The Human Person in Science and Theology

The Human Person in Science and Theology
Edited by Niels Henrik Gregersen, Willem Drees and Ulf Görman

(Issues in Science and Theology), Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000; xii, 218 pp.; pb. £ 14.95; ISBN: 0-567-08692-5

Review by Guus Labooy

This volume contains plenary lectures and other contributions to the Seventh European Conference on Science and Theology, Durham 1998, on the theme: ‘The Person: Perspectives from Science and Theology’. It represents a valuable contribution to the science-theology debate, including competent essays of an introductory nature as well as some at a more advanced technical level.
The first piece, Mary Midgley’s ‘Consciousness, Fatalism and Science’, deals with the problem of neurological determinism and freedom. It deals with the subject in a metaphorical way. Determinism is defeated with numerous metaphorical arguments, and Midgley’s own position is defended in a similar fashion. Though the use of metaphor is attractive, unfortunately the real issues of the recent debate do not surface. For instance, while it is evident that the author eschews epiphenomenalism, her own position, the ‘Many-Maps Model’, could still be called Non Reductive Physicalism (NRP), which undoubtedly has just as many problems with the activity of the mental as does the epiphenomenalism she seeks to avoid for that reason. She does not discuss the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Therefore we do no not know whether her own position is a kind of NRP (which, on balance, uses the resolution of the Many-Maps view as well) or some sort of libertarianism. In short, the rather triumphant pitch evokes expectations of careful and profound argument, but these cannot be met within the non-technical boundaries of the contribution.
In ‘The Multifaceted Nature of Human Personhood: Psychological and Theological Perspectives’, Fraser Watts offers a very useful survey of the recent debate on the interface of science and personhood in its spiritual, theological dimension. Throughout the article, he presents his own balanced and competent view as to which choices should be made for Christian thinking. He emphasises the need for opposing both forms of ‘imperialism’, i.e. the biological and the social. Here, the author signals an innate partnership between psychology and theology, for both sciences are equipped to hold these two segments of reality together. A useful, non-technically presented overview.
Philip Hefner, in his ‘Imago Dei: The Possibility and Necessity of the Human Person’, offers, in a few pages, a staunch blueprint of a non-reductive view of man as Imago Dei, incorporating modern results from neuroscience and evolutionary theory. Central to his argument is the function of cultural ‘memes’ in the evolutionary process: memes, defined as ‘a packet of cultural information’. He uses this concept in order to link up with science, for these ‘memes’, while playing an important part in the secular debate, can at the same time be seen as the point where revelation and the Spirit intermingle with the biological. These partly religiously informed systems of memes have played a fundamental role in the emergence of persons. They generate cultural abilities like ‘thinking, planning and decision making’. And ‘Although these memes have emerged within the process of cultural evolution, they cannot be accounted for.’ So Hefner argues for a key role for the concept of a personal God in the evolutionary formation of personhood, by way of the ‘memes’. Indeed, by way of evolution we are created in his likeness, Imago Dei. A remarkable and challenging vision.
For the moment, I pass over the contribution of Hugo Lagercrantz, stressing the plasticity of the fetal and infant brain, and the theological contribution of Michael Welker, an interesting article representing the last of the more general articles in this volume, underscoring the importance of faith for the full richness of the concept of person. Three more genuinely philosophical contributions complete this volume. In a very thorough contribution, Dennis Bielfeldt evaluates the usefulness of the concept of supervenience for the science-theology debate. He assesses the concept in its historical depth, signalling the difference between the ‘post-Davidson concept’ and that of the ‘British Emergentists’. He gives much attention to exact analysis, definition and issues of internal coherence. The various aspects of the concept of supervenience all have their champions in recent literature and are often difficult to combine (internal coherence). And, subsequently, some of the implications of the concept are even more difficult to combine with central credal affirmations. If supervenience includes causal closure at the lower level, for instance, adherence to this doctrine amounts to Deism. Moreover, the top-down causation in supervenience theory (if coherent with supervenience at all) is not the sort of causation theism is looking for, because ‘how can God be understood as determinable by the lower-levels?’. In addition, supervenience theory is a form of monism, while theism is compelled to maintain that God and the world are ontologically different. My only criticism of this thorough and instructive critique is that, in my opinion, the author’s verdict on the usefulness of the concept should have been more definite, given his own assessment. I should like to add one more argument. The model of top-down causation, even if it offers enough scope for real causal efficacy at the higher level, is inadequate, for God’s causal efficacy is of a different order: creative causality, in its concurrence with natural order, is not itself a physical act, but creation ex nihilo. However, all the supervenience models of causation presuppose that God’s causation is of a sort of physical nature, which is a typical ‘category mistake’. [1]
The same austerity regarding the usefulness of supervenience should be applied in discussing the admirable contribution of the editor, Niels Gregersen. Gregersen’s use of the supervenience concept is, to my mind, mere appearance. His theory of interaction of the various levels of existence is sophisticated and in keeping with credal affirmations, but contrary to his terminology, it is not the genuine concept of supervenience he calls upon. For his theist goals, one of the hazardous implications of the illustrious concept is what is called the principle of co-variation, an integral part of any genuine concept of supervenience: ‘physical indiscernibility entails psychological indiscernibility’. How does Gregersen deal with this ominous principle? By discussing it, he tacitly admits that it constitutes an important ingredient of supervenience. But he makes it innocuous by using a trick: ‘exactly the same circumstances would not be two persons but one person.’ (173) So physical indiscernibility entails psychological indiscernibility, but in a vacuous way, he argues. Why? Because on the basis of ‘physical indiscernibility’ the author feels entitled to jump to the conclusion of numerical identity (the author calls it ‘strict’ identity, but, in view of his example of the two persons being one, I use the less vague terminology of modern logic). And, as a matter of logic, numerical identity entails psychological indiscernibility, or so his argument goes. This, however, is merely a trick. The argument is flawed, and this can be shown, no doubt, even within the theory of individuality to which the author subscribes. This materialist theory of individuality, however, is devastating to theism, as could be expected given that its pioneer is Aristotle. Moreover, in my opinion it is inadequate for grounding the phenomenon of individuality as well. [2] Therefore, I would deal with Gregersen’s trick by introducing a different theory of individuality. Using Scotus’ theory of haecceitas, physical indiscernibility *** no longer logically entails numerical identity. But then the principle of co-variation is no longer vacuous and it becomes devastating for the theory of interaction between the physical, mental and cultural level that Gregersen has in mind. That, in my opinion***, is not a problem for his theory, but a problem for any genuine concept of supervenience.
John Teske’s final contribution is named ‘Social Construction of the Human Spirit’. It constitutes a praiseworthy conclusion to this fine collection of essays. He offers a both competent and succinct account of the present discussion on the social construction of spiritual life, integrating the views of a great number of leading philosophers and scientist like Searle (his Constitutive Roles!), Averill (emotion theory), Luria, Harre, and Taylor. By stressing the contingency of the formation of self, Teske made me sensitive all over again to the dangers lurking in the contemporary deconstruction of the moral and social realm (C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man!***), for it is the historically developed social meaning-structure that helps to create the human person in the first place. This article is very rich and instructive, and, like the entire volume, sincerely recommended. In view of the overall goal of this book, a more thorough analysis of the concept of freedom comprises one omission I am able to think of. Teske’s article, on account of its rightful underscoring of the contingency of spiritual life, emerging as it does out of historical networks of meaning, poses afresh a question of primary theological importance: does this inspiring scientific assessment of the reality of our inner life*** compels us to board religious relativism? I, personally, do not think so, but this leads beyond the theme of this valuable book.