At present, information processing is an approach taken by different theorists who derive their
theoretical constructs from a common loosely related framework. It is possible, of course,
to construct
theories within the information processing framework but it would be a mistake to assume that there
is a single grand theory of information processing.
It is often stated that one of the fundamental aspects of cognitive psychology is that it tries “to specify the
internal processing involved in perception, language, memory and thought”. We may thus conclude that
cognitive psychology as information processing psychology may be seen as a fundamental part of cognitive
science.
Computationalism as a Cognitivist Approach
According to the computational
conception of mind, mentality is seen as a composite of processes that are
computational. According to this view the mind can at some level be described as a purely computational
device, in other words as “a symbol manipulating engine that operates only on syntactic features of inputs
and its own internal representation” (Cole, 1990, p. 3). This means that computations are performed on the
basis of purely formal or physical properties of the states of the system. The subproperties do not have any
semantic or pragmatic properties and nothing which directly corresponds to beliefs, knowledge or other
folkpsychological explanations.
This view of the mind has also been called the computer metaphor because
of the importance of the
electronic computer in explaining human cognition within cognitive science. It is difficult to overestimate
the role of the computer in cognitive science since it is claimed that “…it is important to all understanding of
the human mind” (Gardner, 1987, pp. 6, 38). The computer has two main functions within cognitive science.
The first reveals its core idea, which is that the computer serves as a model of human thought. It is
considered that it is “…the most viable model of how the human mind functions” (Gardner, 1987, p. 38)
and that it “…serves a theoretical and philosophical role”. The concept of the computer itself serves as a
“theoretical model for cognitive science” (Cole, 1990, p. 2). The second function the computer has is as a
tool by which empirical
data are analysed and also, more importantly, as a means of simulating cognitive
processes. For this reason the representations mentioned above must be expressed in an internal language
which is more like a computer language than natural language, since it has to contain “definitions for well
formed structures and operations upon them” (Hunt, 1989, p. 604). Fodor (1975) has called this internal
language mentalese. Information processing theories thus answer two questions: what kind
of language
mentalese is and what sort of operations manipulate these data-structures.
When we talk about the computer metaphor it must be remembered that some researchers use the
computer precisely as a metaphor. Neisser, (1976) for example, argued that though programmes have very
much in common with cognition, one should stay at the level of metaphor. Others, like Pylyshyn (1984), see
the similarity more literally.
It has also been suggested that this area of research, which is concerned with trying
to express human
cognition in terms of abstract models, could be called cognitive modelling. This view is “based on the
conception of the human brain as a physical symbol system consisting of a representation system and the
processes which manipulate it” (Aitkenhead & Slack, 1987, p. ix). This modelling approach has developed
within two areas, cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence.
Within cognitive psychology modelling means formulation of information processing models. These are
evaluated against experimental data. Within computationalism cognitive modelling means building
computer-based models of cognition. This approach to conceiving computationalism conceives of it as a
5. OBJECT OF ANALYSIS
103
technology, not a psychology. The aim here is to develop artificial systems that can achieve intelligent
behaviour. However it is important to notice that one can also view computationalism from another
perspective, that is, as an attempt to develop a theory about human intelligence, i.e. to see computationalism
as a psychology. The aim is then to explain human behaviour as such as in cognitive psychology. The
generally accepted simulative goal has been evident since its very beginning at the end of the 50s. Newell,
Shaw and Simon wrote
in an early paper called
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