Zbigniew brzezinski

7. The Japan Digest, February 25, 1997, reported that, according to a governmental poll, only 36 percent of 
the Japanese felt friendly toward South Korea. 
In addition, Germany shares with its neighbors both common democratic principles and Europe's broader 
Christian heritage. It also seeks to identify and even sublimate itself within an entity and a cause larger than 
itself, namely, that of "Europe." In contrast, there is no comparable "Asia." Indeed, Japan's insular past and 
even its current democratic system tend to separate it from the rest of the region, in spite of the emergence in 
recent years of democracy in several Asian countries. Many Asians view Japan not only as nationally selfish 
but also as overly imitative of the West and reluctant to join them in questioning the West's views on human 
rights and on the importance of individualism. Thus, Japan is perceived as not truly Asian by many Asians, 
even as the West occasionally wonders to what degree Japan has truly become Western. 
In effect, though in Asia, Japan is not comfortably Asian. That condition greatly limits its geostrategic 
options. A genuinely regional option, that of a regionally preponderant Japan that overshadows China—even if 
no longer based on Japanese domination but rather on benign Japanese-led regional cooperation—does not 
seem viable for solid historical, political, and cultural reasons. Furthermore, Japan remains dependent on 
American military protection and international sponsorship. The abrogation or even the gradual emasculation of 
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would render Japan instantly vulnerable to the disruptions that any serious 
manifestation of regional or global turmoil might produce. The only alternatives then would be either to accept 
China's regional predominance or to undertake a massive—and not only costly but also very dangerous—
program of military rearmament. 
Understandably, many Japanese find their country's present position—simultaneously a quasi-global power 
and a security protectorate—to be anomalous. But dramatic and viable alternatives to the existing arrangements 
are not self-evident. If it can be said that China's national goals, notwithstanding the inescapable variety of 
views among the Chinese strategists on specific aspects, are reasonably clear and the regional thrust of China's 
geopolitical ambitions relatively predictable, Japan's geostrategic vision tends to be relatively cloudy and the 
Japanese public mood much more ambiguous. 

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Most Japanese realize that a strategically significant and abrupt change of course could be dangerous. Can 
Japan become a regional power in a region where it is still the object of resentment and where China is 
emerging as the regionally preeminent power? Yet should Japan simply acquiesce in such a Chinese role? Can 
Japan become a truly comprehensive global power (in all its dimensions) without jeopardizing American 
support and galvanizing even more regional animosity? And will America, in any case, stay put in Asia, and if 
it does, how will its reaction to China's growing influence impinge on the priority so far given to the American-
Japanese connection? For most of the Cold War, none of these (|iieslions ever 
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have become slrategically salient and are propelling an increasingly lively debate in Japan. 
Since the 1950s, Japanese foreign policy has been guided by four basic principles promulgated by postwar 
Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. The Yoshida Doctrine postulated that (1) Japan's main goal should be 
economic development, (2) Japan should be lightly armed and should avoid involvement in international 
conflicts, (3) Japan should follow the political leadership of and accept military protection from the United 
States, and (4) Japanese diplomacy should be nonideological and should focus on international cooperation. 
However, since many Japanese also felt uneasy about the extent of Japan's involvement in the Cold War, the 
fiction of semineutrality was simultaneously cultivated. Indeed, as late as 1981, Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito 
was forced to resign for having permitted the term "alliance" (domef) to be used in characterizing U.S.-Japan 
relations. 
That is now all past. Japan was then recovering, China was self-isolated, and Eurasia was polarized. By 
contrast, Japan's political elite now senses that a rich Japan, economically involved in the world, can no longer 
define self-enrichment as its central national purpose without provoking international resentment. Further, an 
economically powerful Japan, especially one that competes with America, cannot simply be an extension of 
American foreign policy while at the same time avoiding any international political responsibilities. A 
politically more influential Japan, especially one that seeks global recognition (for example, a permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council), cannot avoid taking stands on the more critical security or geopolitical issues 
affecting world peace. 
As a result, recent years have seen a proliferation of special studies and reports by a variety of Japanese 
public and private bodies, as well as a plethora of often controversial books by well-known politicians and 
professors, outlining new missions for Japan in the post-Cold War era.8 Many of these have involved 
speculation regarding the durability and desirability of the American-Japanese security alliance and have 
advocated a more active Japanese diplomacy, especially toward China, or a more energetic Japanese military 
role in the region. If one were to judge the state of the American-Japanese connection on the basis of the public 
dialogue, one would be justified in concluding that by the mid-1990s relations between the two countries had 
entered a crisis stage.