Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

5. 
Mahdi Militia
During the initial post-conflict operations in 2003, the Mahdi militia (also known 
as Mahdi Army) was not seen as a threat, but rather as a trouble-making group that got in 
the way of American interests. Civilian personnel with oversight of reconstruction 
projects in militia-dominated areas such as Sadr City made no attempt to understand their 
design or intention.
156
The Mahdi militia served in a relatively non-threatening fashion 
in the eyes of most Shia neighborhood residents, appealing in particular to the majority 
opposed to the Coalition presence. As the U.S. occupation dragged on with little 
improvement in security, unfulfilled promises for reconstruction, and continued 
aggressive military tactics, residents became angry.
157
Initially, the mantra of the Mahdi 
Militia was support and protection. Its intention was to pursue a non-violent, religious 
path to serve and support local neighborhoods. Its members were prohibited from 
carrying weapons, and the organization was mandated to “devote itself to social work and 
the poor.”
158
This was no small feat: areas such as Sadr City were overpopulated, 
underemployed and basic services were severely lacking. One of Sadr’s lieutenants 
announced: “We are founding the army without weapons. There is no intention to use 
any force.”
159
The lack of communication by both the Mahdi militia and the CPA only 
nurtured divisiveness between the two groups. The CPA lacked a strategy for dealing 
with the growing threat of militias that were increasingly anti-American. Very few U.S. 
civilian or military personnel understood the Mahdi Militia’s role in society or the depth 
of popular support for it. U.S. military forces were identified as the most appropriate tool 
to deal with this irregular threat. However, these forces were designed and trained for 
conventional combat operations, and thus employed kinetic operations.
156
Anderson and Stansfield, 
The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, Or Division?
, 133-134 
157
Shadid, 
Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War
, 258-259. 
158
Shadid, 258. 
159
Ibid
. 

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