Microsoft Word Kurzweil, Ray The Singularity Is Near doc

There exists no objective test that can conclusively determine its presence. 
Science is about objective measurements and their logical implications, but the very nature of objectivity is that 
you cannot measure subjective experience—you can only measure correlates of it, such as behavior (and by behavior, I 
include internal behavior—that is, the actions of the components of an entity, such as neurons and their many parts). 
This limitation has to do with the very nature of the concepts of "objectivity" and "subjectivity." Fundamentally we 
cannot penetrate the subjective experience of another entity with direct objective measurement. We can certainly make 
arguments about it, such as, "Look inside the brain of this nonbiological entity; see how its methods are just like those 
of a human brain." Or, "See how its behavior is just like human behavior." But in the end, these remain just arguments. 
No matter how convincing the behavior of a nonbiological person, some observers will refuse to accept the 
consciousness of such an entity unless it squirts neurotransmitters, is based on DNA-guided protein synthesis, or has 
some other specific biologically human attribute. 
We assume that other humans are conscious, but even that is an assumption. There is no consensus among humans 
about the consciousness of nonhuman entities, such as higher animals. Consider the debates regarding animal rights, 
which have everything to do with whether animals are conscious or just quasi machines that operate by "instinct." The 
issue will be even more contentious with regard to future nonbiological entities that exhibit behavior and intelligence 
even more humanlike than those of animals. 

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In fact these future machines will be even more humanlike than humans today. If that seems like a paradoxical 
statement, consider that much of human thought today is petty and derivative. We marvel at Einstein's ability to 
conjure up the theory of general relativity from a thought experiment or Beethoven's ability to imagine symphonies 
that he could never hear. But these instances of human thought at its best are rare and fleeting; (Fortunately we have a 
record of these fleeting moments, reflecting a key capability that has separated humans from other animals.) Our future 
primarily nonbiological selves will be vastly more intelligent and so will exhibit these finer qualities of human thought 
to a far greater degree. 
So how will we come to terms with the consciousness that will be claimed by nonbiological intelligence? From a 
practical perspective such claims will be accepted. For one thing, "they" will be us, so there won't be any clear 
distinctions between biological and nonbiological intelligence. Furthermore, these nonbiological entities will be 
extremely intelligent, so they'll be able to convince other humans (biological, nonbiological, or somewhere in 
between) that they are conscious. They'll have all the delicate emotional cues that convince us today that humans are 
conscious. They will be able to make other humans laugh and cry. And they'll get mad if others don't accept their 
claims. But this is fundamentally a political and psychological prediction, not a philosophical argument. 
I do take issue with those who maintain that subjective experience either doesn't exist or is an inessential quality 
that can safely be ignored. The issue of who or what is conscious and the nature of the subjective experiences of others 
are fundamental to our concepts of ethics, morality, and law. Our legal system is based largely on the concept of 
consciousness, with particularly serious attention paid to actions that cause suffering—an especially acute form of 
conscious experience—to a (conscious) human or that end the conscious experience of a human (for example, 
murder). 
Human ambivalence regarding the ability of animals to suffer is reflected in legislation as well. We have laws 
against animal cruelty, with greater emphasis given to more intelligent animals, such as primates (although we appear 
to have a blind spot with regard to the massive animal suffering involved in factory farming, but that's the subject of 
another treatise). 
My point is that we cannot safely dismiss the question of consciousness as merely a polite philosophical concern. 
It is at the core of society's legal and moral foundation. The debate will change when a machine—nonbiological 
intelligence—can persuasively argue on its own that it/he/she has feelings that need to be respected. Once it can do so 
with a sense of humor—which is particularly important for convincing others of one's humanness—it is likely that the 
debate will be won. 
I expect that actual change in our legal system will come initially from litigation rather than legislation, as 
litigation often precipitates such transformations. In a precursor of what is to come, attorney Martine Rothblatt, a 
partner in Mahon, Patusky, Rothblatt & Fisher, filed a mock motion on September 16, 2003, to prevent a corporation 
from disconnecting a conscious computer. The motion was argued in a mock trial in the biocyberethics session at the 
International Bar Association conference.
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We can measure certain correlates of subjective experience (for example, certain patterns of objectively 
measurable neurological activity with objectively verifiable reports of certain subjective experiences, such as hearing a 
sound). But we cannot penetrate to the core of subjective experience through objective measurement. As I mentioned 
in chapter 1, we are dealing with the difference between third-person "objective" experience, which is the basis of 
science, and first-person "subjective" experience, which is a synonym for consciousness. 
Consider that we are unable to truly experience the subjective experiences of others. The experience-beaming 
technology of 2029 will enable the brain of one person to experience only the 
sensory
experiences (and potentially 
some of the neurological correlates of emotions and other aspects of experience) of another person. But that will still 
not convey the same