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Attorney General v Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (2000)Bog'liq Attorney General v Blake
Attorney General v Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (2000)
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The grant of the injunction was also an unacceptable
restriction of the defendant's right to freedom of
expression. The Crown would have failed if it had
sought to stop publication of the book because there
was no question of confidentiality or harm to the
public interest. The fact that there might have been a
criminal offence under domestic law did not deprive
the defendant of that right under the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1953) (Cmd 8969) . Freedom of expression
is subject to exceptions but they must be construed
strictly and the need for restrictions must be established
convincingly. There is no evidence that in signing the
undertaking in 1944 the defendant waived his right to
freedom of expression for the rest of his life.
Section 1(1) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 makes
it a criminal offence for a member of the security
services to disclose
any
information regardless of
its effect. Section 1(1) is therefore too broad an
interference with freedom of expression and goes
further than is necessary to accomplish its objective of
protecting national security. It criminalises disclosure
of information where no damage results and focuses
on the status of the person who makes the disclosure
rather than the information. Non-damaging disclosure
by a secret service officer is rendered criminal, whereas
under section 1(3) the identical disclosure by some
other Crown servant or contractor would not be.
[Reference was made to Incal v Turkey (1998) 4
BHRC 476 ; Lawless v Ireland (No 2) (1961) 1 EHRR
13 ; Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd
(No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 and The Observer and The
Guardian v United Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 153 .]
To award restitutionary damages for breach of contract
so as to reflect what a defendant has gained from a
breach rather than what a claimant has lost will disturb
settled rules of contract law and is wrong in principle.
The restitution principle involves a departure from
the principle that contractual damages compensate a
claimant for his loss.
To concentrate on the motive of the party who
committed the breach is contrary to the general
approach to the assessment of damages in contract.
*273
It will lead to uncertainty in the assessment
of damages in commercial and consumer disputes
where predictability is important. The possibility of
a windfall being awarded to an aggrieved party
will discourage economic activity and has important
implications for insurance.
Restitutionary damages do not ensure that those who
make contracts will not break them. Restitutionary
damages are awarded after the event and do not reflect
the value the innocent party attaches to the contract.
The restitutionary principle also conflicts with the
fundamental freedom of an individual either to carry
out his promise or to pay damages. The duty to keep
a contract means a prediction that you pay damages
if you do not keep it, but nothing else. A perceived
injustice cannot be solved by changing the measure of
damages. The principle of compensatory damages is
so well established because it is just that damages are
awarded for the actual loss a claimant has sustained.
[Reference was made to Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1
WLR 269 ; Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes
Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361 ; Wrotham Park Estate Co
Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 ; Ruxley
Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC
344 and Reid-Newfoundland Co v Anglo-American
Telegraph Co Ltd [1912] AC 555 .]
Ross Cranston QC, Philip Havers QC, Philip Sales
and
Anya Proops for the Attorney General. There is a well
established principle in public law that the Attorney
General may seek injunctive relief in the civil courts
to secure the effectiveness and maintain the authority
of the criminal law. The court's jurisdiction to grant a
public law injunction must be viewed in the light of
the Attorney General's unique constitutional position
as guardian of the public interest. [Reference was made
to Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978]
AC 435 and Portsmouth City Council v Richards and
Quietlynn Ltd [1989] 1 CMLR 673 .] The jurisdiction
extends to preventing a person from receiving financial
benefits directly from an offence he has committed.
The defendant is seeking to profit from his breach of
the Official Secrets Acts and from his criminal conduct
as a spy in 1961. There is a strong public interest
in ensuring that individuals who have committed
offences are prevented, whether by criminal or by civil
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