Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

1.5.
 
Conclusions 
Some may object to the use of the term ‘moral enhancement’ as referring only to 
certain capacities and not carrying a clear normative message as well. Although it 
may be true that when we think about moral enhancement we automatically think 
about people being better morally speaking, this approach introduces hard to avoid 
confusion due to the ‘moral’ doing double, and sometimes triple, work; as a 
description of the target abilities that are improved, as a normatively loaded 
reference to whether that intervention results in people being morally better in some 
way, and as a reference to whether this enhancement is overall desirable from a 
moral point of view. This may introduce confusion when examining moral 
enhancement—we can be asking three questions to which we might give, at least in 
principle, three different answers.
5
For subjective rightness, see Carritt (1947) and Parfit (1988). 

---

30 
Moreover, if we find cognitive enhancement interesting, we are also likely to find 
moral enhancement in the third sense (an enhancement of the moral sphere 
beneficial to the agent) interesting. It raises interesting questions about authenticity, 
free will and the moral nature of humans, the role of rational choice and of the 
motivation to be moral in choosing which moral stances one adopts. As a result, 
although most of the current discussion focuses on the second understanding of 
moral enhancement, the ‘cognitive’ understanding is interesting in its own right. 
Although I recognize the need to address the mentioned questions, a more detailed 
discussion will have to wait for another occasion. The aim of this thesis is to 
evaluate and contribute to the current debate.
In sections 1.3 and 1.4 I have attempted to elucidate certain complications in the 
ethical assessment of modifications in the moral sphere. For example, an attempt at 
moral enhancement understood as making morally better agents will be subject to 
assessment whether or not it is also aids moral agency in the wide sense and 
whether or not in enhancement actually making a person better off. Consequently, I 
will use the term ‘moral modification’ or ‘attempts at moral enhancement’ to 
acknowledge the further need for moral assessment. Although most commentators 
use ‘MB’ to refer to ‘moral bioenhancement,’ I will take ‘MB’ to be a short for 
‘moral biomodification.’
In the next chapters I mainly focus on two questions: (1) whether or not and when 
biomedical moral modification will enhance or endanger moral agency, and (2) 
whether or not and which biomedical attempts at moral enhancement are morally 
desirable. The next chapter examines the plausibility of biomedical modification of 
emotion and pro-social sentiment as a way of creating better moral agents. 

---

31