Supreme court of the united states of america
AMES GENERAL LAWS ANNOTATED
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- Before Jessup, Grimes, and Williston, Circuit Judges
AMES GENERAL LAWS ANNOTATEDPART III FAMILY LAW TITLE 20 JUVENILE LAWCHAPTER 87: Juvenile Curfew Ch. 87 §1. SHORT TITLE This Act may be cited as the Ames Juvenile Curfew Act. Ch. 87 §2. PURPOSE (A) It is determined and declared as a matter of legislative finding that (1) individuals under the age of 18 are particularly vulnerable to the threat of injury and the lure of criminal behavior; (2) the incidence of crime involving minors, whether as victims or perpetrators, has increased in the State of Ames over the preceding 10 years; (3) increasing numbers of parents have difficulty controlling their children and seek the help of their elected officials to do so. (B) Therefore, it is the policy of the state and the purpose of this chapter to protect its citizens from crime, with particular emphasis on protecting the health and welfare of children, by establishing a juvenile curfew. Ch. 87 §3. DEFINITIONS Unless the context requires otherwise, the following definitions apply throughout this Chapter to the defined words and phrases and their cognates. (A) Curfew Hours for minors under eighteen (18) years of age shall be between 11:00 p.m. on any Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday until 5:00 a.m. of the following day; and 12:01 a.m. until 5:00 a.m. on any Saturday or Sunday. (B) Emergency means an unforeseen combination of circumstances leading to a situation in which immediate action is needed to avoid serious bodily injury or death. (C) Establishment means any privately-owned place of business operated for a profit to which the public is invited, including, but not limited to, any place of amusement or entertainment. (D) Guardian means: (a) a person who, under court order, is the guardian of the person of a minor; or (b) a public or private agency with whom a minor has been placed by a court. (E) Minor means any person under eighteen (18) years of age who has not had the disabilities of minority removed in accordance with Ames Gen L. ch. 63, §3 or with the laws of another state or jurisdiction. (F) Parent means (a) a person who is a natural parent, adoptive parent or step-parent of another person or (b) a person who is at least 18 years of age and authorized by a parent or guardian to have the care and custody of a minor. (G) Public Place means any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes, but is not limited to, streets, highways, playgrounds, parks, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, retail stores and transportation facilities. (H) Remain means to (a) linger or stay or (b) fail to leave premises when requested to do so by a police officer or the owner, operator, or other person in control of the premises. Ch. 87 §4. Offenses (A) Curfew for Minors. It is unlawful for any minor to remain, idle, wander, stroll or play in any public place or establishment in the State of Ames during curfew hours. (B) Responsibility of Parent. It is unlawful for the parent, guardian, or other adult person having custody or control of any minor under the age of 18 to permit directly or to permit by insufficient control such minor to be on the streets or sidewalks or on or in any public property or public place or establishment within the State of Ames during the curfew hours. (C) Responsibility of Establishment. It shall be unlawful for the owner, operator, or any employee of an establishment to knowingly allow a minor to enter or remain upon the premises of the establishment during curfew hours. Upon probable cause, the owner, operator, or any employee of an establishment may question any person suspected of being a minor and take reasonable steps to prevent minors from entering or remaining on the premises during curfew hours. Ch. 87 §5. Defenses for Minors It is a defense to prosecution under this chapter that the minor engaged in the prohibited conduct was (1) accompanied by a parent, guardian, custodian or other adult person having custody or control of such minor; (2) participating in, going to, or returning from, without any detour or stop: (a) lawful employment (b) an official event sponsored by a school, a religious organization, a club, or a nonprofit or governmental entity that is supervised by adults (c) an errand at the direction of the minor’s parent or guardian, without any detour or stop (d) an emergency;
Exhibit B Juvenile Offenders and Victims, 2000: A Report of the Ames Attorney General on Statewide Crime Table 22: Ames Juvenile Arrests by Municipality, 2000
Note: This table shows the number of persons under 18 years of age arrested in all municipalities within the State of Ames in 2000.
Exhibit C The State of the State of Ames, 1993-2003: The Governor’s Report on Statewide Crime Table 1: Ames Statewide Juvenile Arrest Data by Year, 1994-2004
Note: In this table, arrest rate is defined as the number of arrests of persons under the age of 18 for every 100,000 persons ages 10-17. Juvenile arrests (arrests of youth under age 18) reported at the State level cannot be disaggregated into more detailed age categories so that the arrests of persons under the age of 10 can be excluded in the rate calculation. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF AMES ) SPENCER McNEIL, a minor, through his ) parent and next of friend, VANESSA ) McNEIL, and JUAN PEREZ, a minor, ) through his parent and next of friend, ) JOSE PEREZ, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civ. No. 04-267-J ) SAM LU, in his official ) capacity as Chief of Police of Amesville, ) Ames, SARAH JACKSON, in her ) official capacity as Amesly County ) Prosecutor, and AMESVILLE ) PLAYLAND, ) ) Defendants. ) ) Decision and Order on Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgments Defendants Sam Lu (“Lu”) and Sarah Jackson (“Jackson”) have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ first claim, which alleges that the Ames Curfew Act (“Ames Curfew”), Ames Gen. L. ch. 87, §1 et seq., violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and which seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. Lu and Jackson argue that the Ames Curfew does not deprive Plaintiffs of a fundamental right and does not merit review under a standard of strict scrutiny. They further contend that the Ames Curfew is substantially related to the important interest the State of Ames has in protecting its citizens from crime and preventing minors from committing crimes and therefore survives intermediate scrutiny. Additionally, Defendant Amesville Playland (“Playland”) has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ second claim, which alleges that Playland is liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for its unreasonable detention of Plaintiffs under color of state law. Playland argues that since it was not a state actor acting under color of state law, Plaintiffs’ §1983 claim must fail. The parties have stipulated to certain undisputed facts for the Court’s consideration in connection with this motion. See Joint Stipulation of Undisputed Material Facts. As explained below, and based on the stipulated facts, the court finds that Defendants Lu and Jackson are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the Ames Curfew does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The court also finds that Defendant Playland is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that it was not a state actor acting under color of law and therefore cannot be held liable under §1983. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment applies when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court must determine whether a reasonable jury, based on the evidence at hand, could return a verdict for the non-moving party. The evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249, 255 (1986). The burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, but the non-moving party is required to produce sufficient evidence in connection with any part of a claim for which it has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In this case the parties agree that the material facts are undisputed. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate. Conclusions of Law I. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Defendants Lu and Jackson have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim that the Ames Curfew violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights of minors. Plaintiffs argue that the Ames Curfew unconstitutionally limits their fundamental right to freedom of movement and should be subject to strict scrutiny. Defendants Lu and Jackson argue that the Ames Curfew is substantially related to the State of Ames’ interest in protecting its citizens from crime and preventing minors from participating in crime and therefore survives intermediate scrutiny. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 14. It requires that the state treat similarly situated individuals similarly unless there is an adequate reason to distinguish between them. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Plaintiffs claim that the Ames Curfew violates the Equal Protection Clause because it curtails the right to free movement of minors and not of adults. This court must presume that a government statute is constitutional in that such statute will survive judicial review if there is a legitimate state interest and the means taken to achieve that interest are rationally related to it. See id., at 440. If, however, a statute burdens a suspect class or a fundamental right, it must be subject to strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the government must show that it has a compelling state interest and that the means taken to achieve that interest are narrowly tailored. Plyler v. Doe¸ 457 U.S. 202, 216-217 (1982). When a statute burdens a quasi-suspect classification, it may be subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny under which the government must show that it is substantially related to an important governmental interest. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co.¸ 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980). Plaintiffs argue that strict scrutiny must apply because the Ames Curfew limits the minors’ fundamental right to move freely. Age is not considered a suspect class. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991). Therefore, in order to apply strict scrutiny, the court must decide if a fundamental right has been abridged. The Supreme Court has held that the right to move freely is fundamental. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972). Relying on Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995), the Defendants argue that the right to free movement has not been entirely extended to minors. The court assumes that minors have the fundamental right to freedom of movement. See Qutb v.Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993). Indeed, for purposes of this analysis, it is appropriate to “admit minors to the protected zone and then engage in a balancing of constitutional rights and children’s vulnerabilities.” Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 178. Defendants further contend that even if the fundamental right of free movement applies to minors, they are more at risk to be victims of crime or to be lured into criminal behavior and that therefore curtailment of their rights should be subject to a lower level of scrutiny. The Supreme Court has recognized that minors’ rights may be abridged under certain circumstances. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 161-162 (1944). Yet, justification for abridging the rights of minors may not always exist. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1975). In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court established a three-part test to determine whether differential treatment of minors’ fundamental rights should be allowed. The test assesses (1) “the peculiar vulnerability of children,” (2) “their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner” and (3) “the importance of the parental role in child rearing.” 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). The court will use the Bellotti framework to determine whether the state’s restriction of this right should be subject to lesser scrutiny. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541; Waters v. Barry, 711 F.Supp. 1125, 1136-1137. 1 The defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that minors are vulnerable to crime in public places and that the juvenile arrest rate for certain crimes has increased over the last decade. The court is satisfied that the first prong of the Bellotti test is applicable to this statute. Similarly, the court finds that the second prong of the test also applies to this statute. Minors frequently struggle with decisions about whether or not to engage in illicit activities and such decisions can have life-changing impact. The court does not reach the third prong because the other two parts of the test have been satisfied and support the use of intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the Defendants must show that the State’s statute or regulation is substantially related to an important governmental interest. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150. Juvenile crime arrest rates have increased statewide in the last decade. See Joint Stipulation on Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (“Joint Stipulation”), Exhibit C. Ames City, where a disproportionate number of violent crimes occur during curfew hours, has experienced a sharp increase in violent and property crimes committed by minors. See Joint Stipulation at 12. The State of Ames has an important governmental interest in protecting its citizens from crime and preventing its children from turning to crime. Defendants have demonstrated that the necessary connection exists between this important state interest and the Ames Curfew. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants do not provide sufficient proof that the Ames Curfew is substantially related to the State’s important interest. Defendants have shown that the curfew is a meaningful step toward solving a real problem, but they are not required to give statistical proof of the effectiveness of the curfew. See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 849 (1998). The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Ames State Legislature in this case. The evidence provided by the Defendants demonstrates that the Ames Curfew is substantially related to the State of Ames’ interest in protecting its citizens from crime and in preventing minors from turning to crime. The court finds that the Ames Curfew survives intermediate scrutiny and does not violate the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
Defendant Playland has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983, which alleges that Playland, “under color of state law,” violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by unreasonably detaining Plaintiffs. Because this Court finds that Playland’s undisputed actions did not constitute state action, it grants Playland’s motion. 2 The courts have long recognized that a §1983 claim may lie against a private defendant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). However, in order for a plaintiff to state a viable claim against a private defendant, such as Playland, the conduct of the defendant that forms the basis of the claimed constitutional deprivation must constitute state action under color of law. Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924, 928-32 (1982). The Supreme Court has stated that such state action will be found only if there is such a “close nexus between the State and the challenged action” that seemingly private behavior “may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). Recognizing that whether such a nexus exists is highly circumstantial, Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 295-296 (2001), the Supreme Court has developed a number of tests for determining whether a challenged activity by a private party was a state action. Id. Although the tests are numerous, only some are relevant to the present case. Among the tests that could potentially come into play given the facts before us are (1) whether the state provided “significant encouragement, either overt or covert” and (2) whether the private party was a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” Id. at 296. As to the first test—whether the state provided significant encouragement—the court finds that there is no evidence that the State of Ames significantly encouraged Playland to take the actions it did. Specifically, the court finds nothing in the undisputed facts to indicate that the either the State of Ames or the Amesville police, acting pursuant to the Ames Curfew, encouraged Playland to forcibly detain minors. Accordingly, this test does not support the claim of §1983 liability against Playland. Similarly, the court fails to find evidence of willful, joint activity between Playland and the State sufficient to support §1983 liability. This is true regardless of the fact that one provision of the Ames Curfew authorizes that “[u]pon probable cause, the owner, operator, or employee of an establishment may question any person suspected of being a minor and taking reasonable steps to prevent minors from entering or remaining on the premises during curfew hours.” Ames Gen. L. ch. 87, §4(C). Although some jurisdictions have held that the existence of a statute giving quasi-police powers to merchants is indicative of concerted action between the private party and the state, see, e.g., Murray v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 874 F.2d 555, 559 (8th Cir. 1989); El Fundi v.DeRoche, 625 F. 2d 195, 196 (8th Cir. 1980), this court finds this position unpersuasive. Where, as here, the statute in question is permissive but not mandatory—that is, it permits the private party to take certain actions, but does not compel that such actions be taken – the mere existence of the statute does not indicate state action. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978); see also Morris v. Dillard Department Stores. Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 750-751 (5th Cir. 2001). Because Defendant Playland had the discretion to decide whether it was going to call the police, detain the Plaintiffs, or do otherwise, the statute by itself does not transform Playland into a state actor. Moreover, the undisputed facts in this case provide no other indicia of the type of willful, joint activity that would support §1983 liability against a private party. Although some courts have recognized that state action can be found where a merchant and police act in concert and have a customary plan, Duriso v. K-Mart No. 4195, 559 F2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), this court does not find that such a situation is applicable here. Despite the fact that Playland has detained suspected minors during curfew hours and delivered them to the Amesville police in the past, the court does not find that Playland and the Amesville Police Department have acted in concert and followed a customary plan to detain and cite minors who violate the juvenile curfew. Purely repetitive behavior on the part of the merchants and police, absent prior explicit arrangements, is not sufficient to impose §1983 liability. See Allen v. Columbia Mall, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (D. Md. 1998) (stating that three previous “false shoplifting” complaints filed against mall “would not constitute sufficient circumstantial proof of such custom or practice”).
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants Lu and Jackson’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I and GRANTS Defendant Playland’s motion for summary judgment as to Count II. SO ORDERED Dated: July 27, 2004 ________________________ Eileen Cole United States District Judge
) SPENCER McNEIL, a minor, through his ) parent and next of friend, VANESSA ) McNEIL, and JUAN PEREZ, a minor, ) through his parent and next of friend, ) JOSE PEREZ, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civ. No. 04-267-J ) SAM LU, in his official ) capacity as Chief of Police of Amesville, ) Ames, SARAH JACKSON, in her ) official capacity as Amesly County ) Prosecutor, and AMESVILLE ) PLAYLAND, ) ) Defendants. ) ) NOTICE OF APPEAL Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ames Circuit from a final judgment entered in this action on the 27th day of July, 2004. The first ground for appeal is that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants Jackson and Lu by holding that the Ames Juvenile Curfew Act, Ames Gen. L. ch. 87, §1 et seq., does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights of the Plaintiffs. The second ground for appeal is that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant Amesville Playland by finding that Playland is not a state actor acting under color of state law and therefore cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983. SPENCER MCNEIL AND JUAN PEREZ, Dated: July 28, 2004 By: ____________________ Jeanne A. Doe, Esq. Attorney for the Plaintiffs
) SPENCER McNEIL, a minor, through his ) parent and next of friend, VANESSA ) McNEIL, and JUAN PEREZ, a minor, ) through his parent and next of friend, ) JOSE PEREZ, ) ) Appellants, ) ) v. ) No. 04-506 ) SAM LU, in his official ) capacity as Chief of Police of Amesville, ) Ames, SARAH JACKSON, in her ) official capacity as Amesly County ) Prosecutor, and AMESVILLE ) PLAYLAND, ) ) Appellees. ) ) Before Jessup, Grimes, and Williston, Circuit JudgesDownload 187,5 Kb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham:
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