Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

4. 
U.S. Strategy and Shia Militias 
As in the Kurdish and Sunni cases above, Shia militias also gained considerable 
power after the fall of the Baath party in 2003, due to the security vacuum, which 
Coalition forces were unable to fill. Religious elites affiliated with militias assumed 
positions of authority by default. They were recognized by a majority of the Shia 
population as bearing the responsibility of providing security, governance and stability 
126
Mays, 
Concerned Iraqi Citizen Movement Saves American Lives
, 1. 

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43
after the collapse of the state.
127
Immediately following the fall of Saddam Hussein, 
local neighborhoods were stricken with uncontrolled looting and vandalism for over two 
months.
128
Cultural sites such as the National Library and Iraqi National Museum saw 
ancient artifacts and historical archives destroyed and burned. Public institutions such as 
Baghdad and Mosul University were stripped of all administrative and logistical supplies.
Stability dissolved along with the Iraqi security forces, replaced by U.S. military force 
that was extremely effective in conducting conventional military operations but too small 
and not appropriately trained to perform security and stability operations in a country of 
27 million people. Lawlessness was pervasive and local neighborhoods were forced to 
protect themselves. The establishment of security and stability services through the 
employment of local Shia militias at the local level was a natural process. Local citizens 
knew they could trust these groups to actually protect them, while Coalition forces were 
not allowed by their civilian leadership to intervene as looting and vandalism extirpated 
Iraq’s infrastructure.
129
Thus, Shia militia leaders and subordinates had little choice but to establish their own 
form of militia governance in place of the deposed regime and inability of U.S. forces to 
provide local security. Sadr City is an excellent example of local religious authorities 
establishing their own forms of governance in order to provide some semblance of order to 
their sprawling communities. However, they were careful not to promise what they could not 
deliver. Religious leaders such as Sheikh Abdel-Rahman Shuweili were inundated with 
requests that included such issues as employment, locating stolen goods, medical facilities, 
religious taxes, etc.
130 
The Shia militia leaders established a number of committees using the 
only formal law left after the fall of the Baathist regime: Islamic law. In conjunction with 
Shuweili’s outreach committee, Shia 
militias organized a number of other subcommittees 
127
Alexandra Zavis, “Shiites Want the Help of Sadr’s Militia,” Los Angeles Times, 
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimes888.html2007).; Anthony Shadid, 
Night Draws 
Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War
, 1st ed. (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 172-175, 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0623/2005040348-b.html (accessed September 22, 2007). 
128
No End in Sight, 
Documentary, directed by Charles Ferguson Magnolia, 2007) (accessed 
December 9, 2007); Peter Galbraith, “How to Get Out of Iraq,” 
New York Review of Books
15, no. 8 
(2004), 4-5. 
129
Ferguson, 
No End in Sight.
130
Shadid, 
Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War
, 183. 

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44
that included, “health services, media, religious edicts, Islamic law courts, and, somewhat 
ambitiously, electricity and telecommunications.”
131
However, this included the 
establishment of the notorious vice and virtue committee, which conflicted with the 
western democratic intentions of the CPA. This committee came to be feared by local 
citizens due to its strict interpretation of Islamic law. For example, women were strongly 
encouraged to be veiled, stores that sold alcohol were shut down, and movies considered 
indecent were banned.
132
Yet, it was impossible to prevent Shia militias from 
establishing such groups because they were the legitimate authority available.
The Mahdi Militia was established by Moqtada al-Sadr, a young Shia cleric.
133
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Moqtada al-Sadr resurrected the Sadr 
movement using Shia mosques throughout Iraq. In April 2003 Al-Sadr’s followers, 
known as al-Sariyyun or Sadrists, created local militias of young Shia men who 
forcefully took over local hospitals and policing duties from the waning control of the 
Baath Party.
134
Moqtada al-Sadr’s movement in 2003 can be described by its nationalist 
and religious undertones. He made his anti-American sentiments clear when he “thanked 
God rather than the U.S. for religious freedom and for liberating us from dictatorship” in 
131
Shadid, 185. 
132
Ibid
. 
133
Juan Cole, “The United States and Shi ‘ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba ‘thist Iraq,”