A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

particular situation. It normally suffices that for each person there is some
association (one or more) to which he belongs and within which the
activities that are rational for him are publicly affirmed by others. In this
way we acquire a sense that what we do in everyday life is worthwhile.
Moreover, associative ties strengthen the second aspect of self-esteem,
since they tend to reduce the likelihood of failure and to provide support
against the sense of self-doubt when mishaps occur. To be sure, men have
varying capacities and abilities, and what seems interesting and challeng-
ing to some will not seem so to others. Yet in a well-ordered society
anyway, there are a variety of communities and associations, and the
members of each have their own ideals appropriately matched to their
aspirations and talents. Judged by the doctrine of perfectionism, the ac-
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67. Self-Respect, Excellences, Shame

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tivities of many groups may not display a high degree of excellence. But
no matter. What counts is that the internal life of these associations is
suitably adjusted to the abilities and wants of those belonging to them,
and provides a secure basis for the sense of worth of their members. The
absolute level of achievement, even if it could be defined, is irrelevant.
But in any case, as citizens we are to reject the standard of perfection as a
political principle, and for the purposes of justice avoid any assessment of
the relative value of one another’s way of life (§50). Thus what is neces-
sary is that there should be for each person at least one community of
shared interests to which he belongs and where he finds his endeavors
confirmed by his associates. And for the most part this assurance is
sufficient whenever in public life citizens respect one another’s ends and
adjudicate their political claims in ways that also support their self-es-
teem. It is precisely this background condition that is maintained by the
principles of justice. The parties in the original position do not adopt the
principle of perfection, for rejecting this criterion prepares the way to
recognize the good of all activities that fulfill the Aristotelian Principle
(and are compatible with the principles of justice). This democracy in
judging each other’s aims is the foundation of self-respect in a well-or-
dered society.
Later on I shall relate these matters to the idea of social union and the
place of the principles of justice in human good (§§79–82). Here I wish to
discuss the connections between the primary good of self-respect, the
excellences, and shame, and consider when shame is a moral as opposed
to a natural emotion. Now we may characterize shame as the feeling that
someone has when he experiences an injury to his self-respect or suffers a
blow to his self-esteem. Shame is painful since it is the loss of a prized
good. There is a distinction however between shame and regret that
should be noted. The latter is a feeling occasioned by the loss of most any
sort of good, as when we regret having done something either impru-
dently or inadvertently that resulted in harm to ourselves. In explaining
regret we focus say on the opportunities missed or the means squandered.
Yet we may also regret having done something that put us to shame, or
even having failed to carry out a plan of life that established a basis for
our self-esteem. Thus we may regret the lack of a sense of our own worth.
Regret is the general feeling aroused by the loss or absence of what we
think good for us, whereas shame is the emotion evoked by shocks to our
self-respect, a special kind of good.
Now both regret and shame are self-regarding, but shame implies an
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Goodness as Rationality

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especially intimate connection with our person and with those upon
whom we depend to confirm the sense of our own worth.
26
Also, shame is
sometimes a moral feeling, a principle of right being cited to account
for it. We must find an explanation of these facts. Let us distinguish
between things that are good primarily for us (for the one who possesses
them) and attributes of our person that are good both for us and for others
as well. These two classes are not exhaustive but they indicate the rele-
vant contrast. Thus commodities and items of property (exclusive goods)
are goods mainly for those who own them and have use of them, and for
others only indirectly. On the other hand, imagination and wit, beauty and
grace, and other natural assets and abilities of the person are goods for
others too: they are enjoyed by our associates as well as ourselves when
properly displayed and rightly exercised. They form the human means
for complementary activities in which persons join together and take
pleasure in their own and one another’s realization of their nature. This
class of goods constitutes the excellences: they are the characteristics
and abilities of the person that it is rational for everyone (including our-
selves) to want us to have. From our standpoint, the excellences are goods
since they enable us to carry out a more satisfying plan of life enhanc-
ing our sense of mastery. At the same time these attributes are appreci-
ated by those with whom we associate, and the pleasure they take in
our person and in what we do supports our self-esteem. Thus the excel-
lences are a condition of human flourishing; they are goods from every-
one’s point of view. These facts relate them to the conditions of self-re-
spect, and account for their connection with our confidence in our own
value.
Considering first natural shame, it arises not from a loss or absence of
exclusive goods, or at least not directly, but from the injury to our self-es-
teem owing to our not having or failing to exercise certain excellences.
The lack of things primarily good for us would be an occasion for regret
but not for shame. Thus one may be ashamed of his appearance or
slow-wittedness. Normally these attributes are not voluntary and so they
26. My definition of shame is close to William McDougall,