The Terror of the Machine • 99
impossible. Note especially the investigation of every accident, and follow-
up with closed-loop corrective action to preclude similar accidents.
Ford cites the danger of wearing loose clothing or ties that may be caught
in machinery, and this may be the origin of the practice of putting one’s tie
inside one’s shirt when in a factory.
* * *
Machine safeguarding is a subject all of itself. We do not consider any
machine—no matter how efficiently it may turn out its work—as a proper
machine unless it is absolutely safe. We have no machines that we consider
unsafe, but even at that a few accidents will happen. Every accident, no mat-
ter how trivial, is traced back by a skilled man employed solely for that pur-
pose, and a study is made of the machine to make that same accident in the
future impossible.
When we put up the older buildings, we did not understand so much about
ventilation as we do to-day. In all the later buildings, the supporting col-
umns are made hollow and through them the bad air is pumped out and the
good air introduced. A nearly even temperature is kept everywhere the year
round and, during daylight, there is nowhere the necessity for artificial light.
Something like seven hundred men are detailed exclusively to keeping the
shops clean, the windows washed, and all of the paint fresh. The dark corners
which invite expectoration are painted white. One cannot have morale with-
out cleanliness. We tolerate makeshift cleanliness no more than makeshift
methods.
No reason exists why factory work should be dangerous. If a man has
worked too hard or through too long hours he gets into a mental state that
invites accidents. Part of the work of preventing accidents is to avoid this
mental state; part is to prevent carelessness, and part is to make machinery
absolutely fool-proof. The principal causes of accidents as they are grouped
by the experts are:
(1) Defective structures;
(2) defective machines;
(3) insufficient room;
(4) absence of safeguards;
(5) unclean conditions;
(6) bad lights;
(7) bad air;
(8) unsuitable clothing;
(9) carelessness;
(10) ignorance;
(11) mental condition;
101
8
Wages
This chapter deserves particular attention because it lays out everything
that anybody other than an attorney needs to know about industrial and
labor relations. Ford’s principles are emphatically common sense, but
costly and destructive labor disputes show that common sense is far too
uncommon. The failure of Ford’s successors to conform to these principles
led directly to the company’s decline, and also to serious and even violent
conflicts with labor during the late 1930s.
Chapter 8 begins by discrediting thoroughly employers who seek
to pay their workers as little as possible, and it also underscores the
relationship between high wages and national prosperity.
Ford and
Crowther (1930, 53) state explicitly that it is a false economy to hire
cheap, low-skill workers to run expensive manufacturing equipment.
Ford and Crowther (1926, 119–121) add that cheap sailors will allow a
ship to remain in port for one or two weeks, thus wasting the time of
a very expensive asset. A well-paid, first-class crew, on the other hand,
will keep the ship moving, so payment of higher wages actually saves
money. This was the thought process behind the Ford Motor Company’s
compensation policies.
* * *
There is nothing to running a business by custom—to saying: “I pay the going
rate of wages.” The same man would not so easily say: “I have nothing bet-
ter or cheaper to sell than any one has.” No manufacturer in his right mind
would contend that buying only the cheapest materials is the way to make
certain of manufacturing the best article. Then why do we hear so much talk
about the “liquidation of labour” and the benefits that will flow to the coun-
try from cutting wages—which means only the cutting of buying power and
the curtailing of the home market? What good is industry if it be so unskill-
fully managed as not to return a living to everyone concerned? No question