Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

II. 
CASE STUDY- OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine three different strategies employed by U.S. military 
forces to deal with militias in Iraq since 2003, arguing that strategies of engagement have 
consistently been more effective than strategies of defeat. As background, the first 
section describes the five phases of the United States invasion and occupation of Iraq 
between 2003 and 2007: the invasion, evolution of insurgency, transfer of political 
authority, sectarian violence, and surge of U.S. forces. The rest of chapter is divided into 
three, addressing U.S. strategies vis-à-vis militias in the majority Kurdish, Sunni, and 
Shia regions of Iraq, respectively. The Kurdish section examines the U.S. Special Forces 
strategy of engagement with the Kurdish Peshmerga during the invasion of Iraq and 
during post conflict operations. The analysis highlights the Special Forces perceived 
need to engage and cooperate with the Peshmerga in order to survive and ultimately 
succeed in defeating Saddam Hussein’s military. The analysis will also examine the 
emergency direct employment of Kurdish militias during the post-invasion phase and 
their effect on security and stability when the majority of Iraq was mired in chaos. The 
third section provides a comparative analysis of two different strategies vis-à-vis militias 
in Sunni dominated Anbar province. From 2003 to 2006, the U.S. battled insurgents and 
Al Qaeda in Anbar province, and insecurity remained high. In mid-2006 a U.S. Army 
Brigade Commander reversed course, initiating a strategy of engagement with Sunni 
militias, ultimately endorsing their use for providing local security against al Qaeda 
threats, with the consequence of dramatically reduced levels of violence in the province. 
The last section examines U.S. strategy vis-à-vis Shia militias, focusing on the effects of 
the strategy of non-engagement with Moqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Militia throughout 
the period under consideration. The chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of the 
effects on local stability of U.S. militia strategies in the three regions.

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