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Television and Everyday Life
themselves determined, how they interweave and, most crucially, how they are
to be distinguished in terms of their influence relative to each other. This task
of description and analysis requires both theoretical and empirical attention. I
suggest in this book that it is through detailed analysis of the dynamics of everyday
life on the one hand, and a theoretical account of the politics (in the widest sense)
of everyday life on the other, that the most profitable route will be found.
There are continuities with some of my earlier attempts (esp. Silverstone,
1981) to confront this problem—though the problem itself seemed different
then—and any close reading will recognise continuities of theme running from
that early work, even in its very different methodological orientation. But there
are also differences; differences which mark, I hope, a more sensitive
understanding of the contradictions of television’s status in the modern world.
Indeed even if it is constructed differently now (and even if I have constructed
it differently at various times) that problem remains the same. It is the problem,
in all its social complexity, of the power and resonance of the media in our
lives, articulating, albeit unevenly, their views of the world and limiting our
capacity to influence and control their meanings; but equally offering the very
stuff with which we can, and do, construct our own meanings, and through
them (albeit equally unevenly) generate the raw materials for critique,
transcendence, and change.
Running through the discussions that do follow, and almost with a life of its
own, is the phrase ‘essential tensions’. This phrase has emerged almost
involuntarily while I have tried to work out what I wanted to say. It refers, of
course, to a dialectic at the heart of social reality. This dialectic is that of the
play and place of media in social life. It is a dialectic of freedom and constraint,
of activity and passivity, of the public and private, and it is worked through at
the interface of institutional forces and individual actions, historically situated
and embedded in the contrary discourses of everyday life. It is in this context
that any essentialist claim must be understood. Such essentialism does not
imply an appeal to an unchanging social or political reality, nor is it a form of
reductionism. It is an acknowledgement—for which I have no apology—that
social life is, in all its manifestations,
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