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Political rage terrorism and the politics of emotion

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Global Change, Peace & Security

ISSN: 1478-1158 (Print) 1478-1166 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpar20

Political rage: terrorism and the politics of

emotion

David Wright-Neville & Debra Smith

To cite this article:

David Wright-Neville & Debra Smith (2009) Political rage: terrorism

and the politics of emotion, Global Change, Peace & Security, 21:1, 85-98, DOI:

10.1080/14781150802659390

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Political rage: terrorism and the politics of emotion

David Wright-Neville

and Debra Smith

Global Terrorism Research Centre and Department of Political and Social Inquiry,

Monash University, Caulfield and Clayton, Victoria, Australia

Recently there has been a renewed interest in the role of emotion as both a site of political

knowledge and as a contributing dynamic in the stability or upheaval of political institutions.

While it is widely recognised that emotion is directly implicated in terrorist behaviour, terror-

ism studies has not critically engaged in this revitalised theorising. As a small step towards

addressing this analytical gap we argue that there is a need to see terrorism as a political

act grounded in a particular set of human emotions triggered in certain social circumstances.

We begin with a brief discussion of the treatment of emotion within terrorism studies before

examining how modernity might contribute to an intensification of emotion within political

behaviour. We posit that one outcome of this intensification is the adoption of violent

forms of political agency by individuals seeking to address real or perceived grievances.

Keywords:

emotion; terrorism; political violence; political emotions; rage

Introduction

Understanding the relationship between emotion and human behaviour has long fascinated those

who endeavour to contribute to a broader knowledge of human nature. Great classical philoso-

phers such as Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes and Hume all had identifiable theories

of emotion. It was Cicero, for instance, who reminded orators of his day of the power of emotion

when attempting to persuade an audience. In particular he encouraged the use of

pathos

(the

appeal to emotion), because it is by drawing on emotion, he argued, that opinion can be

swayed most effectively.

Leaders within the global

neojihadist

movement also recognise the importance of emotion in

mobilising the sometimes latent political agency of their audience.

Neojhadist

literature is

replete with narratives that use emotion to trigger direct political action. For example, the fol-

lowing quote taken from what could loosely be described as a ‘jihad-friendly’ website is indica-

tive of a style of discourse that attempts to evoke certain emotional responses among a target

audience; responses which are then used to consolidate a new community of resistance.

‘Know, my beloved brother, that the path of Jiha¯d is not paved with roses, rather it is a path

that is paved with severed limbs and blood, and it is full of fear and danger.’

In the case of

neojihadi

terrorism, an examination of martyr videos, filmatic montages such as those of the

Corresponding author. Email: David.Wright-Neville@arts.monash.edu.au

Here we have in mind Cicero’s

De Oratore

, particularly book I, chapter V.

For an explanation of the concept of

neojihadism

and its utility as an explanatory concept see Pete Lentini, ‘Antipodal

Terrorists? Accounting for Differences in Australian and “Global” Neojihadists’, in

The Globalization of Violence

ed. Richard Devetak and Christopher W. Hughes (London and New York: Routledge 2008), 181 – 202.

For example see M. Hafez, ‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and

Biographies’,

Terrorism and Political Violence

19, no. 1 (2007): 95 – 115.

Abu Usamah Al-Hazin, ‘To the One who falls Imprisoned: Messages of Advice’, http:

tibyan.wordpress.com

2008

to-the-one-who-falls-into-imprisonment-messages-of-advice

(accessed 11 June 2008).

Global Change, Peace & Security

Vol. 21, No. 1, February 2009, 85 – 98

ISSN 1478-1158 print

ISSN 1478-1166 online

2009 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14781150802659390

http:

www.informaworld.com

Baghdad Sniper, still images, websites, and sermons designed to motivate and inspire young

men to accept violent forms of

neojihadist

ideology all illustrate the strong emphasis given to

emotive narratives.

Emotive writing is combined with pictures showing Muslim people

being mistreated or humiliated in an attempt to provoke or escalate outrage and anger within

the wider Muslim community. These emotional appeals are often then juxtaposed against

pictures of Muslims actively fighting American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, or resisting

forces in other conflict zones such as Chechnya and Kashmir, in an attempt to ignite emotional

responses and transform them into political action.

As Davies has noted in an earlier exploration of the role of affect in politics, individuals

search for sites of political participation when they experience something that draws so

deeply on their emotions that it initiates a forceful response.

Davies’ focus was on applying

the insights of psychology to understanding the realm of political agency within its institutiona-

lised forms. Moreover, Davies did so in a scholarly era when violence cast in religious or cultural

terms was largely considered a thing of the past. However, with the benefit of hindsight, his

observations hold for new sites of political agency that have arisen in response to globalisation

and which have resurrected the potency of religion and culture as organising principles for

political resistance.

While the meaning of ‘globalisation’ remains highly contested, and undoubtedly means

different things to different people, one comparatively non-controversial aspect of globalising

processes as far as scholarship is concerned has been the development of fresh arenas within

which new political relationships can be formed.

This development provides novel challenges

for understanding the relationship between emotion and political action as we are now faced with

the emergence of innovative political, cultural, economic and psychological structures, all of

which have a simultaneously local and global dimension.

The experiences which elicit the

sort of deeply emotional responses that drive a person towards political engagement are becom-

ing increasingly complex as individuals become more sensitive to events taking place outside

their own spatially and temporally defined environment. At the level of foreign policy, for

example, the complicating consequences of this development have been spelled out in the

manner in which diasporic communities can now become both politically energised and inspired

to network globally against policy initiatives implemented by the governments of their adopted

lands.

9

This is not to say that their emotional bonds remain solely with their nations of origin.

This is far too simplistic in today’s world. Rather, emotional attachment is complicated by

multiple loyalties that extend beyond nations and which vary in intensity from issue to issue

and, naturally, person to person.

This increasingly complex relationship between affect, political participation and globalisa-

tion is expressed in the following comments made by Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the

suicide bombers who carried out the attacks on the London public transport system on 7 July

2005:

Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all

over the world, and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly respon-

sible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be

Although the same concept can be applied to terrorism perpetrated by many non-Muslim groups.

A.F. Davies,

Skills, Outlooks and Passions: A Psychoanalytic Contribution to the Study of Politics

(Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1980), 293.

Zygmunt Bauman,

Liquid Modernity

(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

Zygmunt Bauman, ‘On Glocalization: Or Globalization for Some, Localization for Others’,

Thesis Eleven

no 54

(1998): 37 – 49. Also see John Urry,

Global Complexity

(Malden, MA: Polity, 2003).

See Shane Brighton, ‘British Muslims, Multiculturalism, and UK Foreign Policy: “Integration” and “Cohesion”

Beyond the State’,

International Affairs

83, no. 1 (2007), 1 – 17.

D. Wright-Neville and D. Smith

our targets, and until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment, and torture of my people we will

not stop this fight.

From the perspective of analysing motive it is the case that the accuracy of Khan’s grievances is

less important than the way in which his perceptions of them shaped his actions. In Khan’s case,

his emotional attachment to fellow ‘Muslim brothers and sisters’ overwhelmed his emotional

attachments to secular Muslims in the UK, who in other parts of the video he chastises and ident-

ifies as legitimate targets for violence. The passions displayed by Khan evince an allegiance to

the ideals and values of an imagined transnational polity – a community of ‘legitimate’ believers

existing beyond spatial boundaries. Simultaneously, his passions towards the polity into which

he was born and had lived all his life had gradually taken on a hostile and retributive tone – so

much so that he no longer identified himself with fellow Britons, experiencing instead a deeply

rooted sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, with the principal protagonists being his own government and its

non-Muslim and Muslim supporters.

In short, emotion – or more precisely emotional attachment – has become the site of a

vigorous tug of war. As globalisation dilutes the emotional power of narratives centring on

the nation state and opens up ever varied spaces for alternative emotional attachments, global

terrorist networks such as al Qaeda have entered the emotional marketplace. Their skill lies in

an ability to tap into emotions such as anger, frustration and humiliation through a narrative

that explains these existential phenomena in terms of victimhood and oppression by outsiders.

However, at the same time the narratives pushed by

neojihadist

groups are designed to stimulate

positive emotions such as love, compassion, loyalty, solidarity and pride and then to channel

these feelings towards political action.

The case of Mohammad Sidique Khan demonstrates that emotion remains a vital dimension

of individual political agency, a powerful source of connectedness within terrorist groups, but

also an under-utilised weapon for countering terrorism. Despite this, political passions and

emotion have rarely figured in contemporary theories of terrorism and as such they are

largely ignored as analytical tools. As a first step towards addressing this lacuna there is a

need to recognise the critical nexus between emotion and violent political agency.

Before

this can be done, however, there is a need for emotion to be historically and sociologically con-

textualised. To paraphrase Laqueur, terrorism has almost always been a reflection of the society

in which it occurs, and so just as the appeal of the anarchist terrorist group the Narodniks was a

reflection of the deprivations of tsarist Russia in the late 1800s, so too is the terrorism of

contemporary groups an expression of real of perceived deprivations in the modern world.

Terrorism studies and emotion

In recent years many scholars working in the field of political science have attempted to

reinvigorate the study of emotion, highlighting its importance to contemporary political

Taken from the suicide video of Mohammed Sidiq. The video and a transcript are available from the Middle East

Media Research Institute (MEMRI) website, http:

www.memritv.org

(accessed 20 September 2007).

In this sense we are suggesting the continuation of work on how the emotions of individuals might interact with

social conditions to result in acts of violence or brutality. Notable earlier studies on this include Thomas

J. Scheff and Suzanne M. Retzinger,

Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts

(Lincoln,

NE: iUniverse, 2001 [1991]); James Gilligan,

Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes

(New York:

Putnam Publishing Group, 1996); Roger D. Peterson,

Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resent-

ment in Twentieth-century Eastern Europe

(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Jack

Barbalet, ‘Emotions in Politics: From the Ballot to Suicide Terrorism’, in

Emotion, Politics and Society

, ed.

Simon Clarke, Paul Hoggett and Simon Thompson (Houndmills, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan,

2006), 31 – 59; Jonathan H. Turner, ‘Self, Emotions, and Extreme Violence: Extending Symbolic Interactionist

Theorizing’,

Symbolic Interaction

30, no. 4 (2007): 501 – 30.

Walter Laqueur,

No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty First Century

(New York: Continuum, 2003), 11 – 12.

Global Change, Peace & Security

challenges.

However, Terrorism Studies has been a notable exception to this trend, even though

it is generally accepted that emotion is an important dynamic in terrorist behaviour.

In his recent

critique of methodologies in Terrorism Studies, Gunning suggests that there has been a tendency

to focus on delegitimising the actions of terrorists and favouring the objectives and perspectives of

state security over any systematic examination of the subjective journeys of those who engage in

sub-state terrorist practices.

Some clear exceptions to this exist within the recently reinvigorated

sub-field of terrorist psychology.

However, even within this realm the role of emotion has not

been systematically examined. Reasons for this may include real difficulties surrounding both

methodology and the obvious dangers in accessing and interviewing subjects. However, it may

also be interpreted as a side-effect of long-running debates surrounding pathology or normality

within terrorists’ psychology. That is to say, in the largely successful attempt to establish that

terrorists are driven by rational political beliefs rather than psychopathological tendencies,

emotions may have been inadvertently relegated to the category of the ‘irrational’.

Those who have sought to ground terrorist behaviour in broadly psychopathological traits (as

opposed to mental illness) have tended to draw unproblematically on the passions to emphasise

the role of emotions such as anger, frustration, aggression, humiliation and hatred. As such,

Peters claims to have found evidence of ‘the madness of a civilization’ in the political passions

of Islamic activists.

In a more nuanced application of the principles of psychological analysis,

Post has demonstrated how ethno-nationalist terrorism in particular is a result of hatred ‘bred to

the bone’.

From this perspective, passion is presented as a pathological bias that distorts ration-

ality in ways that make an individual vulnerable to violent forms of political expression.

Alternatively, scholars such as Horgan and Silke point out that terrorist acts represent only

the final public act of a much longer often silent process in which people from a variety of back-

grounds and with various personality traits become radicalised.

This idea of the evolution of

terrorist violence acknowledges the role of emotions, particularly frustration, anger and humilia-

tion in driving a person towards an incremental embrace of violence, and as such it acknowl-

edges the importance of emotional processes. Of similar value are examinations of the

For example see Neta Crawford, ‘The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relation-

ships’,

International Security

24, no. 4 (2000): 116 – 56; Jonathan Mercer, ‘Rationality and Psychology in

International Politics’,

International Organizations

59 (Winter 2005): 77 – 106; Emma Hutchinson and Roland

Bleiker, ‘Fear no More: Emotions and World Politics’,

Review of International Studies

34 (2008): 115 – 35.

This acceptance is expressed by Slavoj Z

ˇ izˇek when he connects the violent acts of terrorism to the experience of resent-

ment. Importantly, however, Z

ˇ izˇek suggests that violence needs to be explored in both its ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’

forms, therefore connecting terrorists’ experiences of resentment and subsequent violent behaviour to the wider social

conditions in which it manifests. See Slavoj Z

ˇ izˇek,

Violence

(London: Profile Books, 2008), especially 72 – 9.

Jeroen Gunning, ‘A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?’,

Government and Opposition

, 42, no. 3 (2007): 368 – 71. It

should also be noted here that Gunning expresses a degree of scepticism over whether a delineated field of ‘terrorism

studies’ actually exists. Furthermore, he questions the value of creating such a separate discipline on the grounds that

it may ‘limit the necessity for interdisciplinary’.

For example see John Horgan,

The Psychology of Terrorism

(London and New York: Routledge, 2005); Andrew

Silke, ed.,

Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences

(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003); James Jones,

The Blood the Cries Out from the Earth: The Psychology of Religious

Terrorism

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Max Abrahms has recently challenged the Strategic Choice Model of terrorism suggesting that it largely ignores the

role of affective ties. Although suggesting that the role of affect is not limited to bonds of solidarity between ter-

rorists, we certainly agree that this is a significant area of importance. Like Abrahms, we reject the idea that an affec-

tive component in terrorist behaviour renders their behaviour irrational. See Max Abrahms, ‘What Terrorists Really

Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy’,

International Security

32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 78 – 105.

Ralph Peters,

Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World

(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), 57.

Jerrold Post,

The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from al Qaeda to the IRA

(Basingstoke:

Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007). Post emphasises the role of hate in constructing terrorists’ psychological ordering.

John Horgan, ‘The Social and Psychological Characteristics of Terrorism and Terrorists’, in

Root Causes of Terror-

ism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward

, ed. Tore Bjorgo (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 51; Andrew

Silke, ‘Becoming a Terrorist’, in

Terrorists,Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its

Consequences

, ed. Andrew Silke (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003), 29 – 54.

D. Wright-Neville and D. Smith

importance of group solidarity and of terrorists’ perceptions of themselves as soldiers in a just

war – a terrorist ontology that draws on notions of pride as well as in-group compassion and

love. The role of emotion in terrorist behaviour is also obvious with respect to the notion of ‘trig-

gering events’ – incidents that tip an individual from being a passive yet angry observer into an

active and motivated terrorist. Using the events of Bloody Sunday on 30 January 1972 in North-

ern Ireland as an example, Horgan points out how triggering events built ‘a sense of communal

identification with the victimized, and an often unwavering, confident dedication to the preser-

vation and importance of the memory of the particular event itself’.

The deaths of 13 unarmed

demonstrators, shot by a parachute regiment of the British Army, had a catalysing impact on the

republican community and boosted significantly intramural emotional bonds and attachment to

the provisional IRA as a ‘defender’ of ‘Irish’ welfare and rights.

These approaches to explaining terrorist acts contribute significantly to our understanding of

the role of emotion in driving the process of becoming a terrorist. However, they fall short of

systematically analysing the way in which emotion is formed in response to judgements or

appraisals regarding the empirical world.

In other words, while the recognition of emotion

in the evolution of terrorism is an important step forward, models of terrorism are still not

integrated into wider theories of contemporary society. As a result, there is a tendency to

treat terrorists and terrorism as

sui generis

, as an aberrant phenomena disconnected from

wider social and political contexts. Against this, there is a need to view emotions not just as

biologically determined reactions to a given situation (as in ‘lashing out in anger’ or ‘seething

with rage’), but as socially and culturally constructed human phenomena that cannot be divorced

from the wider social circumstances in which people find themselves.

This is not to argue that

all terrorists are innocent victims of their social circumstances, but as individual political agents

they craft a world view, and set of responses to it, out of a personal emotional repertoire that is

heavily influenced by events that surround them. From this perspective, it is important to note

that those who begin the psychological trajectory towards terrorist behaviour may draw on

emotional energy generated from both historical and immediate social contexts which they

perceived as exclusionary, oppressive and sometimes cruel.

The tendency to ignore the role of emotion in the public sphere has a long history. The

Enlightenment’s favouring of science and reason over emotion has left us with an understanding

of emotion as something that needs to be conquered or subsumed by reason. Underpinning most

Enlightenment theories of emotion and human behaviour has been a conviction that emotion is

problematic, something that distorts or interferes with reason. Emotion was often viewed as a

powerful yet enigmatic force that needed to be controlled or repressed in order for (wo)man

to maximise her

his freedom within society. Within theories of International Relations, this per-

spective is expressed most strongly within the Realist school of thought wherein the passions are

understood as powerful yet dangerous forces of human behaviour which unless restrained loom

as a perennial threat to peace. This has led to theories and policies designed to protect states from

‘irrational’ outbursts by purging diplomacy of any semblance of emotion. Rather, diplomacy is

taught and practised under an imaginary cloak of dispassionate rationality.

In the wake of the Cold War Samuel Huntington’s much debated

Clash of Civilizations

thesis

helped rejuvenate the idea that emotion and passion remained an aspect of diplomacy when he

Horgan,

The Psychology of Terrorism

, 87.

For an excellent discussion on the relationship between emotion and judgement see Martha C. Nussbaum,

Uphea-

vals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

This idea is explored more fully in Social Movement Theory. For example see, Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and

Francesca Polletta, eds.,

Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements

(Chicago and London: University of

Chicago Press, 2001); and Helena Flam and Debra King, eds.,

Emotions and Social Movements

(London and

New York: Routledge, 2005).

James Waller,

Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing

(Oxford: Oxford Univer-

sity Press 2007), 269.

Global Change, Peace & Security

suggested that Judeo-Christian civilisation differed from non-Western civilisations partly by the

extent to which the former had successfully distanced reason from emotion in the shaping of

political institutions and agency. This theory achieved a new saliency in the wake of 9

when Huntingtonesque themes were quickly appropriated to explain why Muslims in particular

were prone to such outrageous acts of violence. From this perspective, political emotions have

taken on a particularly dangerous cultural flavour.

For many who are influenced by this view,

the tendency of Muslim communities to allow their emotions to shape their actions not only mili-

tates against rational behaviour, but it also presages a new era of conflict and uncertainty.

Applied to the phenomenon of terrorism, however, this view is at odds with the widely held con-

sensus that terrorists are in fact rational political actors whose actions reflect the outcome of a

steady intensification of feelings of injustice, deprivation and humiliation. Yet it is our view

that even this critique of the Huntingtonesque undertones of much contemporary terrorism

analysis fails to negotiate an adequate understanding of the actual nexus between emotions

and terrorist behaviour. In an attempt to distance themselves from this understanding of the

irrational and destructive emotional forces underpinning terrorism, the general field of Terrorism

Studies has focused on the rationality of terrorists’ psychological ordering in a way that has by-

passed any systematic examination of the emotions. As Neta Crawford has claimed in relation to

the broader study of International Relations, we need to examine how emotions such as anger,

fear, hate, love, compassion and frustration, to name a few, are institutionalised within our exist-

ing social structures and political processes and how this interacts with individual emotional

responses to changing events in the world.

As a step towards this end there is a need for meso-level examinations that draw on multi-

disciplinary research to understand terrorist behaviour. Such an approach offers the possibility

of exploring how an individual’s emotions are developed within broader, more dynamic

emotional processes.

That is to say, we need to begin to explore how an individual’s emotion-

al life is deeply influenced by, but also influences, their perception and experience of the social

world. This level of analysis seems particularly suited to a study of terrorist behaviour because it

prioritises the role of an individual’s perception of their wider social milieu when considering

how micro-level mechanisms become activated, triggered and sustained within particular social

environments. We also need to explore how a person’s experience of emotion helps them to

move towards political action, but, more importantly, towards a particular

type

of political

action, in this case violence. A focus on the mediating role of emotion will contribute to an

understanding of how anger, frustration and humiliation, or even of love and compassion,

helps frame an individual’s psychological process of rationalising violence. Interviews with ter-

rorists and examinations of terrorist biographies suggest that feelings of anger, humiliation and

frustration figure significantly in the process leading towards terrorist behaviour.

However,

terrorists also strongly express emotions such as love (in the case of

neojihadists

, of Allah,

their colleagues, and the

Ummah

), compassion (for those they perceive as suffering under the

existing system) and although it might be difficult for some to acknowledge, courage. While

emotions such as anger, humiliation or frustration can contribute to a person seeking a

See Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells, eds.,

The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy

(New York:

Columbia University Press, 2003).

See Neta Crawford, ‘The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships’,

Inter-

national Security

24, no. 4 (2000): 119.

Christian von Scheve and Rolf von Luede, ‘Emotion and Social Structures: Towards an Interdisciplinary Approach’,

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

35, no. 3 (2005): 306.

For example see, Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita Denny, ‘The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews

with Thirty Five Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists’,

Terrorism and Political Violence

15, no. 1 (2003): 171 –

84; Andrew Silke, ‘Becoming a Terrorist’; Marc Sageman,

Understanding Terror Networks

(Philadelphia: Univer-

sity of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Christine Fair and Bryan Shepherd, ‘Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from

Fourteen Muslim Countries’,

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

29, no. 1 (2006): 51 – 74.

D. Wright-Neville and D. Smith

pathway for political action, love and compassion are necessary for the moral justification and

framing of a terrorist act and for maintaining solidarity within the terrorist group.

This pro-

vides a challenge to popular perceptions of terrorists as either cold, ruthless killers devoid of

all emotion, or as emotionally driven madmen devoid of rationality. Instead, it works from

the assumption that terrorists, like the majority of people, are simultaneously emotive

and

rational political actors.

Terrorism and contemporary social conditions

Conceived in this way we can return to Laqueur’s point that terrorism is an inevitable reflection

of the society within which it occurs. One of the defining characteristics of our contemporary era

is globalisation, or more specifically a neo-liberal form of globalisation, which is changing both

the internal social and political milieu of individual states but also forging new patterns of

emotional response and reaction.

The 1970s saw terrorism break its hitherto strong parochial focus and assume a more global

character. The attack on the Israeli athletes’ compound by the Black September terrorists at the

Munich Olympics in 1972 is perhaps the best example of this early recognition of the political

utility of a global audience. But so too were the nascent links at this time between the anti-

capitalist Red Army Faction of Germany, France’s Action Directe, the Italian Red Brigades,

the Japanese Red Army and various Palestinian groups. In addition there were the operational

links forged between the IRA and Libya, and the IRA and the Basque separatist group ETA.

More recently, the global al Qaeda network, and those groups in the developed and developing

worlds that are inspired by its message, has emerged as one of the most adept manipulators of the

emotional traumas associated with globalisation.

Before teasing out more fully the nexus between globalisation and the emotional precondi-

tions for terrorism, it is worth pausing briefly to reflect on the manner in which the emotional

impact of changing social, political and economic conditions have been theorised in the past.

This is because important insights into the emotional character of global terrorism can be

gained by drawing on earlier scholars of the globalisation of capitalism. Especially important

in this regard was Karl Polanyi’s seminal text

The Great Transformation

which located the

origins of fascism in the emotional trauma bought about by the disembedding and disorientating

effects of free-market economics.

For Polanyi, the ruthless logic of the market artificially disconnected people’s economic

activities from their social relations, destroying complex relationships of mutual obligation

and undermining communal values. The logic underlying Polanyi’s argument develops from

his historical observations of how, when left to the devices of free-market economics, society

was subverted and altered due to the ‘disembedding’ of the economy from the rest of

society. For Polanyi, the artificial divide which classical economic theory and practice creates

between the economic realm and the rest of human social activity creates a tension which

demands the assertion of protective measures, of which he understood fascism to be a particu-

larly repugnant form. Indeed, alongside the ‘great transformation’ to industrial society, Polanyi

identified a second transformation which was more emotional in nature. In Polanyi’s analysis,

Jonathan Haidt, ‘Positive Emotions Motivate Terrorists’, http:

www.thefederationonline.org

events

Briefings

2006_SPSP_DHS

Haidt_Emotions_Sum.pdf (accessed 4 March 2007).

For a fuller exploration of the neo-liberal character of contemporary globalisation see David Harvey,

A Brief History

of Neoliberalism

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). For an examination of the ontological consequences of

neo-liberal globalisation see Catrina Kinnvall, ‘Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the

Search for Ontological Security’,

Political Psychology

25, no. 5 (2004): 741 – 67.

Karl Polanyi,

The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of Our Time

(Boston: Beacon Press,

2001 [1944]). This argument was first articulated by Jack Barbalet,

Emotions, Social Theory and Social Structure: A

Macrosociological Approach

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 172.

Global Change, Peace & Security

the appeal of fascism could be understood as an

emotional

expression of the psychological trans-

formations brought about by free-market economics.

In a similar way, the emotional appeal of

neojihadi

narratives about the contemporary state of the world are rooted in the ontological

uncertainties faced by Muslim diasporas at the margins of Western societies or in those countries

where the political elites appear more beholden to global markets and Western fads than their

own local customs and needs. This phenomenon is by no means confined to the Muslim com-

munity. In a similar vein, a perception of indifference by political elites to the existential uncer-

tainties generated by globalisation also goes a long way to explaining the rise of alternative

fundamentalisms within all major world religions.

It is therefore possible to build on Polanyi’s understanding of the connection between market

forces and emotional responses to offer some important insights into the relationship between

contemporary social conditions, emotionality and terrorist violence. In particular, Polanyi

exposes the futility of attempting to banish emotionality from the public sphere and confine it

to the sphere of the purely ‘personal’. What Polanyi showed us was that contra the view of lib-

erals, emotionality is an ever present part of the public life. Any attempt to separate rationality

from emotion is therefore an artificial exercise as the two are, and will remain, inextricably

linked.

Another liberal myth that Polanyi helps expose and which helps shed light on the relationship

between emotion and terrorism in the contemporary world was his rejection of the idea that there

exists an equal possibility for all individuals to participate rationally, consciously and equally in

economic and political decision-making processes.

This has been built on by many writers, but

in the work of scholars such as Barbalet we can see how, if denied the scope to participate through

rational political channels, an individual will be likely to default to emotional channels in an

attempt to influence their social milieu.

This does not suggest that this default position is

devoid of rationality. On the contrary, the shift in balance draws our attention to the rejuvenated

understanding of emotionality and rationality as two sides of the one coin rather than dichotomous

phenomena.

These views are also consistent with insights generated by psychoanalyst and social theorist

Erik Erikson. In particular, Erikson was interested in the manner in which the rapid changes

associated with modernisation lead to traditional patterns of identity and solidarity being

replaced by new and often retrogressive alternatives. For instance, in his essay

Identity Con-

fusion in Life History and Case History

, Erikson noted that modern technological and economic

development resulted

in a loss of a sense of cosmic wholeness, of providential playfulness, and of heavenly sanction for the

means of production – and destruction. In large parts of the world this apparently leads to a ready

fascination with totalistic world views, views predicting millenniums and cataclysms and advocating

self-appointed mortal gods. Technological centralization today can give small groups of such fanatic

ideologists the concrete power of totalitarian state machines, and of small and secret or large and

open machineries of experimentation.

The idea that economic modernisation generates disorienting effects which under some cir-

cumstances can lead to violence is an important one. Even a cursory survey of the manifestos and

epistles issued by a wide range of contemporary terrorists reveals a focus on the disembedding

consequences of economic and social globalisation, especially growing perceptions of inequities

in wealth and opportunity, a sense that local cultures face extinction in the face of a flood of

Polanyi,

The Great Transformation

, 207.

Mark Juergensmeyer,

Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, From Christian Militias to al

Qaeda

(Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press, 2008).

Barbalet,

Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structure

, 174.

Ibid., 174.

Erik H. Erikson,

Identity: Youth and Crisis

(New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1994 [1968]), 191.

D. Wright-Neville and D. Smith

foreign cultures and images, and the view that a coalition of Western governments, corporations

and indigenous secular elites constitutes a major assault upon the freedom and dignity of

ordinary folk.

Grassroots Muslim resistance to these perceptions has a long history stretching back several

centuries when the accoutrements of Modernity were transposed onto the Muslim world via

colonisation. One of the consequences of this has been to cultivate resentment towards the

West. As Fanon demonstrated in his study of Algeria, in the face of colonisation and domination,

the culture and identity of the dominated is denigrated and deemed inferior in comparison to the

powerful.

Understanding the long history of humiliation, anger, resentment, envy and frustra-

tion which has arisen as a result of this history, and combining this with an understanding of the

possible emotional default position of human agency under conditions of globalisation, is a

critical step towards understanding the deeper dynamic forces which drive the urge to violent

political behaviour in the modern world. In other words, in our attempt to understand the

genesis of contemporary terrorism it would be folly to ignore the interplay between rational

and emotional political agency as it is shaped by contemporary global circumstances at the

economic, political and social levels.

Why violence?

The above discussion raises an important question: Why is the increase of emotion within

political agency

sometimes

expressed through violence? The emphasis placed on the word

‘sometimes’ is critical. It is simply not the case that every increase in emotionality automatically

translates into a higher propensity for violence. Before violence can manifest a number of other

proximate influences need to come into play.

It is obviously not the case that every person who experiences sustained anger and humilia-

tion will become a terrorist; there are wide variety of circumstances that can interrupt the process

of violent emotional outbursts against society, including redirecting violent urges against the self

through drug and alcohol abuse, non-overtly political forms of anti-social behaviour, or even by

learning to peacefully or constructively resolve negative experiences. But while it is true that not

every angry, alienated and humiliated person becomes a terrorist, all terrorists have a deep sense

of social anger, alienation and humiliation.

It is worth reiterating here that terrorists are in no

way hapless victims of a seething rage. On the contrary, the point is that the kind of quiet, object-

directed rage that terrorists experience is simultaneously cognitive and emotional.

Reaching the point at which the urge to violence against fellow humans is triggered is not

straightforward and invariably requires the individual to pass through a process involving the

steady intensification of key emotions. A useful mode for understanding this process is provided

by James Waller whose extensive research into mass killings focuses on the ‘proximate’ and

‘ultimate’ causes of violence. Proximate causes are those that actually trigger the violent act

while ultimate causes are evolutionary in the sense that over time they incrementally prime

the individual for violent behaviour. At both the proximate and ultimate stages there exists a sig-

nificant degree of social construction. In the case of the former, our attention needs to focus on

the role of the terrorist group, particularly the individual’s emotional attachment to the group and

See Bruce Lawrence, ed.,

Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden

(London and New York:

Verso, 2005).

Franz Fanon,

The Wretched of the Earth

, preface by Jean-Paul Sartre, trans. Constance Farrington (Harmondsworth:

Penguin, 1967).

See Louise Richardson,

What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat

(London: John Murray Publish-

ers, 2006), chapter 4. See especially the quote (p. 126) by one of the 9

11 hijackers Ahmad al-Haznawi al-Ghamidi:

‘The time of humiliation is over. It is time to kill the Americans in their own backyard, among their sons, and near

their forces and intelligence.’

Global Change, Peace & Security

the manner in which this attachment can shape both their world view but also associated patterns

of behaviour. In the case of ultimate causes of violence there is a need to look more widely,

especially at the history of the individual’s engagement with society and how the experiences

this engagement has generated can foster a hostile world view that leads to the possibility

that an individual will seek out and join a group of like-minded individuals. It is this process that

Wiktorowicz refers to when he deploys the concept of ‘cognitive openings’ to explain how alie-

nated young men in Britain have been lured into extremist organisations such as al Muhajir-

oun.

A cognitive opening occurs when the ontological security of the person’s existence is

called into question by social or personal events, creating a sense of detachment and anomie

and triggering a new search for meaning.

Cognitive openings are especially prevalent

among those buffeted by the rapid pace of social change driven by globalisation, especially

those who perceive themselves vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the open market in its various

manifestations. But not everybody who experiences feelings of ontological insecurity will

find comfort and meaning in membership in new religious movements let alone those with a

violent orientation. As Wiktorowicz notes: ‘At the heart of decisions about joining is the

process of persuasion. Individuals rarely awake with a sudden taste for radicalism or an epiphany

that drives them to support violence. And they rarely transform themselves from moderates one

day to radicals the next.’

Wiktorowicz’s study is not the only one to show that people do not join extremist or terrorist

groups easily; membership is preceded by a series of evolutionary events whereby emotions are

directed along a path hewn by the manner in which the individual experiences the socio-political

environment in which they exist. In short, emotion, including that shaping terrorist behaviour, is

inherently referential. Terrorists are not just angry, they are angry

something. Terrorists are

not just humiliated, they perceive themselves humiliated

something or someone. In this

sense, emotion is not merely a somatic reaction or reflex but a richly social occurrence in

which the concept of power, or more precisely the personal experience of power, lurks as an

ever present factor. This idea is by no means new in the study of human activity; in fact it

formed a key theme in the works of writers such as Spinoza. For Spinoza, those things that

we perceive as self-empowering bring us joy, while those things that we perceive as disempow-

ering bring us sadness.

Spinoza’s basic emotions of joy and sadness are affects which generate

a shift in a person’s ability, or perceived ability, to think and act freely. All other emotions,

Spinoza argues, are complex derivatives of joy and sadness which arise in response to percep-

tions of power.

In attempting to understand how the experience of joy and sadness is operationalised within

the terrorist group we can return to the insights into the pathology of violence offered by Waller.

Waller’s insights show how, under certain conditions, the inextricable relationship between

emotion and reason can be instrumentalised to create an irresistible compulsion towards violence

against one’s real or imagined enemy. In describing the genesis of this process Waller draws

together themes that are already scattered across the general area of terrorism studies but

which are rarely afforded deep analysis or inter-disciplinary review, especially with regard

to understanding emotion. This is unfortunate because the themes identified by Waller

(and others writing more deliberately in the field of terrorism studies, such as Horgan,

40

Quintan Wiktorowicz,

Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West

(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,

2005).

41

Catarina Kinnvall, ‘Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Secur-

ity’,

Political Psychology

25, no. 5 (2004): 741 – 67.

Wiktorowicz,

Radical Islam Rising

, 85.

See in particular Benedictus de Spinoza,

The Ethics

(London: Penguin Books, 1996), especially Part III.

See also Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. Gilles Deleuze,

Spinoza: Practical Philosophy

(San Francisco: City

Lights Books, 1988), 27 – 8.

Horgan,

The Psychology of Terrorism.

D. Wright-Neville and D. Smith

Silke

and Moghaddam

) can help elucidate the complex interplay of cognitive and emotional

forces that can lead a person to choose violence as a preferred mode of political agency.

As set out by Waller

understanding how emotion can become instrumentalised and

turned into a motive for killing requires an examination of three particular aspects of human

agency as it relates to the formation of groups and their activities at the proximate level. To

be sure, it is also the case that without ultimate or precursory factors proximate violence is

less likely to occur. Or, put slightly differently, terrorist groups would be much less likely to

exist without their individual members experiencing social conditions that eventually primed

them for membership within a group.

But this is a separate issue and in the current environment

the reality is that such groups exist and a proximate threat is also present. Therefore, the remain-

der of this paper focuses on three interconnected aspects of emotion, political agency and

violence as they exist at the proximate level. Drawing on Waller’s conception of

professional

socialisation

group identification

and

peer pressure

it is possible to generate deeper understand-

ings of how some individuals are cognitively and emotionally drawn to violent political

behaviour.

Professional socialisation

refers to the institutionalised manner in which individuals are

socialised into a group context of cruelty towards ‘outsiders’ through the logic of an escalating

rage and a cognitive commitment to violence. The significance of the terrorist group is that it

provides a quasi-family environment that gives the terrorist a sense of emotional attachment

to others involved in the same struggle. Especially for individuals who experience feelings of

alienation, powerlessness and humiliation at the hands of a real or imagined enemy, membership

within the terrorist group provides a palliative and creates the conditions for a cathartic sense of

release. It does so by providing a clear link between how one actually feels and how one must

act. Alienation is replaced by identification with the group, powerlessness is replaced by potency

derived from being involved in group operations, while humiliation is mitigated by participation

in actions that are simultaneously justified in retaliatory and offensive military terms. As Silke

reminds us, most terrorists see themselves as soldiers in a just war, and to this extent the

emotional attachment of the terrorist to his or her group is existentially similar to that of a

soldier to his or her comrades while in combat.

This is an important point because it is

often the case that emotional bonds to the group are so strong that there occurs a blurring of

the distinction between the individual terrorist and their role in the society that they seek to rep-

resent. For Waller, this is encapsulated in the phenomenon whereby ‘rather than joining an

organization because it fulfills our needs, it is the organization that shapes our needs’.

That

is to say, once an individual is socialised into a context of rage, rage becomes an emotional

requirement of the individual. Furthermore, once this rage is cognitively connected to violence,

violence itself becomes a need.

Group identification

has for many years been the focus of a great deal of research in the

social sciences, but less common have been detailed investigations into how this process

works at the emotional level among terrorists. An important consequence of professional socia-

lisation is a greater propensity to embrace hostile views of outsiders. At the beginning the use of

Andrew Silke, ‘Becoming a Terrorist’.

Fathali Moghaddam, ‘The Staircase to Terrorism’,

American Psychologist

60, no. 2 (2005): 161 – 9.

Waller,

Becoming Evil

Silke, ‘Becoming a Terrorist’, 37 – 9.

Andrew Silke, ‘Courage in Dark Places: Reflections on Terrorist Psychology’,

Social Research

71, no. 1 (2004):

189 – 90.

Waller,

Becoming Evil

, 235.

This resonates with parts of the argument put forward by Franz Fanon in

The Wretched of the Earth

. However, while

Fanon makes a normative argument in favour of violence, we limit ourselves to an observation of

why

violence

becomes the preferred form of political agency for some people.

Global Change, Peace & Security

violence against out-group members might offer a salve to temporal grievances, but this is not to

say that it is easy to undertake. A complex process of de-individuation and the diffusion of

responsibility is needed to create an emotional framework in which killing can be subjectively

justified. It is this process that is often referred to as ‘becoming a terrorist’ – the progressive

emotional detachment from other human beings that the psychologist Albert Bandura referred

to as ‘moral disengagement’.

In short, moral disengagement is a critical catalyst for violence

against fellow human beings because, as Bandura notes, ‘people do not ordinarily engage in

reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the rightness of their actions.

What is culpable can be made righteous through cognitive reconstrual’.

Once this process of self-justification begins, and reaches its climax in deadly forms of

violence, the act of killing itself tends to have a brutalising effect within the group. As in

conventional warfare, the horrors of the initial encounter risk becoming routine, and the

killing can become progressively easier.

If the spread of terrorist violence leads to counter-

terrorism responses from the state (or a coalition of states) that feed the sense of collective

anger and reinforce collective memories of brutalisation, an increasing number of

individuals become emotionally primed for recruitment or have their commitment to the

group strengthened.

Peer pressure

emphasises the importance of in-group dynamics in the shaping of violent

behaviours. The utility of this concept lies in its ability to analyse in-group dynamics from a

different analytical perspective. In particular, it focuses on the power of conformity and how,

within the group context, the need to be liked, accepted and respected by fellow in-group

members can become a powerful emotional influence. Fear of ostracism, of ridicule, or of

being charged with cowardice can exert a powerful emotional impact on individuals. Looked

at from a slightly different perspective, a fear of emotional abandonment can lead an individual

to regulate and censor their own behaviour in an attempt to protect the integrity, cohesiveness

and security of the group to which they belong. Importantly, this fear of being abandoned by

the group extends to the acceptance of violence as a legitimate political tool. This is because

any refusal to participate in violence, the questioning of its strategic utility, or arguing against

its morality, threatens to undermine the group’s

raison d’eˆtre

and is sure to lead to personal

expulsion or schisms within the group.

Concluding thoughts: implication for countering terrorism

More than a decade ago Albert Bandura and his colleagues warned that ‘the massive threats to

human welfare stem mainly from deliberate acts of principle rather than from unrestrained acts

of impulse’.

Yet the idea that terrorist violence in particular might be based on deeply held

convictions grounded in emotive responses to real or perceived injustice remains an unpopular

view, particularly in the public sphere. Similarly alien to many public narratives is any recog-

nition of the danger that the greater the perception of external threat, the more intense the

emotionally radicalising effects of Waller’s proximate causes –

socialisation, identification

and

peer pressure

– are likely to be. Even for those who are not part of the formal terrorist

group but who constitute the terrorists’ informal community of support, this is an important

concept. Feelings of kinship have long been recognised as an important trigger to violence. In

the past, it was the ability of the nation-state to foster notions of the ‘national family’ that

Albert Bandura et al., ‘Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency’,

Journal of Person-

ality and Social Psychology

71, no. 2 (1996): 364 – 74.

Ibid., 365.

See Dave Grossman,

On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society

(Boston: Little

Brown, 1995).

Bandura et al., ‘Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement’, 372.

D. Wright-Neville and D. Smith

was critical in rallying a population to war.

In the contemporary era, however, notions of

kinship have become increasingly complicated by the emergence of alternative loyalties not

predicated upon the romantic notion of the nation state.

Most obviously, the idea of the

ummah

, the global family of Muslims, has been used to tap into the emotional anxieties of

Muslims around the world. The key to this strategy has been the development of a set of narra-

tives that encourage individual Muslims to adopt a thoroughly modern conception of family –

one that defines family not just in terms of immediate blood ties but in terms of collective

memories and experiences.

The evolution of identity formation necessarily encroaches on the process of becoming a ter-

rorist, especially at the proximate level. In terms of professional socialisation, there is a need for

counter-terrorism practitioners to pay closer attention to the cognitive connection between anger

and violence and the role that feelings of fraternal anger play in this process. Ensuring that

counter-terrorism activities do not provide the emotive raw materials used to escalate in-

group cohesion can help interrupt the process whereby individuals are socialised into a group

culture predicated upon the demonisation of outsiders. In particular, avoiding human rights

abuses and any other activities that can contribute to feelings of community victimisation –

even if justified under the rubric of securing the nation – is especially important. Returning

to a theme touched upon earlier, terrorist organisers are especially adept at scouring the social

landscape for examples of victimisation and at using these to evoke emotive responses that

not only bind the terrorist group more tightly but also buttress their self-belief that they are fight-

ing on behalf of a wider oppressed community. In contrast, not only does denying the group any

empirical evidence of oppression undermine the cohesive power of shared anger, but it also

widens the gulf between the narratives of the terrorists and the real life experiences of those

they seek to inspire.

At the level of group identification the study of the role of emotion in facilitating political

rage points to the importance of providing alternative avenues for social affiliation and political

expression. Identity dynamics under conditions of late modernity have undermined the potency

of traditional approaches to building emotional attachments to the wider community. Therefore,

it is unreasonable in the contemporary era to predicate counter-terrorism strategies upon belli-

gerent reassertions of narrow definitions of national identity. Yet such has been the approach

of many Western governments in recent years; from the introduction of citizenship tests in

countries such as Australia and Britain to the banning of Muslim headscarves in France. But

such responses go against the flow of global forces and as such they are not only unsustainable

over the long run, but they also risk intensifying the experience of exclusion and alienation

among those unable or unwilling to meet the demand that they sacrifice core aspects of their

identity and embrace the cultural accoutrements of the dominant cultural group. There is a

need to build into counter-terrorism strategies initiatives that not only recognise the growing

complexity of identity but also accept difference as a virtue. In other words, there is a need to

develop initiatives that recognise the inevitability of multiple identities and which accept as

legitimate the expression of political views associated with one aspect of identity even when

they are at odds with mainstream views. In short, effective counter-terrorism cannot occur

without a widening of the democratic space, including facilitating greater capacity for the

peaceful expression of alternative political views.

Community-focused counter-terrorism initiatives designed to facilitate the deeper inte-

gration of marginal groups into society can also play a critically important role at the level of

See John L. Comaroff, ed.,

Perspectives on Nationalism and War

, International Studies in Global Change, 7

(London: Routledge, 1995).

See Ulrich Beck,

Power in the Global Age

(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); Zygmunt Bauman, ‘Reconnaissance

Wars of the Planetary Frontierland’,

Theory, Culture and Society

19, no. 4 (2002): 81 – 90.

Global Change, Peace & Security

peer pressure. In particular, initiatives that run counter to hostile stereotypes of the ‘out-group’

can create a sense of existential confusion within the terrorist group, which in turn can manifest

into a higher degree of moral ambiguity about violence. Greater moral ambiguity opens up the

possibility of schismatic debates within terrorist groups that can in turn be exploited by counter-

terrorism officials. By creating conditions for a bifurcation of emotional attachment such initiat-

ives undermine the ontological certainty of the terrorist group and by so doing weaken the power

of emotional attachment.

None of these initiatives are easy; in fact they run against the grain of conventional counter-

terrorism theory and practice which emphasises the use of hard over soft power. Moreover, such

initiatives require a whole-of-government approach. If the emotional fulcrum that sustains terror-

ist groups is to be undermined there is a need to include other government departments with

responsibilities as diverse as immigration, social services, employment, and sport and recreation

in the development and implementation of counter-terrorism policy. This will not be easy because

to date the challenge has been seized and is jealously guarded by police and security agencies. It

will also confront significant political hurdles in that focusing positively on the same communities

that terrorists claim to be representing risks inflaming the passions of those sections of the

community attracted to simplistic accounts of terrorism as a cultural or religious phenomenon

and who are therefore inclined to view such communities through a suspicious and even hostile

lens. But such obstacles will need to be addressed if we are to develop a sustainable long-term

strategy for managing the threat of terrorism.

Notes on contributors

Dr. David Wright-Neville

is Associate Professor of Politics in the School of Political and Social Inquiry

and Co-Director of the Global Terrorism Research Centre at Monash University. David has also worked as

a senior terrorism analyst in the Australian intelligence community. His research focuses on the political

psychology of violence, the processes of radicalisation in multiethnic societies, and counter-terrorism pol-

icies and practices.

Debra Smith

is a PhD candidate in the School of Political and Social Inquiry at Monash University and a

researcher in the Global Terrorism Research Centre. Her area of interest is on the nexus between human

emotions and the urge to violence.

98

D. Wright-Neville and D. Smith

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