Zbigniew brzezinski

9. Some conservative Japanese have been tempted by the notion of a special Japan-Taiwan connection, and in 
1996 a "Japan-Taiwan Parliamentarians' Association" was formed to promote that goal. The Chinese reaction 
has been predictably hostile. 
By the same token, few favor the opposite: a grand accommodation between Japan and China. The regional 
consequences of such a classical reversal of alliances would be too unsettling: an American withdrawal from 
the region as well as the prompt subordination of both Taiwan and Korea to China, leaving Japan at China's 
mercy. This is not an appealing prospect, save perhaps to a few extremists. With Russia geopolitically 
marginalized and historically despised, there is thus no alternative to the basic consensus that the link with 
America remains Japan's central lifeline. Without it, Japan can neither ensure itself a steady supply of oil nor 

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protect itself from a Chinese (and perhaps soon, also a Korean) nuclear bomb. The only real policy issue is how 
best to manipulate the American connection in order to advance Japanese interests. 
Accordingly, the Japanese have gone along with American desires to enhance American-Japanese military 
cooperation, including the seemingly increased scope from the more specific "Far East" to a broader "Asia-
Pacific formula." Consistent with this, in early 1996 in its review of the so-called Japan-U.S. defense 
guidelines, the Japanese government also broadened its reference to the possible use of Japanese defense forces 
from in "Far East emergencies" to "emergencies in Japan's neighboring regions." Japanese willingness to 
accommodate America on this matter has also been driven by percolating doubts regarding America's long-term 
staying power in Asia and by concerns that China's rise—and America's seeming anxiety over it—could at 
some point in the future still impose on Japan an unacceptable choice: to stand with America against China or 
without America and allied with China. 
For Japan, that fundamental dilemma also contains a historic imperative: since becoming a dominant regional 
power is not a viable goal and since without 
a regional base the attainment of truly 
comprehensive global power is unrealistic, 
it follows that Japan can best attain the 
status of a global leader through active 
involvement in worldwide peacekeeping 
and economic development. By taking 
advantage 
of 
the 
American-Japanese 
military alliance to ensure the stability of 
the Far East—but without letting it evolve 
into an anti-Chinese coalition—Japan can 
safely carve out a distinctive and influential 
global mission as the power that promotes 
the emergence of genuinely international 
and 
more 
effectively 
institutionalized 
cooperation. Japan could thus become a 
much 
more 
powerful 
and 
globally 
influential equivalent of Canada: a state that 
is respected for the constructive use of its 
wealth and power but one that is neither 
feared nor resented.