43
after the collapse of the state.
127
Immediately following the fall of Saddam Hussein,
local neighborhoods were stricken with uncontrolled looting and vandalism for over two
months.
128
Cultural sites such as the National Library and Iraqi National Museum saw
ancient artifacts and historical archives destroyed and burned. Public institutions such as
Baghdad and Mosul University were stripped of all administrative and logistical supplies.
Stability dissolved along
with the Iraqi security forces, replaced by U.S. military force
that was extremely effective in conducting conventional military operations but too small
and not appropriately trained to perform security and stability operations in a country of
27 million people. Lawlessness was pervasive and local neighborhoods were forced to
protect themselves. The establishment of security and stability services through the
employment of local Shia militias at the local level was a natural process. Local citizens
knew they could trust these groups
to actually protect them, while Coalition forces were
not allowed by their civilian leadership to intervene as looting and vandalism extirpated
Iraq’s infrastructure.
129
Thus, Shia militia leaders and subordinates had little choice but to establish their own
form of militia governance in place of the deposed regime and inability of U.S. forces to
provide local security. Sadr City is an excellent example of local religious authorities
establishing their own forms of governance in order to provide some semblance of order to
their sprawling communities. However, they were careful not to
promise what they could not
deliver. Religious leaders such as Sheikh Abdel-Rahman Shuweili were inundated with
requests that included such issues as employment, locating stolen goods, medical facilities,
religious taxes, etc.
130
The Shia militia leaders established a number of committees using the
only formal law left after the fall of the Baathist regime: Islamic law. In conjunction with
Shuweili’s outreach
committee, Shia
militias organized a number of other subcommittees
127
Alexandra Zavis, “Shiites Want the Help of Sadr’s Militia,” Los Angeles Times,
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimes888.html2007).; Anthony Shadid,
Night Draws
Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War
, 1st ed. (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 172-175,
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0623/2005040348-b.html (accessed September 22, 2007).
128
No End in Sight,
Documentary, directed by Charles Ferguson Magnolia, 2007) (accessed
December 9, 2007);
Peter Galbraith, “How to Get Out of Iraq,”
New York Review of Books
15, no. 8
(2004), 4-5.
129
Ferguson,
No End in Sight.
130
Shadid,
Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War
, 183.
44
that included, “health services, media, religious edicts, Islamic law courts, and, somewhat
ambitiously, electricity and telecommunications.”
131
However,
this included the
establishment of the notorious vice and virtue committee, which conflicted with the
western democratic intentions of the CPA. This committee came to be feared by local
citizens due to its strict interpretation of Islamic law. For example, women were strongly
encouraged to be veiled, stores that
sold alcohol were shut down, and movies considered
indecent were banned.
132
Yet, it was impossible to prevent Shia militias from
establishing such groups because they were the legitimate authority available.
The Mahdi Militia was established by Moqtada al-Sadr, a young Shia cleric.
133
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Moqtada al-Sadr resurrected the Sadr
movement using Shia mosques throughout Iraq. In April 2003 Al-Sadr’s followers,
known as al-Sariyyun or Sadrists, created local militias
of young Shia men who
forcefully took over local hospitals and policing duties from the waning control of the
Baath Party.
134
Moqtada al-Sadr’s movement in 2003 can be described by its nationalist
and religious undertones. He made his anti-American sentiments clear when he “thanked
God rather than the U.S. for religious freedom and for liberating us from dictatorship” in
131
Shadid, 185.
132
Ibid
.
133
Juan Cole, “The United States and Shi ‘ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba ‘thist Iraq,”
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