TEACHERS’ INTENTIONS, THE CURRICULUM AND STUDENTS’ INTERESTS
Intentionality is a complex term. Sometimes it is used to denote human goal-orientation, meaning that an
individual has intentions and is aiming at something that is not present. On other occasions again, primarily
within the phenomenological tradition, it refers to the nature of human consciousness. Human
consciousness is claimed to be intentional, since it is always directed towards an object or some content.
Here, only the goal-oriented aspect of the concept will be discussed.
In the presented model, teaching is seen as a conscious,
deliberate activity; teaching cannot generally be
characterized as being unintentional or non-intentional.
A specific feature of teaching in schools compared with teaching outside schools is that a curriculum
frames the teaching process. A consequence previously discussed is that the goals explicated in the
curriculum are realized in the schools only to the extent that the individual teacher accepts them. We may
thus identify intentionality as goal-orientation on several levels of the school system. As this is one of the
fundamental problems in trying to understand the TSL process in the institutionalized schools, the
discussion on intentionality is here limited to this issue.
A model of didactics which, like the present one, takes intentionality as its point of departure, is not
automatically a rationalist model in the sense that it would claim that all educational activity takes the goals
of education as its point of departure. As far as I understand, such a rationalist model presupposes that the
teacher plans on the basis of the goals, i.e. that the content and form of instruction are deduced from the
goals. To accept intentionality or purposiveness as a starting point does not
mean accepting this sense of
rationality. Even though planning is a fundamental category, it is easy to accept that a teacher may let the
available resources affect the goal-setting, since there is seldom any point in setting goals that cannot be
attained.
The interdependence between intention, content, method and media, as well as the context-relatedness of
these concepts, has already been discussed. The present model accepts the thesis of interdependence but
argues that the question of intention is different in character compared, for example, with methods.
A further reason why this model is not a rationalist model in the narrow sense, is that the choice of goals
and the relating of them to the teacher’s own personal educational philosophy is done
both before an actual
pedagogical situation and within it. The goal-setting may thus be parallel to, for example, the choice of
content and of form of representation. And the goal-setting is naturally closely related to the students’
intentions and activities.
Intentionality as Purposiveness
When the school didactic model of this study was presented, it was claimed that the teachers’ planning (P2)
may transcend planning on the collective level (P1). This relation contains a wide spectrum of problems and
only a few principal questions can be touched upon here. One important problem is how teachers follow the
collective curriculum. In other words, how can we conceptually deal with the tension between the collective
intentions and the individual teacher’s intentions?
Applying a teleological mode of discussing goal-orientation and intentionality, Kansanen and Uusikylä
(1983, pp. 73 ff.) make a distinction between purposive and intentional pedagogical activity; pedagogical
activity is always intentional when the teacher’s intentions are based on the teacher’s own goals. But it may
be called purposive if the teacher’s intentions are based on the predetermined goals and if the teacher is aware
that this is the case. Again, if the teacher were to pursue a predetermined goal without being aware of doing
this, it would be a quasi-teleological activity and not purposive in the sense described above. Thus,
awareness is required in order for some activity to be purposive.
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SCHOOL DIDACTICS AND LEARNING
In order to handle the relation between the intentions of the curriculum and the teacher, Kansanen
(1993b) has suggested how the notions of deontological and teleological ethics may be used in solving this
problem. Deontological ethics is generally seen as dealing with the intention of an act when it is evaluated
while the act itself is considered as a duty to be performed. Teleological ethics again stresses the
consequences of an act when it is valued. In Kansanen’s (1993b) interpretation the deontological dimension
is present when the teacher internalizes the goals and intentions of a curriculum. He claims that when “the
teacher knows the curriculum, its
purposes, aims and goals, it is possible for [the teacher] gradually to make
them become a part of [their] thinking and internalize its content as part of [their] responsibility” (p. 58).
When external values are internalized by the teacher these values and norms become a kind of internalized
intention with moral obligations: “With the internalized purposes as [the teachers’] intentions, the aims and
goals gradually receive the character of some kind of a deontological theory with moral responsibilities”
(ibid., p. 58). Having reached this point the teachers’ intentions are “identical” with the aims and intentions
of the curriculum. This is one of the cornerstones of Kansanen’s (1993b) model of teachers’ pedagogical
thinking.
According to Kansanen’s (1993b) interpretation of deontological ethics, we are offered an instrument by
which we can handle the relation between norms and goals on the collective level and the teacher’s
individual intentions. The teleological aspect again makes it possible to discuss the already internalized
intentions of the teacher and to focus on the effects of teaching, i.e. the students’ achievements.
This model
offers the possibility of analysing how an individual teacher’s intentions function as the mediation between
collective goals and their effects. To limit ourselves to one of these perspectives severely restricts our
possibilities of understanding the process as a whole, it is argued. As such the deontological dimension
seems to be close to traditional normative positions in didactics and offers as such no possibilities of
discussing the results of the teaching process.
To Kansanen the described process is a constitutive element of pedagogical awareness: “combining the
deontological aspect with the teleological aspect reflects the teacher’s conscious understanding of the
totality of the instructional process inside the curricular frame” (1993b, p. 58). Further, Kansanen argues
that “if the teacher knows the curriculum “it is possible” for teachers to internalize the collective goals. We
agree with this but we also note the open nature of the assumption; teachers do not necessarily internalize the
goals of the curriculum because they only know the curriculum and know what is expected. In order to
understand why certain collective goals are internalized while others are not, we
must investigate under
what circumstances and conditions an individual acts as a teacher. Thus, as was said before, it is important
to understand
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