The formula for a successful dual transition is summa-
rized in Chapter 9—the key is to privatize in such a way as
to allow for the rapid entry of a large number of new small
and medium-sized privately owned enterprises. These new
enterprises provided more consumer products, new orga-
nizational cultures, and a labor force that had adapted to
new organizations and technologies. The new enterprises
thus stimulated the growth of political constituencies that
voted for reformist parties, and compelled other parties to
compete for their votes. It was only when the entry of new
firms slowed after 1998 that the Polish transition faltered,
lending support for antiliberal parties on both the Left
and the Right.
Although this is an important book, I do have a few
minor criticisms. Primarily, I think that a political “pre-
condition” is missing from this analysis. That is, the SdRP
(and its successor, the SLD) was able to move from being
relatively anti-reform to relatively pro-reform, largely
because it had already become dominated by pro-reform
communists grouped around Aleksandr Kwaniewski prior
to the end of communist rule. Indeed, unlike many other
communist parties in the region, the reformists had won
the internal struggle within the Polish United Workers’
Party in the late 1980s, making them far more receptive to
reform and electoral incentives than other more hard-line
communists. Had the party been dominated by conserva-
tives (as was the case with the Czech Communist Party),
they would certainly have been much less inclined to move
as far as they did in support of both economic reform and,
ultimately, political democracy. To what extent, then, does
the legacy of the previous regime and the transition pro-
cess have an impact on negotiating the challenges of the
dual transition?
Second, and related to the previous point, I am not
entirely sure that the SLD was the primary party that
threatened reform in the 1990s, nor that it was they who
had to be “convinced” to accept economic reforms. As in
Hungary with the MSzP (the Hungarian Socialist Party),
the SLD was more likely to be led by Western-oriented
“modernizers” than by the leaders of the Right. Although
I think it is correct to argue that the growth of the reform
constituency pushed the SLD toward more reform, it was
already predisposed to doing so, at least more so than was
the Polish Right, which had historically tended toward
statism, nationalism, and xenophobia/Euroskepticism.
This, of course, raises an additional question: Will this
political stability and deepening of reform continue, given
the current antics of the Polish Right and the political
climate under the Kaczynski presidency (although this may
change with the recent parliamentary electoral victory of
Donald Tusk and the Civic Platform Party).
Despite these minor criticisms, this is an interesting
and important book. It provides a persuasive argument
regarding how Poland overcame the challenges of the
dual transition, and it also provides important guidance
for “democratizers” and policymakers as to how to pro-
ceed with simultaneous economic and political reform.
This will undoubtedly be important for students not only
of postcommunist Europe but also of African, Central
Asian, and Middle Eastern countries as these countries
embark on the difficult “dual” journey toward markets
and democracy.