Georgios Deligiannakis
Open University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus;
g.deligiannakis@ouc.ac.cy
Imperial and Christian Patrons for Salamis/Constantia in the Fourth Century
The paper re-considers the fourth-century history of Salamis/Constantia of Cyprus by asking
the following questions: who was responsible for the reconstruction of Salamis after the earthquakes
of AD 332 and 342? What evidence do we possess about the emperor Constantius II (337-361) as
the city’s re-founder? When was the provincial capital transferred from Nea Paphos to Salamis/
Constantia? What do we know about the progress of Christianity in the same period?
Written sources are particularly confusing regarding the city’s re-foundation. It is here argued
that the re-founding of the city by Constantius II should not be taken for granted and possibly
Constantine had also played a key-role. Nor should the emperor have entrusted the bishop of
Salamis to supervise the rebuilding of the ruined city in the 340s. Similarly uncertain is the year
when Salamis/Constantia became the metropolis of the province. Different possibilities on all these
issues will be suggested.
It must be noted that the Christian history of Salamis in Late Antiquity has been distorted
by the career of Epiphanios, bishop of Salamis/Constantia (365/7-403). It is argued that the newly
founded city of Salamis/Constantia enjoyed neither a prominence among the other bishoprics of
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the island in the fourth century, nor perhaps an elaborate cathedral, nor even a major pilgrimage
site, compared to what we trace already in other parts of the island. Comparing Cyprus with the
evidence of Antioch and other important eastern cities, a complex and much wavering religious
atmosphere across the island can be suggested.
Łukasz Pigoński
Uniwersytet Łódzki, Katedra Historii Bizancjum, Łódź, Poland;
pigonski@zoho.com
Marcian, the Soldier-Emperor, and the Early Byzantine Military Elites
The Late Roman political system was heavily reliant on the army and its command. The will of
the commanders was one of the, if not the most important, factors when choosing an emperor. The
military influence on politics, especially in the age of barbarization, is often pictured negatively, or
even, as one of the factors that contributed to the political crisis of the 5
th
century.
The aim of this paper is to re-evaluate the impact of the military elites on the early Byzantine
politics exemplified by Marcian’s reign (450-457). His predecessor, Theodosius II when making deci-
sions regarding political affairs relied on court faction, especially the eunuch Chrysaphius. This, and
the failure of Theodosius’ foreign policy, marked by defeats at the hands of Huns and Vandals, caused
a dissent among the military elite. Most important members of that political faction were the generals
Flavius Zeno and Flavius Ardaburius Aspar. When the emperor died, they seized an opportunity, allied
with the emperor’s sister, Pulcheria against Chrysaphius, and used their political influence to choose
Marcian as the next emperor. In the past Marcian was an officer in Aspar’s ranks, and he had neither
the wealth, nor noble heritage that would allow him to seize the throne. It is clear that the general spe-
cifically picked Marcian, so he could potentially influence the emperor to do his bidding. While the
military elites of the Empire, especially those of barbarian descent, are often being accused of disloy-
alty to the common cause, a careful analysis of the situation before, and during Marcian’s reign proves
that it was a much more complex matter. Even though most ancient authors condemned the emperors
who weren’t independent in their decision making, Marcian was almost universally considered as a
good emperor. There is also no indication of any conflict between the emperor and the generals, while
there are multiple accounts of such political struggle during the reigns of both Marcian’s successor
and his predecessor. It is very likely that the emperor not only owed his imperial power to the military
elites, but also cooperated with them closely, having similar political views in most matters. Marcian’s
primary achievements were the containment of the Hun menace, stabilization of the northern border
and reduction of the taxes, which was exactly what the generals wanted.
The analysis of Marcian’s reign shows that the early Byzantine military elites had clear political
goals that stretched far beyond achieving simple personal gains. They had their own vision of how
the imperial policy should be conducted and what was good for the Empire. Oftentimes their ideas
faced the opposition from the court faction or ambitious emperors, like Leo I, which then resulted in
political conflicts. However, Marcian, the soldier-emperor, shared these views and cooperated with
the military elites. The result was the seven years of stability, which should challenge our judgement
on the influence of the army on early Byzantine politics.
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