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Second-generation
operations involved the implementation with the consequences of complex, 
multi-dimensional peace agreements. Examples included the UN Transition-Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) in Namibia, the UN Observe mission in Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
These operations were deployed as part negotiated political solutions and the 
responsibilities of peacekeepers included non-military tasks such as disarmament, demobilization 
in and reintegration of former combatants, resettlement of refugees, police training and 
supervision, election monitoring and other transitional administrative tasks new generation of 
operations, engender by the fading of bipolar 'antagonism, saw peacekeepers engage in what 
would come to be called "peace-building. A conceptual link was established by then Secretary-
General Boutros Ghali between peacekeeping and the range of other peacemaking and peace-
building activities Prescribed by the UN Charter (Boutros-Ghali 1992). 
The concept that describes this new range of tasks is called Peace Support operations 
(PSO). Peace Support Operations (PSO) are multifunctional operations in which impartial military 
activities are designed to create a secure environment and facilitate the efforts of the civilian 
elements of the mission to create a self sustaining peace (Wilkinson, 2000: 63-69; Mackinlay, 
1996). PSO may include peace keeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE) as well as conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, peace-building and humanitarian operations. Outside of military 
circles, the term Peacekeeping' is often used erroneously to embrace all PSO, including PE. 
Third
generation
operations are primarily enforcement operations taken under Chapter 
vii of the UN Charter without the consent of the parties and usually in internal conflicts such as 
Somalia and Bosnia. Invoking Chapter vii the Security Council to bypass the specific injunction 
in the Charter not to intervene in their internal affairs of states. Usually undertaken in the context 
of humanitarian crises and massive flows of refugees, such third generation operations are 
characterized by even more complex mandates with less clear-cut objectives than in the past.

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These in third-generation operations in Somalia and Bosnia, with the disastrous experience 
in Rwanda, soon prompted a period of cutback, with reluctance on the part of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council (P5) - particularly the United States (US) - to authorize, 
implement or finance new peacekeeping operations. These setbacks resulted from a range of 
factors, including not only the overextension of UN resources despite evident, continuing 
limitations but also dilemmas inherent in the situations, which the organization was attempting to 
address.
The UN was also undermined by a critical discrepancy between mandate and resources, 
whereby financial support and political will did not match the complex mandates being authorized 
by the Security Council. Soon the "over-credibility" of the early 1990s gave way to a dearth of 
confidence in the UN's capabilities. These new imperatives have forced the UN and the 
international community to re-think and circumscribe their expectations of UN-led peace 
operations. The United Nations does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional capacity 
to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Under present conditions, ad hoc 
member states in the "coalitions of the wiling" offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or 
to the spread of conflict. As in the past, a mandate from the Security Council authorizing such a 
course of action is essential if the inform in is to have broad international support and legitimacy.
The Security Council has merely authorized - sometimes after a considerable delay - an 
action that has already been completely planned or even initiated. This has especially been the 
case with regard to actions by regional or sub-regional organizations, exemplified most recently 
by the operation conducted by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to oust the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council/Reyo1utionary United Front (AFRCIRUF) junta in Sierra Leone. Times have changed to 
the point where traditional peacekeeping no longer address the challenges of either managing or 
resolving many complex intra-state conflicts. Between 1989 and 1994, UN peacekeeping 
generally expanded its number of missions, criteria for intervention, and tasks of intervention.
The nature of the intra-state conflicts in cases like Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Liberia, 
and Serial Leone, forced additional changes on peacekeeping.