The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

12.3.1.  A Legal–Cultural Explanation: Text, Structure 

and Australia’s Partial Bill of Rights

One possible explanation is legal–cultural: it rests on the limited express sup-

port in the language and structure of the Australian Constitution for the pro-

tection of individual rights together with the influence of the Engineers’ Case, 

an early decision of the High Court emphasising the centrality of ‘text and 

structure’ in Australian constitutional interpretation.

12.3.1.1.  Limited Express Textual Recognition of Rights

Compared to many modern democratic constitutions, the text of the Australian 

Constitution provides limited support for the High Court to play a robust role in 

the protection of individual rights. It is sometimes suggested that Australia is now 

the only constitutional democracy in the world without a written Bill of Rights. 

70 

See Gummow and Hayne JJ in Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case) 

(1998) 19 CLR 336. Contrast Kirby J.

71 

See e.g., discussion in 

ibid.

 (Kirby J, dissenting). See also Expert Panel on Constitutional Rec-

ognition of Indigenous Australians, Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in 

the Constitution (2012) ch. 2; Australian Human Rights Commission, Can International Com-

parison of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (2008); M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in  

the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equiv-

alent Protections in National Constitutions’ (1993) 3 Duke Journal of Comparative and Inter-

national Law 235, 258–9.

72 

Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians, note 71, chs 4, 6; Ref-

erendum Council, Final Report (2017).

---

360 

Rosalind Dixon and Gabrielle Appleby

But as one of us has suggested elsewhere, this statement is also somewhat mis-

leading: Australia does in fact have at least four express constitutional rights 

guarantees that, together, could readily be considered a narrow or ‘partial’ bill 

of rights. The text of the Constitution explicitly guarantees a right to trial by 

jury in certain Commonwealth trials (section 80), a right to freedom of reli-

gion (section 116), freedom of movement across state lines (section 117) and 

protection of the right to property against acquisitions by the Commonwealth, 

other than on just terms (section 51(xxxi)).

73

What is striking about these provisions, however, is their extreme narrow-

ness in both comparative and democratic terms. Where international human 

rights law, and most modern democratic constitutions, protect a range of due 

process rights or rights on the part of criminal defendants, section 80 of the 

Australian Constitution guarantees a trial by jury for Commonwealth indicta-

ble offences, where the Commonwealth Parliament itself defines an offence 

as triable on indictment.

74

 Further, the Court has historically divided over the 

purpose of the guarantee in section 80, whether it is an individual right – ‘a 

protection of the citizen’ against the power of the government

75

 – or whether 

it is an institutional guarantee, of predominantly ‘public concern’, protect-

ing the standards, integrity and impartiality of the administration of criminal 

justice.

76

Where international and comparative law gives strong protection to reli-

gious liberty, against any form of unreasonable limitation, section 116 of the 

Australian Constitution simply prohibits the Commonwealth Parliament from 

passing laws with the purpose of imposing undue burdens on religious liberty. 

And where international and comparative human rights instruments protect 

broad rights to individual liberty, dignity and equality, the Commonwealth 

Constitution protects only rights to property and free movement across state 

lines. The narrowness of the Australian Constitution, in this context, is also far 

from supported by contemporary democratic understandings of rights.

77

73 

See further discussion in George Williams and David Hume, Human Rights under the Aus-