Figure 1.
Provincial Map of Iraq
39
The lack of focus on post-conflict operations was evident in the under-funded and
under-equipped Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), led by
retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, which was established to “manage postwar
reconstruction, governance, and assistance in Iraq.”
40
Created and funded by the
Department of Defense in January 2003, ORHA was composed of Iraqi exiles and
opponents of the Saddam Hussein regime. It was intended to “re-establish law and order,
basic services and some form of governance.”
41
The tactical military strategy was to pass
the torch of responsibility to civilian agencies that specialized in post-conflict operations,
including OHRA and a newly elected Iraqi government. Major General David Petraeus,
commander of the 101
st
Airborne division who was responsible for most of Northern Iraq
39
John Pike, "Global Security.Org Maps of Iraq," Global Security,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/maps.htm (accessed January 4, 2008).
40
Kirsten Lundberg, The Accidental Statesmen: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq
(Cambridge, MA: Case Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,[2006]).
41
Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2006), 292.
16
stated that he “had a sense that ORHA, working together with Iraqi exiles and Iraqis who
would be on the job, would probably take the lead” and that the U.S. military would assume
more of a supporting role.42 However ORHA was able to accomplish little more than
damage assessments as large areas of Iraq plummeted into chaos. ORHA had not prepared
for the scenario that was playing out in Iraq and thus had no contingency plans ready to deal
with such widespread looting, vandalism, and organized crime. The 600-800 ORHA staff
stationed in Baghdad was driven by competing political agendas, which led to sub par work
and refusal to remove themselves from Saddam’s palaces and communicate with the local
population. ORHA’s “planning was ragged and execution was worse.”43 Personnel
limitations and location also were a problem. The ORHA North office was staffed by only
ten personnel safely located in Irbil, in the Kurdish zone, which was too far away from other
northern Iraqi cities such as Mosul, where reconstruction assistance was desperately
needed.44 ORHA’s shortcomings were not all of its own making. It had less than three
months from its inception to plan and prepare for post-conflict nation-building whereas
planning for post-conflict administration after World War II took two and a half years.45 In
July 2003, ORHA was replaced with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by L.
Paul Bremer, which was designed to “exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers
while rebuilding the state’s infrastructure and beginning the job of reconstruction.”46 On
July 13, 2003, the CPA established the Interim Governing Council, an appointed body of
Iraqis that was to “consult and advise [Bremer] on all matters relating to the temporary
governance of Iraq.”47 However, by then reservations in Sunni and Shia communities about
U.S. employment of what appeared to be a combat-oriented strategy in response to ORHA
failures had begun to foment.
42
Lundberg, The Accidental Statesmen: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq, 7.
43
Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 294-295.
44
Lundberg, The Accidental Statesmen: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq, 8.
45
Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 294.
46
Hashim, 18.
47
Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 18.
17
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