School Didactics And Learning: a school Didactic Model Framing An Analysis of Pedagogical Implication of Learning Theory

seems
to be an
object before us, but not that there really 
is
an object. The problem is thus how sure we can be that our
experiences have external, objective correlates.
This sceptical interpretation (B) was carried further by the British empiricists. John Locke (1632–1704)
represented the causal theory of perception, according to which perceiving was to have sensations caused by
the things themselves (Locke, 1961). More specifically the primary qualities of objects were received by the
perceptual system (Hamlyn, 1967, p. 23). Simple ideas did not receive any contribution from the mind. The
construction of complex ideas, i.e. knowledge, was possible as the mind was capable of repeating,
comparing and uniting simple ideas. One can say that Locke was a clear empiricist concerning the sources of
ideas but a rationalist with regard to knowledge, as human reason was able to construct complex ideas. It is
useful to note that Locke conceived of inner experience, called reflection, as a type of experience in addition
to outer sense experience (sensation). Also, the simple ideas stemming from reflection could be combined
into complex ideas.
The point in the present context is that according to Locke human knowledge was not a copy of the
external world. However, although we do not have access to the essence of the things themselves, Locke
postulated the existence of primary qualities as the foundation for his empiricism (see Haag, 1988, pp. 57–
58).
In defining reflection, i.e. thinking about one’s own thinking, Locke clearly stressed the individual
dimension, the knowing subject. Locke argues that reflection upon simple ideas results in the creating of the
self. Remembering how I was aware of something earlier and comparing that awareness with my awareness
of something present is the foundation of personal identity. Identity is thus the result of correspondence
between two conceptions of myself. By this identification the subject becomes a recognizing subject.
FIG. 6.3. What do we have access to—the real chair or the conceived chair?
6. FEATURES OF COGNITIVISM
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The existence of personal identity has its foundation in a state of consciousness. The Cartesian man can
thus be seen as a reflecting man, not as an acting man (cf. Marková, 1982). Reflection is thus prior to action
in the sense that to be sure of our existence we must be conscious of our acts. As Marková (1982) puts it, to
say that “I walk, therefore I exist” must refer to the awareness of doing this. More precisely one should say:
“I am aware that I walk, therefore I exist”.
George Berkeley (1685–1753) again advanced one step from Locke’s position; not only were the
secondary qualities constructed by the mind as Locke had argued, but also primary qualities (extension,
shape, etc.). His position is condensed in the new principle, “Esse est percipi”, according to which the
objects of experience only exist as being experienced. This position is usually called epistemological or
subjective idealism (Hamlyn, 1967, p. 25). Berkeley’s position should not be misunderstood—he did not
argue that the outer world does not exist. What he asserts is that unexperienced reality does not make sense
(Marc-Wogau, 1983, p. 219). Consequently, objects not experienced by individuals exist anyway, as they
are experienced by a God.
Like Berkeley, David Hume (1711–1776) argued that man in direct experience is aware only of his ideas.
Thus, Hume denies the causal role of primary qualities accepted by Locke. As ideas were the only objects
of certain knowledge, the existence of external objects, causal relations etc. had to be inferred from
perceptual evidence. The associative rules guaranteed the coherence of perception.
Rationalists (e.g. Descartes) argued that absolutely certain knowledge is possible only in conceptual
domains like logic and mathematics, which are not dependent on empirical reality. The empiricists thought
that sources of knowledge consist in our experience, and true knowledge of the outer reality should thus be
possible (Uljens, 1994b, pp. 40 ff.). The empiricists (Hume), however, did not succeed in reaching true
knowledge of the world because they were trapped in the sceptical tradition and made a distinction between
the world as such and the world as perceived. The empiricist conclusion was thus extremely close to
Descartes’ position; only propositions about the world as perceived were possible.
The difference between Locke’s and Hume’s empiricism is crucial in this context. Whereas Locke
preserved the idea of a causal theory of perception concerning primary qualities, Hume did not accept this
position. Therefore it appears that present-day cognitivism is closer to Lockean than to Humean empiricism
as a causal theory of perception is accepted. While Locke accepted that the mechanism by which simple
ideas were combined into complex ideas was an innate capacity to unite, compare and repeat ideas,
contemporary cognitivism is often silent about what is innate, although the question is debated. Cognitivism
rather emphasizes the individual’s capacity to construct new methods of connecting simple ideas with each
other.
The Kantian Impact
Finally there is reason to briefly consider the Kantian solution, which in a certain sense combined the
rationalistic and empiricist traditions. In accordance with the empiricists, Kant (1724–1804) thought that
knowledge of empirical reality must be possible. Further he thought, like the empiricists, that the only
reality we have access to is the experienced, phenomenal, reality. The reality-as-such is impossible to reach
in direct experience but nevertheless exists. In order to avoid the risk of solipsism or idealism in both
rationalism and empiricism he locked the mind by introducing aprioristic categories and relational concepts
which organize sense impressions. The forms of perception