The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal of NSW v. Henderson; Ex parte Defence Housing Authority 

(Henderson’s Case) (1997) 190 CLR 410.

45 

Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557. The Court in this 

context also cited s 128, on the Amendment of the Constitution, and ss 1, 8, 13, 15 and 30: see 

at 557.

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354 

Rosalind Dixon and Gabrielle Appleby

The Court thus emphasised the importance of grounding the implied princi-

ple and rules in the constitutional text, rather than extraneous constitutional 

principles such as ‘democracy’ or even ‘representative government’.

The Court in Lange held that, in ascertaining whether this freedom of 

communication was infringed by Commonwealth or state law, it was neces-

sary to ask two questions: whether a law ‘effectively burden[s] freedom of com-

munication about government or political matters either in its terms operation 

or effect’ and if so, whether it is ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a 

legitimate end the fulfilment of which is compatible with the maintenance of 

the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible gov-

ernment on the procedure prescribed by section 128 for submitting a proposed 

amendment of the Constitution to the informed decision of the people’.

46

Since then, the Court has restated and refined this test,

47

 most recently 

in 2015 by suggesting that the notion of a law being ‘reasonably appropriated 

and adapted’ to its end can best be understood as a requirement of reasonable 

proportionality – i.e., as requiring the law be suitable and narrowly tailored to 

a legitimate end, and achieve an adequate balance between that end and the 

implied freedom.

48

 

The Court has been quite consistent in adopting a broad approach to the 

first stage of the inquiry invited by Lange. The Court has held that the implied 

freedom is broad enough to protect a protest against duck shooting within a 

legally restricted zone;

49

 virulent criticism of the conduct of individual police 

officers;

50

 political campaign donations;

51

 statements to the media by a person 

on parole;

52

 religious leafleting in a public shopping mall;

53

 and ‘offensive’ 

communication via the post of the families of deceased Australian military 

officers, criticising their conduct and that of the Australian government in 

military activities overseas.

54

 While the Court has often gone on to uphold the 

legislative restriction of communication of this kind as reasonably appropriate 

and adapted or proportionate to serving a legitimate government end, it has 

46 

Ibid.

, 567.

47 

Coleman v. Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 51 (McHugh J); Brown v. Tasmania [2017] HCA 43, [104] 

(Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ); [156] (Gageler J).

48 

See McCloy v. New South Wales (2015) 89 ALJR 857, 862ff (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane 

JJ).

49 

Levy v. Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579.

50 

Coleman v. Power (2004) 220 CLR 1.

51 

Union NSW v. New South Wales (2013) 252 CLR 530; McCloy v. New South Wales (2015) 89 

ALJR 857.

52 

Wotton v. Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1.

53