The scientist who finds tablets with hieroglyphs or wedge-shaped
inscriptions in an unknown language, deciphers and reads them after a great
deal of work. And in order to read them he needs only one thing: he must
know that these signs
represent writing.
As long as
he regards them as mere
ornament, an external embellishment of the tablets, or an accidental design
unconnected with any meaning, their significance and meaning will remain
completely closed to him. But as soon as he presupposes the existence of this
meaning, the
possibility of
grasping it arises.
Every cipher can be read, even without any key.
But one must know that it
is a cipher.
This is the first and indispensable condition. Without it nothing
can be done.
The idea of the existence of the visible and the hidden aspects
of life has been
known to philosophy long ago. Events or
phenomena
were admitted to
represent only one side of the world, an
apparent
one, devoid of real
existence and coming into being at the moment of our contact with the real
world; a side infinitely small as compared with the other side. The
other side,
noumena,
were regarded as really existing in themselves, but inaccessible to
our perception.
But there can be no greater mistake than to regard the world as
divided
into
phenomena and noumena - to take phenomena and noumena as separate from
one another, existing independently one from another
and as capable of being
perceived apart from one another. This is complete philosophical illiteracy,
which manifests itself most clearly in dualistic
spiritualistic
theories. The
division of phenomena and noumena exists only in our perception. The
'phenomenal world' is merely our incorrect representation of the world.
As Karl du Prel has said,
the world beyond is only this world strangely
perceived.
It would be
more correct to say that
this world is only the world
beyond strangely perceived.
Kant's idea is quite correct that the study of the phenomenal aspect of the
world will not bring us nearer to the understanding of 'things in themselves'.
A 'thing in itself is a thing as it exists in itself,
independently of us.
The
'phenomenon of a thing' is the thing in that aspect of it which we perceive.
The example of a book in the hands of an illiterate savage demonstrates quite
clearly that it is sufficient to be unaware of the existence of the noumenon of
a thing (the contents of the book in this case) for it not to
manifest itself in
phenomena. But the knowledge of its existence is sufficient to open up the
possibility
of finding it by means of the very
same
phenomena the study of which would
have been utterly useless without the knowledge of the existence of the
noumenon.
Just as it is impossible for a savage to come nearer to understanding the
nature of a watch by studying the phenomenal aspect of it, i.e. the number of
wheels and the number
of teeth in each wheel, so in the case of a positivist
scientist studying the external,
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