The bukharan emirate and turkestan under russian rule in the revolutionary era: 1917-1924

.
190
 
But, Emir Alim was aware 
that he had to satisfy the new regime somehow to maintain his rule. Emir’s approval 
of a few reforms did not only rescue the independence of the emirate, but also 
juridical and political foundations, the essential components of its social structures, 
and the regime itself. On the other hand, he did not avoid applying for the path of 
coercion and rejecting the reforms when he was aware that the power of Provisional 
Government was in decline. 
191
Indeed, Emir Alim was not a person antagonizing the 
reformism and renewal. He was educated in Russian schools and his library was full 
of Russian books. He was known with his modern personality. But, he had some 
responsibilities such as maintain his rule and satisfying the internal groups. He was a 
ruler of traditional, religious and patriarchal country. He also knew how to play the 
game in realpolitik. He inherited from his predecessors how to act for balance of 
power. He knew about shifting from the collapsing power to the strengthening one 
in the crisis times. However, he was not very aware of ideological developments. 
When he encountered the increasing Bolshevik power in the region, he thought that 
he could stand by agreeing with them just he had done with Tsarist Russia and then 
with the Provisional Government. His basic philosophy was to agree with whoever 
came to power. He also remained away and objective against the developments in 
Turkistan, for instance the event of Kokand government’s collapse by the Red army. 
However, at that time, he was not aware that he did not have any chance against the 
increasing Soviet power. 
190
Becker, Seymour, 
Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924
, 
(London &New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 190. 
191
Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., 
Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in 
Central Asia,
(London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 146. 

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75 
During the era of Provisional Government, it was not very possible for 
enforcement and implementation of reforms in Bukhara, because both the 
Provisional government and Turkestan Committee were not strong and forceful 
enough for solving that question. Firstly, Russia was inside the war and dealt with 
the fronts. There was not military force to enforce the Emir and operate in the region 
for the acceptance of the demands. In addition, the position of the public opinion was 
another preventive factor. The reforms did not have advocates among the native 
population in the patriarchal Bukharan society. For that reason, the implementation 
of reforms required deployment of Russian troops in Bukharan lands, however it was 
not very possible at that time when Russian armies were in battles on German and 
Austrian fronts. Even, a probable intervention of Russian forces in Muslim areas of 
Central Asia might cause Afghan intervention.
192
 
According to S. Becker, “the use of 
Russian troops might provoke a general uprising throughout the Moslem areas of 
Russia and raise the threat of Afghan intervention in Russian Central Asia”.
193
In 
addition, the Provisional Government centered in Petrograd was not sufficient to 
analyze the situation of Bukhara and evaluate the developments properly. “The 
Provisional Government installed on the ruins of the monarchy was very divided and 
uncertain about what solutions might settle the national problem”.
194
 
In Turkestan 
and the khanates, the Provisional Government was far from responding to the reform 
demands of the indigenous population. For example, a group of exiled Jadids in 
Samarkand came to express their national ideal to Alexander Kerensky, the prime 
minister of the Provisional Government. Kerensky’s reply to the Jadids was: “I know 
Turkistan and its population well. I believe in your loyalty and reject the rumors 
192
Becker, Seymour, 
Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924
, 
(London &New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 196. 
193
Ibid, 196. 
194
Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans.,
 Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in 
Central Asia,
(London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 121. 

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76 
about disturbances supposedly being prepared among you against Russia. But I warn 
you that if such an eventuality were to occur, I should take the most far-reaching 
measures of coercion.”
195
 
Because the government had some many difficulties and 
problems that it had to deal with under the conditions of the war, they could not 
focus on Turkistan and Bukhara. So, the problems and conflicts in the Turkistan 
region and Bukhara were not prioritized by Kerensky and his friends. Kerensky 
expected indisputable loyalty and dependence from these protectorates of the old 
regime in his government’s era without focusing on the reasons of questions 
increasing instability in the region.