Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

Introduction 
Moral and social enhancement has recently emerged as a topic of public discussion 
and applied ethical examination. In response to global problems, and inspired by 
the increased focus on social neuroscience, many authors put forward proposal 
about how to address the worlds’ pressing problems and make us better people.
Jeremy Rifkin in 
Empathetic Civilization
, 
Rethinking Human Nature in the 
Biosphere Era
(2010), argued that we need to extend ‘empathic consciousness’ (p. 
168) and moving away from the Enlightenment idea of humans as rational, self-
interested, and utilitarian, is what is needed to face the challenges the humanity is 
now facing. Simon Baron-Cohen (2011), a psychologist famous for his research on 
Autism and empathy, proposes that we explain evil in terms of low levels of 
empathetic ability. Further, in his 
Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of 
Cruelty
, Baron-Cohen proposes that more empathy would make better people and 
better society. Patricia Churchland, a philosopher known for her eliminativism
1
in 
the philosophy of mind, in
 Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality 
(2011) argues that morality originates in the biology of the brain. Moral values, 
Churchland argues, are rooted in a behaviour common to all mammals the caring 
for offspring.
In this context, the applied ethical discussion of enhancement, typically focused on 
cognitive, mood and memory enhancement, was extended to considering the 
prospects of moral and social enhancement. In 2008, Douglas published a paper on 
MB in which he argued that enhancement of moral motives would be an 
enhancement that escapes the objections of the so called ‘bioconservative’ critics of 
1
Eliminative approaches
 
assume that beliefs, desires, hopes, and fears are 
theoretical constructs of a theory of mind called ‘folk psychology.’ This theory and 
all its constructs are seen as having little value and candidates for elimination. 
According to eliminativism, the theory should be replaced by a better theory of 
‘neuroscience,’ which would replace the obsolete categories by a better system of 
neurobiological categories. See for example, Churchland (1986). 

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9 
enhancement. Further, Persson and Savulescu (2008) argued that since cognitive 
enhancement and the increased access to technology means that the society is 
increasingly exposed to the risk of large scale harm perpetuated by a small 
minority, we have a reason to complement cognitive enhancement with moral 
improvement aimed at preventing such harm. They argue that this gives us a reason 
to pursue moral bioenhancement (MB) and propose enhancing social sentiments 
and capacities such as empathy and sense of fairness. In their 2012 book (Savulescu 
and Persson, 2012b), they also propose that MB could help to solve the great 
problems facing humanity such as climate change and poverty.
The ethical examination of moral and social enhancement has been further fuelled 
by the development in social neuroscience over the past two decades, newly 
budding interest of neuroscientists in moral judgement and decision-making, the 
boom in brain imaging research, the emergence of empirical philosophy and the 
increasing popularity of the diagnosis of asocial personality disorder in the context 
of public safety and criminal justice. 
The goal of this thesis is to examine the arguments put forward by the proponents 
of MB as well as those who raise ethical objections and doubts about the 
plausibility of MB aimed at enhancing moral agency. I will focus on MB that 
targets the underpinnings of social action, such as emotions – what some scholars 
have called direct emotion modulation (Douglas, 2013). Although I will at points 
examine ethical criticism related to the possibility of compulsory use of MB, in this 
thesis I will focus mainly on examining the ethical dimension of voluntary MB. The 
reason for this is that although the compulsory use adds another layer of ethical 
challenge, the examination of issues raised by voluntary use is foundational. More 
discussion is needed is in this area and such discussion will likely enrich further 
considering issues related to compulsory use. Moreover, the discussion of 
compulsory use of neurotechnologies would incorporate the arguments already put 
forward in the area of compulsory measures in mental health, crime prevention and 
rehabilitation of offenders and require additional reference to political theory ideas 
that underpin such arguments. In the service of the depth of the argument, this 
thesis focuses mainly on the voluntary aspects of MB, with reference to issues 
raised by compulsory use where appropriate.

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10 
Additionally, the current work’s leading emphasis on the voluntary agent-led MB 
(see especially Chapter 8) is a result of a choice made to address issues from the 
perspective of a potential user when she is faced with a decision of whether or not 
to use MB (see Chapter 4 in which I argue that despite moral disagreement such 
decisions will have to be made). I have attempted to focus on the areas that might 
be especially problematic for the potential user, at the same time adding to the 
existing scholarship on the topic. I have aimed to use philosophical and applied 
ethical methods in the service of elucidating, analysing and responding to the 
doubts potential users of MB may be faced with.
There are two predominant methods proposed for MB via direct emotion 
modulation: pharmacological enhancement (via administration of oxytocin and 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors [SSRIs] for example) and enhancement using 
brain stimulation (e.g. modulating amygdala activation). Pharmacological agents 
that are potential moral enhancers are already here shall we wish to use them (e.g. 
SSRIs and oxytocin) and others will likely emerge as our