11
The Court adopted its advisory opinion by seven to five. It found that the classical
theory of unanimous consent could not be applied to the Genocide Convention.
"The character
of a multilateral convention, its purpose […] and adoption, are
factors which must be considered in determining […] the possibility of making
reservations."
12
In the preparatory works of the convention the Court found
evidence to support the fact that reservations had been contemplated, and since it
was the GA's and the state parties’ intention that as many states as possible
would participate, it was inconceivable to enable
an objection to a minor
reservation to exclude one or more states, and thus to restrict the scope of the
Convention and detract from the authority of the principle upon which it was
based.
13
The Court rejected an interpretation that would result in excluding a state for
making a minor reservation, and said: "But even less could the contracting parties
have intended to sacrifice the very object of the Convention in favor (sic!) of a
vain desire to secure as many participants as possible."
14
The object and purpose
of a convention limited both the freedom to make reservations
and the freedom to
object to them. The Court identified two evils between which the application of
the "object and purpose test" would steer. Reservations are accepted that
frustrates the purpose of the treaty. Objections have the effect of excluding the
reserving state even when the reservations are minor and compatible with the
purpose of the treaty. By saying "but even less", the Court implied that the evils
are not equal, implying that the former is somewhat greater. The conclusion of the
Court was that there was no absolute answer.
The answer depended on the
circumstances of each case.
15
The Court said that if it finds the reservation to be incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty, the objecting state may consider that the reserving state
is not a party. Each state is entitled individually to appraise the validity of a
reservation, and since no state can be bound by a reservation to which it has not
consented, each objecting state will consider either that the reserving state is a
party to the treaty or that it is not. This decision will only affect the relationship
between the objecting and the reserving states. Thus,
in the opinion of the Court,
the objection of a single contracting party could not prevent another contracting
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