1.5.
Conclusions
Some may object to the use of the term ‘moral enhancement’ as referring only to
certain capacities and not carrying a clear normative message as well. Although it
may be true that when we think about moral enhancement we automatically think
about people being better morally speaking, this approach introduces hard to avoid
confusion due to the ‘moral’ doing double, and sometimes triple, work; as a
description of the target abilities that are improved, as a normatively loaded
reference to whether that intervention results in people being morally better in some
way, and as a reference to whether this enhancement is overall desirable from a
moral point of view. This may introduce confusion when examining moral
enhancement—we can be asking three questions to which we might give, at least in
principle, three different answers.
5
For subjective rightness, see Carritt (1947) and Parfit (1988).
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Moreover, if we find cognitive enhancement interesting, we are also likely to find
moral enhancement in the third sense (an enhancement of the moral sphere
beneficial to the agent) interesting. It raises interesting questions about authenticity,
free will and the moral nature of humans, the role of rational choice and of the
motivation to be moral in choosing which moral stances one adopts. As a result,
although most of the current discussion focuses on the second understanding of
moral enhancement, the ‘cognitive’ understanding is interesting in its own right.
Although I recognize the need to address the mentioned questions, a more detailed
discussion will have to wait for another occasion. The aim of this thesis is to
evaluate and contribute to the current debate.
In sections 1.3 and 1.4 I have attempted to elucidate certain complications in the
ethical assessment of modifications in the moral sphere. For example, an attempt at
moral enhancement understood as making morally better agents will be subject to
assessment whether or not it is also aids moral agency in the wide sense and
whether or not in enhancement actually making a person better off. Consequently, I
will use the term ‘moral modification’ or ‘attempts at moral enhancement’ to
acknowledge the further need for moral assessment. Although most commentators
use ‘MB’ to refer to ‘moral bioenhancement,’ I will take ‘MB’ to be a short for
‘moral biomodification.’
In the next chapters I mainly focus on two questions: (1) whether or not and when
biomedical moral modification will enhance or endanger moral agency, and (2)
whether or not and which biomedical attempts at moral enhancement are morally
desirable. The next chapter examines the plausibility of biomedical modification of
emotion and pro-social sentiment as a way of creating better moral agents.
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