CHAPTER 2 – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
57
empire. By March they had bottled up Denikin’s forces in the Crimea. They ignored
Curzon’s proposal, reminiscent of attempts to square the circle on Smyrna, in July
for the Crimea to be a neutral zone and went on to conquer it in November
94
. In
April they took over Azerbaijan but failed to do the same in Armenia in May
95.
From
Ankara, meanwhile, the nationalists had out of a common interest in opposing the
western powers initiated contact in April and despatched an emissary to Moscow in
May; a treaty of cooperation was initialled on 24 August
96
. Haggling continued over
the eventual frontier but this was settled by military operations conducted by Kâzım
Karabekir against the still independent Armenia between 24 September and 18
November. Signature of the treaty of Gümrü, which fixed what is still the frontier
between Armenia and Turkey, was signed on the very day, 2 December, that
Armenia was proclaimed a Soviet Republic
97
. There was henceforth no threat to the
nationalists from the northeast and they now shared a border with the Bolsheviks.
Independent Georgia would stand between them until the Soviet conquest in
February 1921; the Treaty of Moscow of 16 March 1921 would settle the frontier
there too with the Turks keeping Kars and Ardahan and ceding Batum. This treaty,
which recognised Turkey as the territory claimed by the National Pact and provided
for Soviet military and financial aid, was also a diplomatic landmark as the first
between nationalist Turkey and a major power
98
.
94
Kotkin, 356,358, 379
95
Mango, 288
96
Gawrych, 113-114.
97
Gawrych 122-124.
98
Gawrych, 129-130.
CHAPTER 2 – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
58
The other principal factor which changed the strategic balance was the change of
government in Greece. With Sèvres achieved, on 7 September Venizelos fulfilled an
earlier pledge by calling parliamentary elections for 7 November; he faced a united
opposition which had been assembled earlier in the year by all his principal
opponents on the royalist side of the national schism
99
. An unexpected twist was
given to the election campaign by the action of a monkey, which on 30 September
bit King Alexander and through the resulting sepsis brought about his death on 25
October
100
. This event has become a
locus classicus
for those who emphasise the
workings of chance in history, Churchill, for example, being stirred to write that “it
is perhaps no exaggeration to remark that a quarter of a million persons died of this
monkey’s bite”. Despite Churchill, serious students are disinclined to regard the
defeat at the polls of Venizelos, the return of King Constantine and the Asia Minor
Disaster as the work of the monkey
101
. Venizelos lost the elections, which were
postponed following Alexander’s death by only a week, by so large a margin overall
and by so overwhelming a margin in “old Greece” as to render implausible the idea
that he would have won, had Alexander still lived
102
; the opposition had always
stood for the return of Constantine both before and after Alexander’s death
103
; and
Greece faced the same strategic problem in Asia Minor on the morrow of the
election as it did on its eve.
99
Llewellyn Smith, 135, 143-4.
100
Llewellyn Smith, 138
101
Pace Fromkin, 432. Cf. Llewellyn Smith, 159
102
Llewellyn Smith, 150-152
103
Ploumidis, 247, 267 n. 82; Llewellyn Smith, 147-148
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