School Didactics And Learning: a school Didactic Model Framing An Analysis of Pedagogical Implication of Learning Theory

specific
types of physical states as counterparts of certain types of
mental states; token identity theory limits the demands, requiring that every mental state has to have 
some
brain-physiological correlate. Functionalism again accepts 
any
kind of physical state as a correlate to
mental states, i.e. both physiological and physical.
The previous distinctions also show in what sense functionalism is dualistic. Functionalism is not
dualistic in the sense of Cartesian two-substance dualism but it represents Cartesian dualism in that genuine
human experience should not be described on a neurophysiological level although cognition is dependent on
the human brain. Functionalism, like neurophysiological psychology, thus represents a kind of mind-
physical instance dualism in that physical states other than physiological brain states can be said to be in
experiential states.
A reason for the popularity of functionalism is that according to this view psychology remains
methodologically autonomous, i.e. it cannot be reduced to the neurophysiological structure of the brain.
Thus there is a logical difference from the eliminative materialist position represented by physical-level
psychology, which tries to explain mental events in purely physicalistic or neuroscientific terms (see
Churchland). It is against this background that it becomes interesting to construct systems of functional
states in terms of computer simulations to be compared with human behaviour aiming at discovering the
functional organization of humans.
A second positive feature of this view is that it offers a quite simple way of dealing with the notion of the
unconscious mind. The position accepted is that one may view conscious awareness as the usage of
a limited part of the information stored in the memory. As Jackendoff (1989, pp. 16–17) says: “inactive
information can be regarded as unconscious—but still mental… Thus, the conscious and unconscious parts
of the mind are of the same character, built of information and the processes that operate upon it”.
SUMMARY
In the previous analysis, the process and result of the cognitivist view of learning were systematically
related to the ontological and epistemological problem within the philosophy of mind. The analysis was
6. FEATURES OF COGNITIVISM
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reported in accordance with the four relations identified. The process and the result of learning were thus
discussed both in terms of the epistemological problem and in terms of the ontological problem. In short,
the result revealed the following.
Learning in the Light of the Epistemological Problem
The epistemological problem actualized the relation between the content of awareness and external reality.
The first question was how cognitivist theory conceives of this relation when an individual has knowledge of
something. The second question was how the process of learning may be understood in terms of changes in
the so-called mind-world relation.
The results of the analysis concerning these questions revealed the following. During the learning process
an individual receives information about the surrounding world via the sensory systems and the brain. This
information has a subject-independent existence, i.e. it exists independently of an experiencing individual.
This information is then received and manipulated by the human information-processing system. Often
some type of causal relation between external reality and the receiving sensory system seems to be accepted.
This information is then encoded and manipulated by the cognitive system.
The result of this process is conceptual knowledge which may be described in terms of individual
systems of information stored in some representational format. This conceptual structure, a scheme, mental
model or the like, is then an individual representation of the surrounding world. The correspondence
between the individual conceptual structure and the structure of the external reality may consequently be
evaluated.
The epistemological analysis thus shows that the cognitivist position may be described in terms of a
representative epistemology or a dualist epistemological position. In some cases it seems that this dualist
epistemology is based upon scientific critical realism according to which the world has independent
existence, but that its meaning is to be established in terms of a relation between the experiencing subject’s
previous knowledge and their sensory input of the world.
However, there seems to be an unsolved conflict between the view of the individual as an active agent
constructing interpretations and the view according to which the individual receives and treats information.
On the one hand, the cognitivist thinks that it may be possible to obtain a true picture of the world by
relating pieces of information to each other. This view often occurs in connection with the implicit
assumption of a causal theory of perception. On the other hand, in cognitivist-oriented positions supporting
a view of learning as a constructive process, experiences do not have any straightforward relation to
external reality. On the contrary, a constructivist cannot evaluate their experiences by comparing them with
a world as such, precisely because experiencing is always a constructive process. In this respect
constructivism represents some version of epistemological idealism.
Finally it should be noted that the result of the learning process is discussed in a much more detailed way
compared with the process of learning. From an epistemological perspective on the mind-world problem,
learning is close to the assimilative process through which information is incorporated into the individual’s
conceptual structure. In order to discuss how the content of mind changes in learning, the ontological level
was a necessary level of analysis.