The Language of Law School This page intentionally left blank

Making and Molding Identity
, 17–18.
68. Here again, in Silversteinian terminology, I am arguing not for “translation” but
for even just a very rudimentary attempt at laying the groundwork for “transduction.” For
an economist’s call for more humility in the interpretation and use of social science by
those in legal arenas, see Donahue, “The Case for More and Better Empirical Research.”
69. For a discussion of the empirical evidence revealing growing alienation and cor-
responding differences in orientations between attorneys and laypeople, see Daicoff, 
Law-
yer, Know Thyself
. Elkins’s early article pointed out the problematic character of the lawyer’s
persona: “The lawyer considers himself a neutral, rational, and objective problem solver
. . . representing certain events in the world . . . [by] structuring all possible human rela-
tions into the form of claims and counterclaims.” Elkins, “The Legal Persona,” 739. Un-
fortunately, as Elkins points out, the “myth of rationality in the legal profession is founded
on a model of human behavior” that omits unconscious and nonrational motivation and
behavior: “Like classical economic theory, it views man as totally rational and influenced
in his decisionmaking only by external objective factors,” whereas both lawyers and their
clients operate in the world using a combination of internal and external, rational and other
guideposts. Id. See also Menkel-Meadow, “What’s Missing,” on the importance of the
“human arts” of lawyering, and Noonan, 
Persons and Masks of the Law
, on the importance
of viewing rationality in the context of larger humanity. This may have contributed to the
ironic situation that current legal thinking has moved closer to that of economics at the
price of more realistic understanding of (and communication with) law’s intended sub-
jects, who, as Daicoff points out, tend to differ considerably in their orientation.
Notes to Pages 222–223
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