Zbigniew brzezinski

partnership as the combined political-
economic engine of European unification 
while precluding German leadership in 
Europe. 
If France were truly a global power, the resolution of these dilemmas in the pursuit of France's central goal 
might not be difficult. None of the other European states, save Germany, are endowed with the same ambition 
or driven by the same sense of mission. Even Germany could perhaps be seduced into acceptance of French 
leadership in a united but independent (of America) Europe, but only if it felt that France was in fact a global 
power and could thus provide Europe with the security that Germany cannot but America does. 
Germany, however, knows the real limits of French power. France is much weaker than Germany 
economically, while its military establishment (as the Gulf War of 1991 showed) is not very competent. It is 
good enough td squash internal coups in satellite African states, but it can neither protect Europe nor project 
significant power far from Europe. France is no more and no less than a middle-rank European power. 
Accordingly, in order to construct Europe, Germany has been willing to propitiate French pride, but in order to 
keep Europe truly secure, it has not been willing to follow French leadership blindly. It has continued to insist 
on a central role in European security for America. 
That reality, painful for French self-esteem, emerged more clearly after Germany's reunification. Until then, 
the Franco-German reconciliation did have the appearance of French political leadership riding comfortably on 
German economic dynamism. That perception actually suited both parties. It mitigated the traditional European 
fears of Germany, and it had the effect of fortifying and gratifying French illusions by generating the 
impression that the construction of Europe was led by France, backed by an economically dynamic West 
Germany. 

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Franco-German reconciliation, even with its misconceptions, was nonetheless a positive development for 
Europe, and its importance cannot be overstated. It has provided the crucial foundation for all of the progress so 
far achieved in Europe's difficult process of unification. Thus, it was also fully compatible with American 
interests and in keeping with the long-standing American commitment to the promotion of transnational 
cooperation in Europe. A breakdown of Franco-German cooperation would be a fatal setback for Europe and a 
disaster for America's position in Europe. 
Tacit American support made it possible for France and Germany to push the process of Europe's unification 
forward. Germany's reunification, moreover, increased the incentive for the French to lock Germany into a 
binding European framework. Thus on December 6, 1990, the French president and the German chancellor 
committed themselves to the goal of a federal Europe, and ten days later, the Rome intergovernmental 
conference on political union issued—British reservations notwithstanding—a clear mandate to the twelve 
foreign ministers of the European Community to prepare a Draft Treaty on Political Union. 
However, Germany's reunification also dramatically changed the real parameters of European politics. It was 
simultaneously a geopolitical defeat for Russia and for France. United Germany not only ceased to be a 
political junior partner of France, but it automatically became the undisputed prime power in Western Europe 
and even a partial global power, especially through its major financial contributions to the support of the key 
international institutions.1 The new reality bred some mutual disenchantment in the Franco-German 
relationship, for Germany was now able and willing to articulate and openly promote its own vision of a future 
Europe, still as France's partner but no longer as its protege. 
For France, the resulting diminished political leverage dictated several policy consequences. France somehow 
had to regain greater influence within NATO—from which it had largely abstained as a protest against U.S. 
domination—while also compensating for its relative weakness through greater diplomatic maneuver. 
Returning to NATO might enable France to influence America more; occasional flirtation with Moscow or 
London might generate pressure from the outside on America as well as on Germany.