Dosi characterizes a technological paradigm as a “pattern of solution of selected
technological problems, based on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on selected
material technologies” (152). New paradigms represent discontinuities in trajectories of progress as
defined within earlier paradigms. They tend to redefine the very meaning of progress, and point
technologists toward new classes of problems as the targets of ensuing normal technology
development. The question examined by Dosi—how new technologies are selected and retained—is
closely related to the question of why firms succeed or fail as beneficiaries of such changes.
7.
Value network, as presented here, draws heavily on ideas I developed jointly with Professor Richard
S. Rosenbloom and which are summarized in two journal articles: Clayton M. Christensen and Richard
S. Rosenbloom, “Explaining the Attacker’s Advantage: The Technological Paradigms, Organizational
Dynamics, and the Value Network,”
Research Policy (24), 1995, 233–257; and Richard S. Rosenbloom
and Clayton M. Christensen, “Technological Discontinuities, Organizational Capabilities, and Strategic
Commitments,”
Industrial and Corporate Change (3), 1994, 655–685. I am heavily indebted to
Professor Rosenbloom for his contributions to the development of these perspectives.
8.
See D. L. Marples, “The Decisions of Engineering Design,”
IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management EM8, 1961, 55–71; and C. Alexander,
Notes on the Synthesis of Form (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1964).
9.
On this point, too, correspondence between the concept of the value network and Dosi’s concept of
technological paradigms is strong. (See note 6.) The scope and boundaries of a value network are
defined by the dominant technological paradigm and the corresponding technological trajectory
employed at the higher levels of the network. As Dosi suggests,
value can be defined as a function of
the dominant technological paradigm in the ultimate system of use in the value network.
10.
Michael Porter,
Competitive Advantage (New York: The Free Press, 1985).
11.
A more complete report of this analysis can be found in chapter 7 of Clayton M. Christensen,
The
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