C H A P T E R
6
Time Discounting and Time Preference:
A Critical Review
S H A N E F R E D E R I C K , G E O R G E L O E W E N S T E I N ,
A N D T E D O ’ D O N O G H U E
Intertemporal
choices—decisions involving trade-offs among costs and bene-
fits occurring at different times—are important and ubiquitous.
Such decisions
not only affect one’s health, wealth, and happiness, but may also, as Adam Smith
first recognized, determine the economic prosperity of nations. In this chapter, we
review empirical research on intertemporal choice, and present an overview of re-
cent theoretical formulations that incorporate insights gained from this research.
Economists’ attention to intertemporal choice began early in the history of the
discipline. Not long after Adam Smith called attention to the importance of in-
tertemporal choice for the wealth of nations, the Scottish economist John Rae was
examining the sociological and psychological determinants of these choices. We
will briefly review the perspectives on intertemporal choice of Rae and nineteenth-
and early
twentieth-century economists, and describe
how these early perspec-
tives interpreted intertemporal choice as the joint
product of many conflicting
psychological motives.
All of this changed when Paul Samuelson proposed the discounted-utility (DU)
model in 1937. Despite Samuelson’s manifest reservations about the normative
and descriptive validity of the formulation he had proposed, the DU model was
accepted almost instantly, not only as a valid normative standard for public poli-
cies (for example, in cost-benefit analyses), but as a descriptively accurate repre-
sentation of actual behavior. A central assumption of the DU model is that all of
the disparate motives underlying intertemporal choice
can be condensed into
a single parameter—the discount rate. We do not present an axiomatic derivation
of the DU model, but instead focus on those features that highlight the implicit
psychological assumptions underlying the model.
We thank John McMillan, David Laibson, Colin Camerer, Nachum Sicherman, Duncan Simester,
and three anonymous referees for useful comments. We thank Cara Barber, Rosa Blackwood, Mandar
Oak, and Rosa Stipanovic for research assistance. For financial support, Frederick and Loewenstein
thank the Integrated Study of the Human Dimensions of Global Change at Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity (NSF Grant SBR-9521914), and O’Donoghue thanks the National Science Foundation (Award
SES-0078796). This chapter was reprinted with the permission of the American Economic Associa-
tion. It was originally published in 2002 as “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Re-
view.”
Journal of Economic Literature
40(June): 351–401.