School Didactics And Learning: a school Didactic Model Framing An Analysis of Pedagogical Implication of Learning Theory

Erlebnis
) as a meaningful sense impression based on a perceptual process. In
other words, it means that we have perceptual impressions caused by something else than ourselves. We
may be aware of these impressions, yet not understand what they mean. These impressions may thus be
given meaning. The meaning of an impression or perception could be established on the basis of earlier
experience in the following way.
Previous experience contains a horizon of future possible changes. This horizon would offer us
preliminary instruments to establish a meaning. Therefore it is reasonable to talk about something being
unexpected. Meeting something unexpected means that an experience is not completely accounted for by
one’s earlier experiences. It is this gap that results in reflection (not necessarily always but generally).
Reflection is thus a way to deal with such a situation.
In accordance with this model, when something incongruous occurs we may ask whether we reflect on
our present (new) experiences or on our previous experiences. On none of them solely, I would say. We
rather reflect on the fact that something did not work, i.e. both on why our previous experience cannot
account for the new experience in a sufficient way 
and
on the nature of the new experience. We cannot act
otherwise because it is only in relation to our previous experience that a new experience may be called
unexpected. And it is only in relation to a new experience that our previous experience is defined as
existing.
Learning and Inventing.
Another perspective on learning which is important from an educational point of
view is whether one can 
learn
something that nobody else knows. This might seem obvious—think of
researchers, one might argue, are they not a perfect example of what learning new insights means? Yet it
seems reasonable to discuss researchers’ work in other terms also. One may, for example, say that researchers
discover new knowledge, construct new theories and develop things.
The difference between learning in this sense and learning something known becomes even more evident
if we notice that some knowledge or skills may be taught to novices in the field. However, nobody can teach
researchers new knowledge. General research methods are of course taught, but not what can be found out
about the world with the help of these methods. And even though every method or approach points out the
2. DIDACTICS AND THE TSL PROCESS
21

---

limits of what one is most likely to achieve (at least with respect to the type of knowledge), this does not include
insight into what will be found. So, we may identify a difference between knowledge that somebody else
has in advance and knowledge that nobody is previously familiar with. On the other hand, a
counterargument could be presented here: it is correct that there seems to be a difference, but if I, as
learner,
am unaware that somebody else knows what I try to learn then the difference seems to cease. For me
as learner it doesn’t matter whether anybody who knows exists or if it is only I who am unaware that
somebody already knows what I am trying to learn. Only one difference may be noticed; if I know (or have
good grounds to believe) that nobody knows what I am trying to learn, this may affect me emotionally or in
some other way. The process of learning may appear more exciting if this is the case, or it may be
frightening because there is nobody to ask.
The point here is that learning something already known is not the same thing as learning something
completely new. This latter activity is often called inventing, discovering or constructing. Plato opened the
discussion of this issue of acquiring new knowledge in the 
Meno
with a paradox: If one knows what one is
trying to learn there is no reason to learn because one already knows it. On the other hand, if one does not
know what one is trying to learn one will never be able to decide whether one has been successful or not.
However, observe that this paradox makes sense only in talking about acquiring the kind of competence
that I call invention (i.e. transcending the known). In the case of known knowledge (i.e. “I know that you
know how to do this, though I myself do not know how to do it”) the case is different. It is certainly
possible to identify knowledge or competence that one would like to reach, but identifying this does not
mean that one has reached it. To know what one wants to learn does not mean knowing how to try to learn
it. The second half of the paradox ceases to be a problem; in the case of identifiable competence we have a
pretty good idea of what is counted as successful.
In 
Fig. 2.2
learning denotes reaching something which the learner recognizes as something new to them,
though it is known by somebody else. In learning something known, i.e. something identified as
competence or knowledge by the learner, a fundamental problem is how an individual constructs the initial
interpretation or chooses a hypothesis to be tested. One’s previous experience seems to contain a limiting
horizon of possibilities which are actualized in relation to different experiences. In the same sense as the
future is present as potentiality, experiencing actualizes possible interpretations (or definitions of a
situation). Some undetermined, round and greyish object in a children’s playground may be interpreted as a
ball or some construction, whereas the same impression in another context may be identified and acted upon
as if it were a dangerous small creature. To explain the limitation of possible interpretations is to explain
important aspects of the process of learning.
There is more, however. Having made a first interpretation, after generating a first heuristic model, we
also choose criteria to decide when something is achieved, i.e. criteria for when a heuristic (initial) model 
works. The individual must decide when an understanding of a situation will do, be deep enough, be
considered acceptable.
Discovery would again point to learning something that the learner recognizes as previously unknown,
not only to themself but also to others, but which in fact is nevertheless known by others. The point here is
that the learner mistakenly believes that she is the only or the first person to know. Inventing would point to
something that is new not only to the learner but also to everybody else (in the world). When we identify
something as being new, there are several aspects of the problem that we have to pay attention to. Two
fundamental aspects are (a) the conceptual field within which something is identified not only as different
but also as new, and (b) those individuals who form the “social reference group”. Now, from the learner’s
point of view, learning as Discovery and Invention may be similar; the learner simply does not necessarily
know that there 
are
people who already have the competence to be reached. This is not a shortcoming of the
22
SCHOOL DIDACTICS AND LEARNING

---

learner; the distinction between discovery and invention is possible only when some competence is reached
and acknowledged.
At this point I would like to remind the reader that I am only trying to point out what is changing in
learning, i.e. what kind of changes are counted as learning; I will not go into an analysis of the process of
how this change occurs. For example, I do not discuss questions of prior experience or knowledge nor how
to generalize context or domain-specific skills or competence, i.e. how competence is de-contextualized or
made context-independent.
In a sense one may compare a teacher’s knowledge and tasks with a researcher’s—they both try to
pinpoint a problem. The teacher does this to the student, the researcher to themself. In comparing the student’s
knowledge with the teacher’s, a logical gap may often be identified and a teacher may construct a problem
for the student based on this comparison. The researcher asks themself in a sense the same questions as a
teacher asks the student; namely those that are confined to what is known and aim at a penetration into the
unknown. A question may function as the generative motor in moving from the known into the twilight
zone of knowledge.
Reproductive teaching corresponds to learning as described above, while productive (constructive,
generative) teaching corresponds to field 2 (a kind of “directed, basic pedagogical practice”, simulated as-if-
situations). It appears that this is about as far as educational work can go. The last step, invention, definitely
touches (in a sense goes beyond) the borders of what is possible in an educational setting.
The educational implication of the distinction between known and unknown is that only invented,
discovered or constructed knowledge can be taught; only something discovered can be shown. Something
undiscovered cannot be an object of instruction, something unexperienced cannot be explicated.
We can thus see that the concept of teaching may also help us in delimiting the phenomenon of learning.
One could, in fact, define learning as achievement of teachable competence, i.e. reaching competence that is
possible to achieve by pedagogical means. This definition does not suggest that teaching is a necessary element
in reaching a certain degree of competence nor that this must be done in an educational setting. The
competence could perfectly well be reached by other means as well (individually, in ordinary activity,
unconsciously, by mistake, etc.). The only requirement demanded in this definition is that the process of
reaching or moving towards competence must be possible to facilitate through pedagogical efforts.
FIG. 2.2. 1. Learning something that the learner is aware that somebody else knows. 2. Discovery. “Learning”
something that is recognized (by the learner) as new both to the learner and others, yet, in fact, is known by others. 3.
Invention. “Learning” something completely new, not known before either by the learner (subject) or by anybody else.
2. DIDACTICS AND THE TSL PROCESS
23

---

CONCLUSION
To summarize, one might say that a theory of learning should specify both what is changing through the
process of learning and how this change should be described. In this chapter the focus has been on the first
of these questions.
From a pedagogical perspective on learning and cognition it appears important to pay attention to the
relation between the content of human experience and external (social, cultural) reality as well. How an
individual adopts certain cultural ways of acting and how cultural patterns are kept alive by this individual
engagement is certainly interesting from a pedagogical perspective. To focus on this relation also directs the
attention to the problem of how individuals transcend established cultural patterns.
ON TEACHING, STUDYING AND LEARNING
I will now summarize what has been stated previously, as well as defining more precisely the relation
between teaching, studying and learning.
Since education is generally thought to lead to an increase in competence, knowledge, skill, insight or the
like and since it is widely held that this process of increase or change may be called learning, it may be
useful to start here when we discuss the relation between teaching and learning.
We first get the following relation (
Fig. 2.3
):
According to proposition (1) learning always leads to competence or the like. However, if learning also
leads to changes in personality and if having a personality is not a skill, insight, or competence, then it seems
as if learning also leads to changes in things other than competence. Thus the assumption above would not
hold true. The first modification to be made on the basis of the analysis above results in 
Fig. 2.4
.
If we accept the figure above, it is time to include teaching in the analysis. Teaching is often defined as
intentional activity aiming at supporting someone’s learning.
The relation in 
Fig. 2.5
assumes (a) that teaching always leads to learning and (b) that everything learned
is a result of teaching.
With respect to the first assumption, that teaching