School Didactics And Learning: a school Didactic Model Framing An Analysis of Pedagogical Implication of Learning Theory

 functional
simulation of cognitive behaviour. It was now thought that simulations were
models of intelligent systems only if they realized operations in order to reach functions in the same manner
as the system simulated did.
A third fundamental background concept of cognitive science is the schema-concept introduced by Kant.
The mental categories that Kant proposed constituted an important break compared with the associative
theory that had been developed since Aristotle. In cognitive science the schema-concept has been
considered useful since cognition is seen as a symbol-processing system that both regulates attention and
the receiving of information and also includes the syntax according to which information is processed.
However, during the 20th century the schemaconcept has been applied in several ways (cf. Bartlett, 1932;
Neisser, 1976; Piaget, 1953; Selz, 1924), which makes it impossible to present a precise definition of it
(Eckblad, 1981). Nevertheless, a most influential single conceptualization of the schema-concept with
respect to cognitive science was the one presented by Bartlett (1932) in his criticism of Ebbinghaus’s
approach. For Bartlett the schema was primarily a structure of organized knowledge which affected what
individuals recalled when reading texts. Bartlett’s argument about “effort after meaning” pointed out that
“knowledge of the world is interpreted through schemata based on past experience”.
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However, in different cognitive theories the functional status of the inner system varies. For example
Ulric Neisser’s and Jean Piaget’s schemes are not as dominating as a scheme in more radical cognitivism.
Neisser and Piaget do not presuppose an autonomous existence of either schemes or constructs. However
their schemes are not passive. Both Piaget’s and Neisser’s schemes direct the attention exhibited by the
person towards the world. For Piaget an object gets its meaning when it is assimilated in the scheme, or
system of schemes, but the difference to cognitivism is that the assimilation process “is not assumed to
involve hypothesis testing, analysis, inferences or any kind of cognitive operations” (Lundh, 1983, p. 14).
Thus Piaget does not specify operations by which information is assimilated into the scheme, which is one
of the major goals in information processing psychology. In spite of these differences the main point here is
the transition from an associative to a schema-theoretical model of explanation (see Leiser & Giliéron, 1990
for a discussion of the relation between cognitivism and Piagetian psychology).
A fourth important background factor for the development of the cognitive science approach has been the
development of computers. The expectations exhibited in the AI literature in the 60s reflected much hope
concerning the solution of the nature of human cognition. The dominating contemporary views in cognitive
science were also developed when the classical von Neumann architecture was the paradigm of designing
computers. This architecture correlates well with the idea of symbols and rule systems as the basis of human
mental life where cognition (thinking) is seen as the application of formal rules on syntactically structured
internal representations. Even though the more recent development of parallel distributed processing models
breaks with the serial processing of the earlier architecture, the most important assumption remains, namely
that computational processing of information simulates human cognition. In fact the change in interest
towards connectionism only supports this interpretation. However, one cannot say that the cognitivist or
computational view of the mind has developed after the development of the computer. Fodor (1981, p. 140)
reminds us that the “computer metaphor predates the computer by about three hundred years”.
Nevertheless, computers have supported theory development in “non-physicalist” terms.
A fifth factor that has had a general influence on research in cognitive science is the renewed interest in
the philosophy of mind during the last few decades. During the same period philosophers have also been
more interested in developing conceptions of the human mind that are consistent with empirical research on
cognition.
A sixth influence is the research carried out by neuropsychologists. The approaches that attempt to
explain different aspects of human cognition from a physiological perspective have increased dramatically
in the last decade (cf. Churchland, 1986).
Cognitivism and Cognitive Science
In this study I have had to make decisions concerning the delimitation of the cognitivist approach. This is a
complex task because the research is so diverse. On the other hand it is not difficult since the cognitivist
approach is quite easily recognized thanks to central works representing it. The principle guiding the choice
of particular pieces of research has been that they must be accepted by the scientific community they
represent as research items where fundamental ideas are explicated.
Secondly, we have the problem of what directions within the cognitivist approach should be focused on.
In order to indicate how cognitivism is delimited, its relation to cognitive science and computationalism is
specified.
Cognitive science is taken to be a recent concept referring to efforts to coordinate research on different
aspects of cognition within different disciplines. Hunt (1989, p. 603) writes:
5. OBJECT OF ANALYSIS
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Cognitive science is an attempt to unify views of thought developed by studies in psychology,
linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, computer science and the neurosciences.
We have noticed that research today in the area generally called cognitive science is characterized by a
multitude of theoretical approaches and that it has been difficult to relate theories to each other.
1
In order to
handle this problem, cognitive scientists have used concepts like framework (approach, meta-theory,
paradigm), theory, model and cognitive architecture. The concept closest to the level of analysis adopted in
this study is that of framework (Eysenck & Keane, 1991, p. 31):
A framework is a general set of ideas which is drawn upon by theorists within a particular discipline…
The important thing about frameworks is that they should be regarded as useful or not useful rather
than correct or incorrect. The reason for this is that they consist of high-level assumptions which
cannot be tested directly at an experimental level.
It has also been suggested that cognitive science is not just a perspective on cognition, but a new discipline
(Norman, 1980; Pylyshyn, 1984). As a concept, cognitive science would thus refer to a research object, human
cognition, not to a specific kind of theory of its object, cognitivism. Whether cognitive science should be
regarded as a perspective or a new discipline is of a certain importance because of its consequences for the
present study. If various traditional disciplines preceding cognitive science are able to answer the questions
posed by cognitive science, it cannot be established as a discipline. On the other hand, if a multi-disciplinary
approach like cognitive science is necessary for answering basic questions concerning cognition, then at
least that area of existing disciplines dealing with cognition has to be separated from the traditional
disciplines.
The most obvious feature of cognitive science is its cognitivist stance. Thus cognitivism will be
considered as one of the features distinguishing cognitive science from other approaches. Cognitivism
means that