Politics
Jewish involvement in political life in Libya was limited and tended to be
among the European or Zionist circles rather than among the Muslims.
Most of the Jews were small craftsmen and traders who were not inter-
ested in politics. Moreover, most of the men received only limited tradi-
tional Jewish education, which hindered their involvement in the politi-
cal life of the society surrounding them. Those Jews who showed some
interest in political involvement were often graduates of the European
educational institutions, and many of them held European citizenship.
They distanced themselves from the local Muslim population and only
a few tried to get involved in politics. In the mid-twentieth century this
involvement resulted to a large extent from British pressure and fear for
the destiny of the community if its members would not show favor to the
political national process in Libya. Still, most Jews were careful not to be
openly identified with any Libyan political grouping: it seemed to them
that the safest approach would be not to express any political position.
One can divide the political activity during the late Ottoman period
into two phases: before the 1908 Young Turk revolution and after it. In
the first period, and especially under the rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II
(1876–1909), the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire were careful to re-
frain from overt political activity that could be regarded as subversive.
Overall, Ottoman Jews were considered to be a loyal element of the
population. During the Hamidian period, Libya was one of the Otto-
man provinces to which political exiles and prisoners were sent following
purges in the centers of power. Consequently, echoes of Ottoman national
political activities of Jews in Libya can be found among Jewish political
exiles who were sent there from the center of the empire.
35
Most of the
Muslim population rejected the exiles, and this tendency was manifested
following the Young Turk revolution.
36
On the other hand, between 1900
and 1904 there were some signs of budding Zionist activity in Libya. This
involved a few foreign citizens who established contacts with the Central
Zionist Organization, but their activity did not receive much response.
Jewish-Muslim Relations in Libya · 185
Zionist activity did not really penetrate Libya at that period, possibly due
to fear of retribution by the authorities.
37
Following the Young Turk revolution there was at least one local Jew,
in Benghazi, who was involved in Young Turk circles.
38
Other Jews were
ready to participate in evening courses in Turkish organized by Turkish
officers and officials for the local population.
39
This apparently was the
extent of local Jewish involvement in Young Turk activities in Libya. In
contrast to the limited participation of Libyan Jews in the political life
of the Ottoman regime, some Jews who held Italian citizenship demon-
strated more energetic involvement in propaganda in favor of Italian rule
in Libya. These included editors and journalists who following the 1908
revolution founded local periodicals, which were financed by the Italian
consulate general in Tripoli. These periodicals praised the Italian policy
toward Libya and even called for the strengthening of its presence and
influence in the region.
40
During the Italian period, most Jews did not support the Muslim anti-
Italian uprising, although the few who lived in rebel-controlled areas
had no other choice. In general, the community supported the Italian
regime, even when its character changed as the Fascists gained power in
1922. Still, many Libyan Jews were angry with the Italian regime, which
refrained from providing them with Italian citizenship. Thus there was
no significant Jewish involvement in political life in Libya, though some
Jews were members of the Fascist Party and attended its clubs. Even
when the regime changed its attitude toward the Jews and started to leg-
islate anti-Semitic racial legislation in 1938, the essential Jewish support
for Italy did not change: they presumed that this new policy was forced
upon Italy by Germany, and their belief was strengthened by the fact that
the authorities in Libya had reservations regarding this policy and were
slow to implement it.
The Italian authorities tried to prevent the development in Libya of
competing non-Italian nationalism—especially Libyan nationalism—
mainly by leadership liquidation and regional isolation. Leaders of the
Muslim revolt were killed, imprisoned or in exile and the regime made it
difficult for local Muslims to be in contact with Muslims outside Libya.
As a result, the knowledge and interest of Libyan Muslims regarding
the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine were poor and did not have reper-
cussions on Jewish-Muslim relations in Libya. Zionist activity was not
regarded as a threat to the Italian regime, and it developed in Libya as
186 · Rachel Simon
a branch of the Italian Zionist Association.
41
The number of registered
Libyan Zionists was not high, but their influence on education and cul-
ture was strong. The desire to learn Hebrew and literature increased,
especially among the youth. This activity, which was cultural-social in
essence, did not arouse objections from the Italian authorities or the Mus-
lims, who were not interested in the cultural life of the Jews—just as the
Jews were not interested in Muslim cultural activities.
National awakening among the Muslim population of Libya re-
emerged during the BMA, with the return of political exiles. Arab politi-
cal life was also strengthened by the Arab clerks and technicians, mainly
from Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, who came to Libya during this period
and manned middle ranks in the military and administration (the “Red
Fezes”). Political life, however, was different in the various parts of Libya.
In the east, Idris al-Sanusi, whose base of support was in Cyrenaica, stood
for moderate and conservative policy. In the west, the young nationalist
Tripolitanians were more radical in their politics and wanted to sweep
the masses to their side in any possible way. As a result, the character
of political activity in eastern and western Libya developed differently.
Moreover, the support in Tripolitania was divided among several lead-
ers and groups, often leading to vocal and extreme politics. In Cyrena-
ica, on the other hand, Idris was then the undisputed dominant figure,
advocating moderation. Thus the struggle among the various political
groups in Tripolitania radicalized local ideology and activity. The vari-
ous Muslim political streams wished to get the support of the masses in
their positions in the ideological struggle over the future political char-
acter of Libya. Since the political vigilance of the Muslims of Libya was
dulled under Italian rule, there was a greater importance than usual for
the Tripolitanian nationalists to draw support to their side by taking ad-
vantage of the economic crisis. The Jews, who were known to support
Italy, became a victim in this struggle for political power, because some
of them grew very rich following World War II and the British occupation
and were blamed by some Tripolitanian leaders for the hardship of the
masses. One can say that the November 1945 riots broke to a large extent
on this economic background, to which was added nationalist commen-
tary, anti-Jewish in part. In this early stage, anti-Semitic undertones were
not emphasized by the Muslims. During the 1948 and 1967 disturbances,
the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine took center stage. During the early
stages of the Libyan national struggle, the Tripolitanian population was
Jewish-Muslim Relations in Libya · 187
not interested in developments outside its narrow boundaries, but the
new leadership hoped to take advantage of broadening the scope of in-
terests to include developments in the Arab and Muslim worlds. For that
reason there was extensive reporting in the Tripolitan Arab press on the
eve of the November 1945 riots on the situation in Palestine, stating that
the partition plan there would cause the liquidation of Jewish life in Arab
lands. There was also a widespread reporting on the 2 November Balfour
Day demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria, which were accompanied
by violence, robbery, and the arson of synagogues.
42
This was the begin-
ning of having national issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, take
center stage in the attention of the masses in Libya.
The Jewish community had usually kept a neutral stand during the
struggle over the political future of Libya. Most Jews, though, hoped that
Italian rule would resume, because they regarded the period of Italian
rule as very comfortable, secure, and flourishing, despite the calamities
of WWII. Still, there were some expressions of support for Libyan na-
tionalism in the community, mainly from official representatives of the
community.
43
The British wanted to use education in order to bolster Libyan na-
tionalism toward the establishment of an independent Arab Libyan
state. Their goal was to create a national education system for all the
inhabitants of Libya, with the exception of the Italian citizens, based on
the Arab educational system. This decision meant the liquidation of a
separate Jewish-Hebrew education within the framework of state edu-
cation.
44
The British claimed that the Jews should be integrated in the
Arab society and that in Cyrenaica they should be “Sanusis of the Mo-
saic Religion.” Still, the British agreed that Jews would be allowed eight
out of thirty-four hours a week for Jewish studies. Arab educators from
Palestine were invited to plan the Arab education system of Libya. One
result of this was the increased awareness by the local Arab population
of developments in Palestine. The British authorities refused to provide
state funding for separate Jewish schools, on the grounds that Hebrew,
contrary to Arabic and Italian, was not an official language in Libya. As
a result, the Jews, who wanted to preserve their unique identity, decided
to get communal and external funding for their schools, mainly from AIU
and the American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC), and operate a
private educational system in order to maintain its independence. In late
1945, because of the riots and the increase of Arab nationalism, Jewish
188 · Rachel Simon
schools were afraid to demonstrate Hebrew identity and Zionism. As a
result, the Benghazi Hebrew School decided that pictures and maps with
Zionist connotations should be removed from the walls, the “Blue Box”
for the collection of donations to the Jewish National Fund disappeared,
and teachers forbade the students to sing Hebrew songs in the street. The
Arab teachers, who taught Arabic in the Hebrew schools, felt they were
setting the tone, and the Jews hesitated to respond to it.
45
Already in 1943, Libyan patriotism started to have implications on the
behavior of Libyan Jews. On Fridays and Muslim holidays, national flags
were raised in Benghazi on all shops, Arab and Jewish alike. The Jews
were afraid to raise Zionist flags or do anything that could be viewed as
separating them from the Muslim majority.
46
If one could interpret the
raising of local flags and the avoidance of Hebrew and Zionist manifes-
tations as a wish not to annoy the Muslims, this is not the case with the
clear support of the Jewish communal council of Tripoli—and especially
of its president, Zachino Habib—for the establishment of an indepen-
dent Libyan state.
47
In early 1946 Habib initiated Jewish support for the
“United Libyan Front,” which called for the unity and independence of
all Libyan provinces. Ex post facto it was realized that this move had
brought a temporary easing of the tension between Arabs and Jews. The
readiness of the official representatives of the Jewish community to ac-
cept the Arab demands for Libyan independence was manifested also
during the meetings of this leadership with the UN delegation of the
committee of inquiry which was sent to Libya. The representatives of
the Tripoli community stated in March 1948 that the community sup-
ported an independent Arab state in Libya.
48
The six representatives of
the Benghazi community stated on 30 April 1948 that the community
supported Libyan independence and keeping contact with the National
Arab Congress and emphasized their good relations with the Arabs.
49
These positions, though, did not represent the views of the majority of
the community, most of which wanted the return of the Italian regime.
But due to the feeling of increased insecurity, many preferred to leave
Libya immediately and permanently.
There was much nervousness in late 1947 in the Jewish community
due to the growing anti-Jewish atmosphere. Although there were no clear
signs of an organized movement against the Jews, the masses tended to
frighten them. In October 1947 announcements were distributed in Beng-
hazi, calling for the establishment of a conscription center for volunteers
Jewish-Muslim Relations in Libya · 189
to fight on the Arab side in Palestine. The Muslims were called to unite in
the struggle for Allah in order to purify the world from the Jews. It was
also stated there that the Jews had established a government in Palestine
and with the protection of the treacherous authorities of the British Man-
datory regime were active in suppressing the Muslims subject to them.
50
A further deterioration in Arab-Jewish relations in Cyrenaica occurred
in 1948, and the British authorities attributed this to the developments
in Palestine. There were also minor incidents, which the president of
the Benghazi Jewish council defined as discrimination in trade on racial
background and which caused a deterioration of the economic status of
the Jews.
51
These developments increased the Jews’ desire to emigrate to
Israel.
Following the British approval of free emigration from Libya to Israel,
official representatives of the state of Israel and the Jewish Agency came
to Libya in early 1949. They operated in Libya freely without hiding their
identity: their offices bore public signs and the Israeli Independence Day
was celebrated with local Muslim officials in attendance. The Israeli rep-
resentatives met with senior government officials, including ministers. In
late 1951 there were some officials in Israel who hoped that this represen-
tation could remain and operate in Libya after independence and even
become an official representation of the state of Israel. The Israeli immi-
gration officer in Libya felt reinforced in this belief when he referred to
himself as the representative of the state of Israel in his blessings to King
Idris on his birthday and as Idris thanked him using the same term.
52
This event, however, resulted from an oversight and did not reflect an
official Libyan policy toward Israel. Although the Libyans continued to
treat the Israeli and Jewish Agency representatives with respect, and the
latter were even invited to the Libyan Independence Day celebrations,
53
it was made clear to them that once the mass emigration from Libya to
Israel was concluded, their task would also be complete. The emissaries
were not expelled, but the entrance of their replacements was not ap-
proved, and official Israeli presence in Libya ended in late 1952.
Economy
Economic interdependence, based on professional specialization, devel-
oped between the Jewish minority and the Muslim majority in Libya.
Until the departure of the Jews from Libya, they were in charge of most
190 · Rachel Simon
trade. Thus, some 80 to 90 percent of the trade houses in Tripoli were
in Jewish hands. The indigenous Muslims were mainly farmers and
herdsmen—as well as administrators, soldiers, and policemen. The vital
economic role of the Jews got them the protection of the society among
which they lived. Jewish peddlers made their lengthy rounds in the coun-
tryside safely, sometime returning home only for the High Holidays and
Passover. The trust was mutual: Jewish peddlers were the sole non-kin
males who were allowed to have direct contact in private with Muslim
women, and when peddlers spent the night with Muslims, their hosts
knew which foods were allowed to Jews.
54
Still, there were many in-
stances of tension resulting from Jewish control over trade, capital, and
some crafts. Violence on this background was manifested mainly at times
of political and security unrest—mainly in the late Ottoman period and
the BMA—when the protection of the authorities was not always mani-
fested in a decisive manner. In these periods, incidents of robbery and
murder of Jewish peddlers and moneylenders increased as did attempts
to seize control over Jewish real estate in the countryside.
The vital economic role of the Jews was felt especially when they re-
frained from work or migrated in protest of government policy or ha-
rassment by their neighbors. During the late Ottoman period, the Jews
held several prayer assemblies in protest of decrees imposed by the au-
thorities. These gatherings of the whole community caused a complete
economic standstill in Tripoli and forced the authorities to withdraw
the decrees.
55
In another case, the Jews left the town of Zawiyah because
of Muslim religious scheming; once the Muslims felt that their economic
life depended on the Jews, they promised not to plot against them once
they returned.
56
When the mass Jewish emigration started in 1949, the
Muslim population, especially in the small towns and villages of the
hinterland, expressed fears regarding the loss of the economic services
that the Jews used to provide.
57
After 1952, most of Libya remained
without Jews. Many Muslims entered into partnerships with the small
number of remaining Jews, mainly the wealthiest, who continued to
control big businesses, especially international trade and the growing oil
market, but gradually Muslims took over economic positions vacated by
Jews.
In order to prevent the escape of capital from Libya during the mass
Jewish emigration, the authorities limited to £250 the amount of capi-
tal and property that a family was allowed to take out of the country.
Jewish-Muslim Relations in Libya · 191
The authorities tried to prevent the escape of Jewish capital by putting
property whose owners had left Libya under state custodianship and at
risk of expropriation. Warnings to this effect had been voiced by Libyan
leaders already in 1952, and real measures were taken from 1961 on. In
order not to be accused of anti-Jewish legislation, the laws which were
legislated for this purpose were not explicitly against Jews but covered
all those who had left Libya, especially those who had kept contacts with
an enemy state: Israel. These developments coincided with Libya’s join-
ing the Arab boycott against Israel, which in 1957 opened an office in
Tripoli overseeing the boycott. The law of 21 March 1961 put under the
Custodian over Enemy Property all the possessions of anyone who had
emigrated to Israel or who maintained contact with it. Additional laws
forbade real estate businesses with Jews, and companies had to include
on their board at least 51 percent Libyan citizens, namely, Muslims. The
situation had aggravated further following Mu῾ammar al-Qaḍafi’s 1
September 1969 revolution. On 7 February 1970, the property of anyone
living permanently outside Libya was put under state custodianship.
Following a number of additional statutes, the legislative process was
completed with the 21 July 1970 law that returned to the Libyan people
all the properties that were put under custodianship. The law stated that
the government would establish a committee that would decide on com-
pensation for these properties in the form of government bonds, to be
paid off in fifteen years. Such a committee was never established, and no
compensation was ever paid.
58
At that stage there were virtually no Jews left in Libya. Some 6,000
Jews, most of them very wealthy, left Libya in June 1967 following the Six
Day War, when they were allowed to take with them only £20 each. Until
that time, they continued to control the international trade, and many of
the trading houses in Libya were owned by Jews, although they usually
had to operate with a Muslim partner. The growing oil market of the
1960s also benefited many of the Jews who remained in Libya, some of
whom became extremely wealthy. A large number of this group moved to
Italy in the late 1960s, and some of them continued to be active in the eco-
nomic life of Libya from their new base, with the help of local partners.
Thus, from a state of Jewish-Muslim economic interdependence, Libya
became the owner of Jewish property, with only a few Libyan Jews, who
were by then living in Italy, still involved in Libya’s economy as condi-
tions allowed.
192 · Rachel Simon
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