Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

6.2.5.
 
Conclusions 
This part of the chapter examined the objection that biomedical interventions such 
as DBS or moral modification would impair narrative identity and inquired whether 
such worry would provide a robust basis for an argument that MB is impermissible. 
After outlining the relevant features of Schechtman’s (1996) account of identity, I 
have examined the objection she raises in her critique of the use of DBS 
(Schechtman, 2009). I have argued that DBS patients, and by extension subjects of 
voluntary MB, are likely to satisfy 
Schechtman’s articulation constraint, i.e., to 
provide a satisfactory account of their history, life situation and motivations. 
Consequently, at least as far as narrative identity is concerned, the ability of agents 
to make sense of their actions and engage with moral reasons is not obviously 
impaired. It remains unclear what degree and kind of change would be disruptive 
on Schechtman’s account and what kind of change can be assimilated into a 
changing but continuously present narrative. Moreover, it seems that even if 
narrative identity is disrupted, this does not mean that such disruption is irreparable. 
What we seem to be left with are worries about the epistemic justification of the 
post-intervention beliefs and desires, but this worry would only apply if there is a 
net loss in the degree of justification. 
Further, I have argued that Schechtman’s empathetic access criterion should be 
rejected as too demanding to ground a strong moral critique of MB. Some 
interventions proposed (see: Chapter 3) aim at increasing empathy. Where those 
changes would strengthen the ability to empathise with ourselves, the intervention 
could potentially have strengthened the empathetic identification and thus narrative 
self-identity of a person. However, even where the moral modification intervention 

---

119 
loosens the empathic connection between oneself now and in the past, I argued that 
this would not provide us with a strong moral objection to MB. Although the ability 
to understand one’s past in the phenomenally rich way – which would also include 
an affective attitude of sympathy – is one way of engaging with the past, other 
backwards-looking attitudes can underpin the identity-narrative. Moreover, 
although the changes in the ‘subtle sense of identity’ Schechtman is trying to 
pinpoint while emphasising a sympathy-filled understanding of one’s past may be 
valuable in some way, the life transitions that also are a valuable part of the human 
condition may require giving that up. The transitions marked by ‘I changed so 
much! I don’t really understand how I could value what I did!’ may indeed be 
significant for us, yet to say that they are significant does not imply that they should 
not be lived through.
Schechtman’s account of narrative identity is an interesting attempt to theorise 
factors that make up human identity. Since the ability of a person to give a 
satisfactory account of her history, plans and motivations need not to be disrupted 
by DBS or MB, and the ethical significance of such disruptions remains unclear 
even if narrative identity was disrupted, Schechtman’s account fails to provide basis
for a strong objection to the use of biomedical emotion modulation.