BUDGET REVIEW: GERMANY
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 2014/2 © OECD 2015
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budget year and the medium-term planning period. Any changes from the figures set out
in the previous year’s budget cycle are explained in an aggregate manner, e.g. naming the
new initiative for which new resources are allocated. The key figures decision is regarded
as binding at the level of ministry allocation.
After the key figures decision has been made, the next phase of the top-down process
is concerned with filling in the line-item detail of the highly aggregated figures. This is the
only phase of the budget process where negotiations take place on operational level, and
they should – in a bottom-up manner – be settled below the political level (except in the
case of particularly contentious items that may require State Secretary-level intervention).
This detailed draft budget is decided by the government at the end of June/beginning
of July and then submitted to the parliament.
An obvious potential limitation with this approach is that, in circumstances where
demographic and other technical drivers call for extra spending, above and beyond what
would be permitted under the debt brake, there is little guidance as to how the Federal
Ministry of Finance should adjudicate among the claims of different line ministries, or re-
prioritise overall spending to stay within permitted limits. Indeed, the early official-led
process appears quite “bottom-up” and technical – focusing as it does upon the variations
that may be called for within each of the line items in the budget – and this might seem
difficult to reconcile with the requirements of a top-down, fiscally constrained approach.
In recent years, these aspects do not appear to have presented a significant hindrance for
Germany’s budget process. One reason for this is that the budgetary forecasts supplied at each
phase or arc of the process have usually been over-pessimistic; and the budget actors have
come to expect that additional resources can be found to meet new pressures as the process
moves forward, rather than have to engage in more difficult rounds of re-prioritisation. In fact
the budget process has an intrinsic incentive to this effect: improvements in economic
forecasts in January and in April provide extra funds to accommodate the budget-formation
process; if however the forecasts come in below expectations, it is the Federal Ministry of
Finance that is expected to bear the cost of correction.
Notwithstanding these incentives, in the process of preparations for the 2014 budget,
with the expiry of certain transitional aspects of the fiscal rule framework, it became
apparent at an early stage (January 2013) that an additional significant quantum of savings
would be required. Securing agreement on these savings called for a new
ad hoc
budget
flexibility mechanism, which is discussed below.
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